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Equal but Different
(2018)
Objectives: Integrating research on intergroup contact and intercultural relations, we investigated effects of 2 types of cultural diversity norms (equality/inclusion and cultural pluralism) on outgroup orientation and perceived discrimination among students of immigrant and nonimmigrant background. Method: Our sample comprised 1,975 6th graders (M-age = 11.53, SDage = 0.69, 47% female) in Germany, of whom 1,213 (61%) were of immigrant background, defined as having at least 1 parent born in a different country. A total of 83 countries of origin were represented. We applied a multilevel framework to assess the impact of individual-level and class-level predictors on intergroup outcomes, controlling for the classroom ethnic composition, school track, and individual-level covariates. Immigrant background was treated as a moderator. Results: The 2 types of cultural diversity norms were generally associated with more positive intergroup outcomes. Some of the associations differed in strength between students of immigrant and nonimmigrant background. There were stronger associations of equality/inclusion with higher outgroup orientation among students of nonimmigrant background and with lower perceived discrimination among students of immigrant background. Ethnic composition, as well as the classroom-aggregated diversity norms (diversity climate) showed weaker relations with the outcome variables. Conclusions: Equality/inclusion norms and cultural pluralism norms can make complementary contributions to positive relations between students of immigrant and nonimmigrant background. Equality/inclusion norms foster positive contact and equal treatment, while cultural pluralism norms emphasize that it is also important to value diversity. 1
In this bachelor’s thesis I implement the automatic theorem prover nanoCoP-Ω. This system is the result of porting arithmetic and equality handling procedures first introduced in the automatic theorem prover with arithmetic leanCoP-Ω into the similar system nanoCoP 2.0. To understand these procedures, I first introduce the mathematical background to both automatic theorem proving and arithmetic expressions. I present the predecessor projects leanCoP, nanoCoP and leanCoP-Ω, out of which nanCoP-Ω was developed. This is followed by an extensive description of the concepts the non-clausal connection calculus needed to be extended by, to allow for proving arithmetic expressions and equalities, as well as of their implementation into nanoCoP-Ω. An extensive comparison between both the runtimes and the number of solved problems of the systems nanoCoP-Ω and leanCoP-Ω was made. I come to the conclusion, that nanoCoP-Ω is considerably faster than leanCoP-Ω for small problems, though less well suited for larger problems. Additionally, I was able to construct a non-theorem that nanoCoP-Ω generates a false proof for. I discuss how this pressing issue could be resolved, as well as some possible optimizations and expansions of the system.
What does the value of political equality imply for the institutional design of democracies? The existing normative literature highlights the importance of proportional representation and legislative majority rule, but neglects the choice of an executive format. This paper explores two potential egalitarian trade-offs in this choice. First, while presidential systems tend to achieve too little bundling of separable decision-making issues (within political parties), parliamentary systems often tend towards too much bundling (between political parties), thus establishing informal veto positions in the democratic process. This is a trade-off between the adversarial' and deliberative' aspects of equality. Second, there is a trade-off between horizontal' and vertical' equality. Neither pure presidentialism nor pure parliamentarism may be able to maximise both dimensions of equality simultaneously. The paper argues that certain hybrids between parliamentarism and presidentialism have the potential to mitigate both trade-offs. These hybrids establish power separation between the executive and legislature without allowing for popular executive elections. The argument also has potential implications for the democratisation of the European Union.