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Acceleration of the flow of ice drives mass losses in both the Antarctic and the Greenland Ice Sheet. The projections of possible future sea-level rise rely on numerical ice-sheet models, which solve the physics of ice flow, melt, and calving. While major advancements have been made by the ice-sheet modeling community in addressing several of the related uncertainties, the flow law, which is at the center of most process-based ice-sheet models, is not in the focus of the current scientific debate. However, recent studies show that the flow law parameters are highly uncertain and might be different from the widely accepted standard values. Here, we use an idealized flow-line setup to investigate how these uncertainties in the flow law translate into uncertainties in flow-driven mass loss. In order to disentangle the effect of future warming on the ice flow from other effects, we perform a suite of experiments with the Parallel Ice Sheet Model (PISM), deliberately excluding changes in the surface mass balance. We find that changes in the flow parameters within the observed range can lead up to a doubling of the flow-driven mass loss within the first centuries of warming, compared to standard parameters. The spread of ice loss due to the uncertainty in flow parameters is on the same order of magnitude as the increase in mass loss due to surface warming. While this study focuses on an idealized flow-line geometry, it is likely that this uncertainty carries over to realistic three-dimensional simulations of Greenland and Antarctica.
We present the Potsdam Parallel Ice Sheet Model (PISM-PIK), developed at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research to be used for simulations of large-scale ice sheet-shelf systems. It is derived from the Parallel Ice Sheet Model (Bueler and Brown, 2009). Velocities are calculated by superposition of two shallow stress balance approximations within the entire ice covered region: the shallow ice approximation (SIA) is dominant in grounded regions and accounts for shear deformation parallel to the geoid. The plug-flow type shallow shelf approximation (SSA) dominates the velocity field in ice shelf regions and serves as a basal sliding velocity in grounded regions. Ice streams can be identified diagnostically as regions with a significant contribution of membrane stresses to the local momentum balance. All lateral boundaries in PISM-PIK are free to evolve, including the grounding line and ice fronts. Ice shelf margins in particular are modeled using Neumann boundary conditions for the SSA equations, reflecting a hydrostatic stress imbalance along the vertical calving face. The ice front position is modeled using a subgrid-scale representation of calving front motion (Albrecht et al., 2011) and a physically-motivated calving law based on horizontal spreading rates. The model is tested in experiments from the Marine Ice Sheet Model Intercomparison Project (MISMIP). A dynamic equilibrium simulation of Antarctica under present-day conditions is presented in Martin et al. (2011).
Anthropogenic climate change is likely to cause continuing global sea level rise(1), but some processes within the Earth system may mitigate the magnitude of the projected effect. Regional and global climate models simulate enhanced snowfall over Antarctica, which would provide a direct offset of the future contribution to global sea level rise from cryospheric mass loss(2,3) and ocean expansion(4). Uncertainties exist in modelled snowfall(5), but even larger uncertainties exist in the potential changes of dynamic ice discharge from Antarctica(1,6) and thus in the ultimate fate of the precipitation-deposited ice mass. Here we show that snowfall and discharge are not independent, but that future ice discharge will increase by up to three times as a result of additional snowfall under global warming. Our results, based on an ice-sheet model(7) forced by climate simulations through to the end of 2500 (ref. 8), show that the enhanced discharge effect exceeds the effect of surface warming as well as that of basal ice-shelf melting, and is due to the difference in surface elevation change caused by snowfall on grounded versus floating ice. Although different underlying forcings drive ice loss from basal melting versus increased snowfall, similar ice dynamical processes are nonetheless at work in both; therefore results are relatively independent of the specific representation of the transition zone. In an ensemble of simulations designed to capture ice-physics uncertainty, the additional dynamic ice loss along the coastline compensates between 30 and 65 per cent of the ice gain due to enhanced snowfall over the entire continent. This results in a dynamic ice loss of up to 1.25 metres in the year 2500 for the strongest warming scenario. The reported effect thus strongly counters a potential negative contribution to global sea level by the Antarctic Ice Sheet.
Increasing Earth’s surface air temperature yields an intensification of its hydrological cycle. As a consequence, the risk of river floods will increase regionally within the next two decades due to the atmospheric warming caused by past anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. The direct economic losses caused by these floods can yield regionally heterogeneous losses and gains by propagation within the global trade and supply network. Here we show that, in the absence of large-scale structural adaptation, the total economic losses due to fluvial floods will increase in the next 20 years globally by 17% despite partial compensation through market adjustment within the global trade network. China will suffer the strongest direct losses, with an increase of 82%. The United States is mostly affected indirectly through its trade relations. By contrast to the United States, recent intensification of the trade relations with China leaves the European Union better prepared for the import of production losses in the future.
Earth’s surface temperature will continue to rise for another 20 to 30 years even with the strongest carbon emission reduction currently considered. The associated changes in rainfall patterns can result in an increased flood risk worldwide. We compute the required increase in flood protection to keep high-end fluvial flood risk at present levels. The analysis is carried out worldwide for subnational administrative units. Most of the United States, Central Europe, and Northeast and West Africa, as well as large parts of India and Indonesia, require the strongest adaptation effort. More than half of the United States needs to at least double their protection within the next two decades. Thus, the need for adaptation to increased river flood is a global problem affecting industrialized regions as much as developing countries.
Increasing greenhouse gas emissions are likely to impact not only natural systems but economies worldwide. If these impacts alter future economic development, the financial losses will be significantly higher than the mere direct damages. So far, potentially aggravating investment responses were considered negligible. Here we consistently incorporate an empirically derived temperature-growth relation into the simple integrated assessment model DICE. In this framework we show that, if in the next eight decades varying temperatures impact economic growth as has been observed in the past three decades, income is reduced by similar to 20% compared to an economy unaffected by climate change. Hereof similar to 40% are losses due to growth effects of which similar to 50% result from reduced incentive to invest. This additional income loss arises from a reduced incentive for future investment in anticipation of a reduced return and not from an explicit climate protection policy. Under economically optimal climate-change mitigation, however, optimal investment would only be reduced marginally as mitigation efforts keep returns high.
Regional and sectoral disaggregation of multi-regional input-output tables - a flexible algorithm
(2015)
A common shortcoming of available multi-regional input-output (MRIO) data sets is their lack of regional and sectoral detail required for many research questions (e.g. in the field of disaster impact analysis). We present a simple algorithm to refine MRIO tables regionally and/or sectorally. By the use of proxy data, each MRIO flow in question is disaggregated into the corresponding sub-flows. This downscaling procedure is complemented by an adjustment rule ensuring that the sub-flows match the superordinate flow in sum. The approximation improves along several iteration steps. The algorithm unfolds its strength through the flexible combination of multiple, possibly incomplete proxy data sources. It is also flexible in a sense that any target sector and region resolution can be chosen. As an exemplary case we apply the algorithm to a regional and sectoral refinement of the Eora MRIO database.
After the United Kingdom has left the European Union it remains unclear whether the two parties can successfully negotiate and sign a trade agreement within the transition period. Ongoing negotiations, practical obstacles and resulting uncertainties make it highly unlikely that economic actors would be fully prepared to a “no-trade-deal” situation. Here we provide an economic shock simulation of the immediate aftermath of such a post-Brexit no-trade-deal scenario by computing the time evolution of more than 1.8 million interactions between more than 6,600 economic actors in the global trade network. We find an abrupt decline in the number of goods produced in the UK and the EU. This sudden output reduction is caused by drops in demand as customers on the respective other side of the Channel incorporate the new trade restriction into their decision-making. As a response, producers reduce prices in order to stimulate demand elsewhere. In the short term consumers benefit from lower prices but production value decreases with potentially severe socio-economic consequences in the longer term.
After the United Kingdom has left the European Union it remains unclear whether the two parties can successfully negotiate and sign a trade agreement within the transition period. Ongoing negotiations, practical obstacles and resulting uncertainties make it highly unlikely that economic actors would be fully prepared to a “no-trade-deal” situation. Here we provide an economic shock simulation of the immediate aftermath of such a post-Brexit no-trade-deal scenario by computing the time evolution of more than 1.8 million interactions between more than 6,600 economic actors in the global trade network. We find an abrupt decline in the number of goods produced in the UK and the EU. This sudden output reduction is caused by drops in demand as customers on the respective other side of the Channel incorporate the new trade restriction into their decision-making. As a response, producers reduce prices in order to stimulate demand elsewhere. In the short term consumers benefit from lower prices but production value decreases with potentially severe socio-economic consequences in the longer term.
There is growing empirical evidence that anthropogenic climate change will substantially affect the electric sector. Impacts will stem both from the supply sidethrough the mitigation of greenhouse gasesand from the demand sidethrough adaptive responses to a changing environment. Here we provide evidence of a polarization of both peak load and overall electricity consumption under future warming for the worlds third-largest electricity marketthe 35 countries of Europe. We statistically estimate country-level doseresponse functions between daily peak/total electricity load and ambient temperature for the period 2006-2012. After removing the impact of nontemperature confounders and normalizing the residual load data for each country, we estimate a common doseresponse function, which we use to compute national electricity loads for temperatures that lie outside each countrys currently observed temperature range. To this end, we impose end-of-century climate on todays European economies following three different greenhouse-gas concentration trajectories, ranging from ambitious climate-change mitigationin line with the Paris agreementto unabated climate change. We find significant increases in average daily peak load and overall electricity consumption in southern and western Europe (similar to 3 to similar to 7% for Portugal and Spain) and significant decreases in northern Europe (similar to-6 to similar to-2% for Sweden and Norway). While the projected effect on European total consumption is nearly zero, the significant polarization and seasonal shifts in peak demand and consumption have important ramifications for the location of costly peak-generating capacity, transmission infrastructure, and the design of energy-efficiency policy and storage capacity.
Assessing global impacts of unexpected meteorological events in an increasingly connected world economy is important for estimating the costs of climate change. We show that since the beginning of the 21st century, the structural evolution of the global supply network has been such as to foster an increase of climate-related production losses. We compute first- and higher-order losses from heat stress-induced reductions in productivity under changing economic and climatic conditions between 1991 and 2011. Since 2001, the economic connectivity has augmented in such a way as to facilitate the cascading of production loss. The influence of this structural change has dominated over the effect of the comparably weak climate warming during this decade. Thus, particularly under future warming, the intensification of international trade has the potential to amplify climate losses if no adaptation measures are taken.
Both climate-change damages and climate-change mitigation will incur economic costs. While the risk of severe damages increases with the level of global warming (Dell et al., 2014; IPCC, 2014b, 2018; Lenton et al., 2008), mitigating costs increase steeply with more stringent warming limits (IPCC, 2014a; Luderer et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 2015). Here, we show that the global warming limit that minimizes this century's total economic costs of climate change lies between 1.9 and 2 ∘C, if temperature changes continue to impact national economic growth rates as observed in the past and if instantaneous growth effects are neither compensated nor amplified by additional growth effects in the following years. The result is robust across a wide range of normative assumptions on the valuation of future welfare and inequality aversion. We combine estimates of climate-change impacts on economic growth for 186 countries (applying an empirical damage function from Burke et al., 2015) with mitigation costs derived from a state-of-the-art energy–economy–climate model with a wide range of highly resolved mitigation options (Kriegler et al., 2017; Luderer et al., 2013, 2015). Our purely economic assessment, even though it omits non-market damages, provides support for the international Paris Agreement on climate change. The political goal of limiting global warming to “well below 2 degrees” is thus also an economically optimal goal given above assumptions on adaptation and damage persistence.
Anthropogenic carbon emissions lock in long-term sea-level rise that greatly exceeds projections for this century, posing profound challenges for coastal development and cultural legacies. Analysis based on previously published relationships linking emissions to warming and warming to rise indicates that unabated carbon emissions up to the year 2100 would commit an eventual global sea-level rise of 4.3-9.9 m. Based on detailed topographic and population data, local high tide lines, and regional long-term sea-level commitment for different carbon emissions and ice sheet stability scenarios, we compute the current population living on endangered land at municipal, state, and national levels within the United States. For unabated climate change, we find that land that is home to more than 20 million people is implicated and is widely distributed among different states and coasts. The total area includes 1,185-1,825 municipalities where land that is home to more than half of the current population would be affected, among them at least 21 cities exceeding 100,000 residents. Under aggressive carbon cuts, more than half of these municipalities would avoid this commitment if the West Antarctic Ice Sheet remains stable. Similarly, more than half of the US population-weighted area under threat could be spared. We provide lists of implicated cities and state populations for different emissions scenarios and with and without a certain collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet. Although past anthropogenic emissions already have caused sea-level commitment that will force coastal cities to adapt, future emissions will determine which areas we can continue to occupy or may have to abandon.
Thawing of permafrost and the associated release of carbon constitutes a positive feedback in the climate system, elevating the effect of anthropogenic GHG emissions on global-mean temperatures. Multiple factors have hindered the quantification of this feedback, which was not included in climate carbon-cycle models which participated in recent model intercomparisons (such as the Coupled Carbon Cycle Climate Model Intercomparison Project - (CMIP)-M-4). There are considerable uncertainties in the rate and extent of permafrost thaw, the hydrological and vegetation response to permafrost thaw, the decomposition timescales of freshly thawed organic material, the proportion of soil carbon that might be emitted as carbon dioxide via aerobic decomposition or as methane via anaerobic decomposition, and in the magnitude of the high latitude amplification of global warming that will drive permafrost degradation. Additionally, there are extensive and poorly characterized regional heterogeneities in soil properties, carbon content, and hydrology. Here, we couple a new permafrost module to a reduced complexity carbon-cycle climate model, which allows us to perform a large ensemble of simulations. The ensemble is designed to span the uncertainties listed above and thereby the results provide an estimate of the potential strength of the feedback from newly thawed permafrost carbon. For the high CO2 concentration scenario (RCP8.5), 33-114 GtC (giga tons of Carbon) are released by 2100 (68% uncertainty range). This leads to an additional warming of 0.04-0.23 degrees C. Though projected 21st century permafrost carbon emissions are relatively modest, ongoing permafrost thaw and slow but steady soil carbon decomposition means that, by 2300, about half of the potentially vulnerable permafrost carbon stock in the upper 3 m of soil layer (600-1000 GtC) could be released as CO2, with an extra 1-4% being released as methane. Our results also suggest that mitigation action in line with the lower scenario RCP3-PD could contain Arctic temperature increase sufficiently that thawing of the permafrost area is limited to 9-23% and the permafrost-carbon induced temperature increase does not exceed 0.04-0.16 degrees C by 2300.
Changes in the Atlantic overturning circulation have a strong influence on European temperatures, North American sea level and other climate phenomena worldwide. A meaningful assessment of associated societal impacts needs to be based on the full range of its possible future evolution. This requires capturing both the uncertainty in future warming pathways and the inherently long-term response of the ocean circulation. While probabilistic projections of the global mean and regional temperatures exist, process-based probabilistic assessments of large-scale dynamical systems such as the Atlantic overturning are still missing. Here we present such an assessment and find that a reduction of more than 50 % in Atlantic overturning strength by the end of the 21 (s t) century is within the likely range under an unmitigated climate change scenario (RCP8.5). By combining linear response functions derived from comprehensive climate simulations with the full range of possible future warming pathways, we provide probability estimates of overturning changes by the year 2100. A weakening of more than 25 % is found to be very unlikely under a climate protection scenario (RCP2.6), but likely for unmitigated climate change. The method is able to reproduce the modelled recovery caused by climatic equilibration under climate protection scenarios which provides confidence in the approach. Within this century, a reduction of the Atlantic overturning is a robust climatic phenomena that intensifies with global warming and needs to be accounted for in global adaptation strategies.
In order to provide probabilistic projections of the future evolution of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC), we calibrated a simple Stommel-type box model to emulate the output of fully coupled three-dimensional atmosphere-ocean general circulation models (AOGCMs) of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP). Based on this calibration to idealised global warming scenarios with and without interactive atmosphere-ocean fluxes and freshwater perturbation simulations, we project the future evolution of the AMOC mean strength within the covered calibration range for the lower two Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) until 2100 obtained from the reduced complexity carbon cycle-climate model MAGICC 6. For RCP3-PD with a global mean temperature median below 1.0 degrees C warming relative to the year 2000, we project an ensemble median weakening of up to 11% compared to 22% under RCP4.5 with a warming median up to 1.9 degrees C over the 21st century. Additional Greenland meltwater of 10 and 20 cm of global sea-level rise equivalent further weakens the AMOC by about 4.5 and 10 %, respectively. By combining our outcome with a multi-model sea-level rise study we project a dynamic sea-level rise along the New York City coastline of 4 cm for the RCP3-PD and of 8 cm for the RCP4.5 scenario over the 21st century. We estimate the total steric and dynamic sea-level rise for New York City to be about 24 cm until 2100 for the RCP3-PD scenario, which can hold as a lower bound for sea-level rise projections in this region, as it does not include ice sheet and mountain glacier contributions.
Large-scale transitions in societies are associated with both individual behavioural change and restructuring of the social network. These two factors have often been considered independently, yet recent advances in social network research challenge this view. Here we show that common features of societal marginalization and clustering emerge naturally during transitions in a co-evolutionary adaptive network model. This is achieved by explicitly considering the interplay between individual interaction and a dynamic network structure in behavioural selection. We exemplify this mechanism by simulating how smoking behaviour and the network structure get reconfigured by changing social norms. Our results are consistent with empirical findings: The prevalence of smoking was reduced, remaining smokers were preferentially connected among each other and formed increasingly marginalized clusters. We propose that self-amplifying feedbacks between individual behaviour and dynamic restructuring of the network are main drivers of the transition. This generative mechanism for co-evolution of individual behaviour and social network structure may apply to a wide range of examples beyond smoking.