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In this paper, we study how the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) used different legitimacy strategies between 2004 and 2021 to secure its organisational survival. Although EFRAG is now an established player within the regulatory space of corporate reporting, the organisation’s path towards this position was not straightforward. Based on 20 interviews with current and former members of EFRAG and archival documents, we investigate how EFRAG initially gained and maintained its legitimacy and how it responded to a legitimacy crisis arising in the aftermath of the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Based on prior research on organisational strategies for legitimising actions, we derive a framework for our analysis and show how EFRAG has adapted various legitimacy strategies over time. We further find that the use of legitimacy strategies is constrained by various systemic factors and show how EFRAG’s adaptations to its legitimacy strategies led to new tensions. Our findings contribute to the literature on private regulatory organisations’ legitimacy and the political economy of standard setting.
Reporting Self-Made Errors - The Impact of Organizational Error-Management Climate and Error Type
(2013)
We study how an organization's error-management climate affects organizational members' beliefs about other members' willingness to report errors that they discover when chance of error detection by superiors and others is extremely low. An error-management climate, as a component of the organizational climate, is said to be "high" when errors are accepted as part of everyday life as long as they are learned from and not repeated. Alternatively, the error-management climate is said to be an "error averse" climate when discovery of errors invokes the laying of blame on those admitting to or found committing errors. We examine the effects of this error-management climate in a professional services environment where uncorrected errors may have severe consequences and discovery of work errors is crucial for organizational success. We find that error-management climate affects organizational members' beliefs about what other members will report about discovered self-made errors, with a high error-management (versus error averse) climate leading to greater reporting willingness. We also find a significant interaction with a key contextual variable, error type (conceptual or calculation), that suggests the effect is more significant for conceptual errors than calculation errors. Our findings suggest that an organization's error-management climate is an important factor in promoting ethical behavior of employees, especially junior employees, carrying out routine tasks whose failure to report errors discovered incidental to those tasks may have severe implications for their organizations.
The current financial reporting environment, with its increasing use of accounting estimates, including fair value estimates, suggests that unethical accounting estimates may be a growing concern. This paper provides explanations and empirical evidence for why some types of accounting estimates in financial reporting may promote a form of ethical blindness. These types of ethical blindness can have an escalating effect that corrupts not only an individual or organization but also the accounting profession and the public interest it serves. Ethical blindness in the standards of professional accountants may be a factor in the extent of misreporting, and may have taken on new urgency as a result of the proposals to change the conceptual framework for financial reporting using international standards. The social consequences for users of financial statements can be huge. The acquittal of former Nortel executives on fraud charges related to accounting manipulations is viewed by many as legitimizing accounting gamesmanship. This decision illustrates that the courts may not be the best place to deal with ethical reporting issues. The courts may be relied on for only the most egregious unethical conduct and, even then, the accounting profession is ill equipped to assist the legal system in prosecuting accounting fraud unless the standards have been clarified. We argue that the problem of unethical reporting should be addressed by the accounting profession itself, preferably as a key part of the conceptual framework that supports accounting and auditing standards, and the codes of ethical conduct that underpin the professionalism of accountants.
We take an error management perspective on audit quality. Drawing on 18 months of participant observations and 38 interviews conducted in a Big 4 accounting firm, we develop a multi-level model of error management. With this model, we propose how organizational structures, team procedures and practices, and individual cognitions and emotions interact to manage errors. The multi-level model of error management allows us to conceptually integrate previous behavioral and social research on audit quality, contributes to the rising accounting firm error management literature, and explains how and why two general approaches from the broader error management literature to errors that are usually considered as opposing each other, i.e., error prevention and error resilience, may interact and actually entail each other in accounting firms.