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Tectonic and geological processes on Earth often result in structural anisotropy of the subsurface, which can be imaged by various geophysical methods. In order to achieve appropriate and realistic Earth models for interpretation, inversion algorithms have to allow for an anisotropic subsurface. Within the framework of this thesis, I analyzed a magnetotelluric (MT) data set taken from the Cape Fold Belt in South Africa. This data set exhibited strong indications for crustal anisotropy, e.g. MT phases out of the expected quadrant, which are beyond of fitting and interpreting with standard isotropic inversion algorithms. To overcome this obstacle, I have developed a two-dimensional inversion method for reconstructing anisotropic electrical conductivity distributions. The MT inverse problem represents in general a non-linear and ill-posed minimization problem with many degrees of freedom: In isotropic case, we have to assign an electrical conductivity value to each cell of a large grid to assimilate the Earth's subsurface, e.g. a grid with 100 x 50 cells results in 5000 unknown model parameters in an isotropic case; in contrast, we have the sixfold in an anisotropic scenario where the single value of electrical conductivity becomes a symmetric, real-valued tensor while the number of the data remains unchanged. In order to successfully invert for anisotropic conductivities and to overcome the non-uniqueness of the solution of the inverse problem it is necessary to use appropriate constraints on the class of allowed models. This becomes even more important as MT data is not equally sensitive to all anisotropic parameters. In this thesis, I have developed an algorithm through which the solution of the anisotropic inversion problem is calculated by minimization of a global penalty functional consisting of three entries: the data misfit, the model roughness constraint and the anisotropy constraint. For comparison, in an isotropic approach only the first two entries are minimized. The newly defined anisotropy term is measured by the sum of the square difference of the principal conductivity values of the model. The basic idea of this constraint is straightforward. If an isotropic model is already adequate to explain the data, there is no need to introduce electrical anisotropy at all. In order to ensure successful inversion, appropriate trade-off parameters, also known as regularization parameters, have to be chosen for the different model constraints. Synthetic tests show that using fixed trade-off parameters usually causes the inversion to end up by either a smooth model with large RMS error or a rough model with small RMS error. Using of a relaxation approach on the regularization parameters after each successful inversion iteration will result in smoother inversion model and a better convergence. This approach seems to be a sophisticated way for the selection of trade-off parameters. In general, the proposed inversion method is adequate for resolving the principal conductivities defined in horizontal plane. Once none of the principal directions of the anisotropic structure is coincided with the predefined strike direction, only the corresponding effective conductivities, which is the projection of the principal conductivities onto the model coordinate axes direction, can be resolved and the information about the rotation angles is lost. In the end the MT data from the Cape Fold Belt in South Africa has been analyzed. The MT data exhibits an area (> 10 km) where MT phases over 90 degrees occur. This part of data cannot be modeled by standard isotropic modeling procedures and hence can not be properly interpreted. The proposed inversion method, however, could not reproduce the anomalous large phases as desired because of losing the information about rotation angles. MT phases outside the first quadrant are usually obtained by different anisotropic anomalies with oblique anisotropy strike. In order to achieve this challenge, the algorithm needs further developments. However, forward modeling studies with the MT data have shown that surface highly conductive heterogeneity in combination with a mid-crustal electrically anisotropic zone are required to fit the data. According to known geological and tectonic information the mid-crustal zone is interpreted as a deep aquifer related to the fractured Table Mountain Group rocks in the Cape Fold Belt.
Bad governance causes economic, social, developmental and environmental problems in many developing countries. Developing countries have adopted a number of reforms that have assisted in achieving good governance. The success of governance reform depends on the starting point of each country – what institutional arrangements exist at the out-set and who the people implementing reforms within the existing institutional framework are. This dissertation focuses on how formal institutions (laws and regulations) and informal institutions (culture, habit and conception) impact on good governance. Three characteristics central to good governance - transparency, participation and accountability are studied in the research.
A number of key findings were: Good governance in Hanoi and Berlin represent the two extremes of the scale, while governance in Berlin is almost at the top of the scale, governance in Hanoi is at the bottom. Good governance in Hanoi is still far from achieved. In Berlin, information about public policies, administrative services and public finance is available, reliable and understandable. People do not encounter any problems accessing public information. In Hanoi, however, public information is not easy to access. There are big differences between Hanoi and Berlin in the three forms of participation. While voting in Hanoi to elect local deputies is formal and forced, elections in Berlin are fair and free. The candidates in local elections in Berlin come from different parties, whereas the candidacy of local deputies in Hanoi is thoroughly controlled by the Fatherland Front. Even though the turnout of voters in local deputy elections is close to 90 percent in Hanoi, the legitimacy of both the elections and the process of representation is non-existent because the local deputy candidates are decided by the Communist Party.
The involvement of people in solving local problems is encouraged by the government in Berlin. The different initiatives include citizenry budget, citizen activity, citizen initiatives, etc. Individual citizens are free to participate either individually or through an association.
Lacking transparency and participation, the quality of public service in Hanoi is poor. Citizens seldom get their services on time as required by the regulations. Citizens who want to receive public services can bribe officials directly, use the power of relationships, or pay a third person – the mediator ("Cò" - in Vietnamese).
In contrast, public service delivery in Berlin follows the customer-orientated principle. The quality of service is high in relation to time and cost. Paying speed money, bribery and using relationships to gain preferential public service do not exist in Berlin.
Using the examples of Berlin and Hanoi, it is clear to see how transparency, participation and accountability are interconnected and influence each other. Without a free and fair election as well as participation of non-governmental organisations, civil organisations, and the media in political decision-making and public actions, it is hard to hold the Hanoi local government accountable.
The key differences in formal institutions (regulative and cognitive) between Berlin and Hanoi reflect the three main principles: rule of law vs. rule by law, pluralism vs. monopoly Party in politics and social market economy vs. market economy with socialist orientation.
In Berlin the logic of appropriateness and codes of conduct are respect for laws, respect of individual freedom and ideas and awareness of community development. People in Berlin take for granted that public services are delivered to them fairly. Ideas such as using money or relationships to shorten public administrative procedures do not exist in the mind of either public officials or citizens.
In Hanoi, under a weak formal framework of good governance, new values and norms (prosperity, achievement) generated in the economic transition interact with the habits of the centrally-planned economy (lying, dependence, passivity) and traditional values (hierarchy, harmony, family, collectivism) influence behaviours of those involved.
In Hanoi “doing the right thing” such as compliance with law doesn’t become “the way it is”.
The unintended consequence of the deliberate reform actions of the Party is the prevalence of corruption. The socialist orientation seems not to have been achieved as the gap between the rich and the poor has widened.
Good governance is not achievable if citizens and officials are concerned only with their self-interest. State and society depend on each other. Theoretically to achieve good governance in Hanoi, institutions (formal and informal) able to create good citizens, officials and deputies should be generated. Good citizens are good by habit rather than by nature.
The rule of law principle is necessary for the professional performance of local administrations and People’s Councils. When the rule of law is applied consistently, the room for informal institutions to function will be reduced.
Promoting good governance in Hanoi is dependent on the need and desire to change the government and people themselves. Good governance in Berlin can be seen to be the result of the efforts of the local government and citizens after a long period of development and continuous adjustment.
Institutional transformation is always a long and complicated process because the change in formal regulations as well as in the way they are implemented may meet strong resistance from the established practice. This study has attempted to point out the weaknesses of the institutions of Hanoi and has identified factors affecting future development towards good governance. But it is not easy to determine how long it will take to change the institutional setting of Hanoi in order to achieve good governance.