Filtern
Volltext vorhanden
- ja (1)
Erscheinungsjahr
- 2020 (1) (entfernen)
Dokumenttyp
- Arbeitspapier (1)
Sprache
- Englisch (1)
Gehört zur Bibliographie
- ja (1)
Schlagworte
- stochastic uncertainty (1) (entfernen)
Stochastic uncertainty can cause difficult coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can do so. To test this, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeatedly played Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not entail an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two main reasons for this finding: First, the stochastic uncertainty forces proposers to accept high strategic uncertainty if they intend to cooperate by claiming a low amount (which many proposers do not). Second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperative by transferring too little (which hinders cooperation in future periods).