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Public debate about energy relations between the EU and Russia is distorted. These distortions present considerable obstacles to the development of true partnership. At the core of the conflict is a struggle for resource rents between energy producing, energy consuming and transit countries. Supposed secondary aspects, however, are also of great importance. They comprise of geopolitics, market access, economic development and state sovereignty. The European Union, having engaged in energy market liberalisation, faces a widening gap between declining domestic resources and continuously growing energy demand. Diverse interests inside the EU prevent the definition of a coherent and respected energy policy. Russia, for its part, is no longer willing to subsidise its neighbouring economies by cheap energy exports. The Russian government engages in assertive policies pursuing Russian interests. In so far, it opts for a different globalisation approach, refusing the role of mere energy exporter. In view of the intensifying struggle for global resources, Russia, with its large energy potential, appears to be a very favourable option for European energy supplies, if not the best one. However, several outcomes of the strategic game between the two partners can be imagined. Engaging in non-cooperative strategies will in the end leave all stakeholders worse-off. The European Union should therefore concentrate on securing its partnership with Russia instead of damaging it. Stable cooperation would need the acceptance that the partner may pursue his own goals, which might be different from one’s own interests. The question is, how can a sustainable compromise be found? This thesis finds that a mix of continued dialogue, a tit for tat approach bolstered by an international institutional framework and increased integration efforts appears as a preferable solution.
Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht das Zusammenspiel von Motiven und Anreizen sowie beobachtbaren dysfunktionalen Verhaltensweisen von Managern bei der Berliner Median-Budgetierung. Von einer Literaturrecherche ausgehend wird zunächst das theoretische Konzept der Dysfunktionen näher gehend erläutert und erklärt. Um den Aussagegehalt der theoretischen Annahmen zu überprüfen und somit eine Verbindung zwischen Einzelfallstudie und generellem theoretischem Kontext zu erhalten, werden hierzu Hypothesen aufgestellt. Darauf aufbauend folgt eine Einzelfallstudie der Berliner Median-Budgetierung mit Fokus auf die Amtsleiter der Leistungs- und Verantwortungszentren. Auf der fallbezogenen Ebene zeigt sich, dass die ursprünglich in der Berliner Median-Budgetierung intendierten Anreizfunktionen bei den Amtsleitern weitest gehend nicht verfangen. Vielmehr produziert das Verfahren Anreize, die dysfunktionale Verhaltensweisen fördern. Auf der generellen Ebene kann hierzu ein Zusammenhang zwischen theoretischen Annahmen zu Dysfunktionen und den Beobachtungen der Einzelfallstudie hergestellt werden. Somit lassen sich dysfunktionale Handlungsmuster innerhalb der Berliner Median-Budgetierung mittels Erklärungsmodellen der theoretischen Konzeption begründen.
The economic impact analysis contained in this book shows how irrigation farming is particularly susceptible when applying certain water management policies in the Australian Murray-Darling Basin, one of the world largest river basins and Australia’s most fertile region. By comparing different pricing and non-pricing water management policies with the help of the Water Integrated Market Model, it is found that the impact of water demand reducing policies is most severe on crops that need to be intensively irrigated and are at the same time less water productive. A combination of increasingly frequent and severe droughts and the application of policies that decrease agricultural water demand, in the same region, will create a situation in which the highly water dependent crops rice and cotton cannot be cultivated at all.
Die 2016 verabschiedeten Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) der Vereinten Nationen sind Referenzrahmen von Nachhaltigkeitsstrategien auf Bundes- Landes- und kommunaler Ebene geworden. Städte rückten im Zuge der Agenda 2030 in den Mittelpunkt. Ihre Verwaltungen befinden sich dabei in einem herausfordernden Spannungsfeld: Einerseits haben die SDGs den holistischen Anspruch, vollständig in das Handeln der Kommunen integriert zu werden. Andererseits ist für eine effektive Umsetzung eine starke Anpassung der SDGs an den lokalen Kontext notwendig. Die vorliegende Arbeit betrachtet anhand einer Fallstudie die Frage, wie Kommunen die Nachhaltigkeitsziele der Vereinten Nationen in ihre Handlungsprogramme und Nachhaltigkeitsstrategien übersetzen, und welche Faktoren Einfluss auf diesen Prozess haben. Dabei wird ein translationstheoretischer Ansatz verwendet, der die Übertragung einer Idee in einen lokalen Kontext als aktiven Transfer versteht, bei dem das Handeln der beteiligten Akteure und deren Konstruktion der aufzunehmenden Idee im Fokus steht. Die Translation wird mit Hilfe von qualitativen Interviews nachvollzogen und analysiert. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die SDGs zwar anhand ihrer Relevanz für die Kommune gefiltert werden, der normative Anspruch der SDGs aber erhalten bleibt und angesichts des als gering beurteilten Fortschritts der Kommune besonderes Gewicht erhält. Zentrale Einflussfaktoren für die Translation sind die verfügbaren personellen und finanziellen Ressourcen, die Akzeptanz für die SDGs in Verwaltung, Politik und Gesellschaft und nicht zuletzt das persönliche Engagement einzelner Verwaltungsmitarbeiter*innen.
”Thanks in Advance”
(2019)
This paper studies the effect of the commonly used phrase “thanks in advance” on compliance with a small request. In a controlled laboratory experiment we ask participants to give a detailed answer to an open question. The treatment variable is whether or not they see the phrase “thanks in advance.” Our participants react to the treatment by exerting less effort in answering the request even though they perceive the phrase as polite.
Envy is an unpleasant emotion. If individuals anticipate that comparing their payoff with the (potentially higher) payoff of others will make them envious, they may want to actively avoid information about other people’s payoffs. Given the opportunity to reduce another person’s payoff, an individual’s envy may trigger behavior that is detrimental to welfare. In this case, if individuals anticipate that they will react in a welfare-reducing way, they may also avoid information about other people’s payoffs from the outset. We investigated these two hypotheses using three experiments. We found that 13% of our potentially envious subjects avoided information when they did not have the opportunity to reduce another participant’s payoff. Psychological scales do not explain this behavior. We also found that voluntarily uninformed subjects did neither deduct less of the payoff nor less frequently than subjects who could not avoid the information.
Being ignorant of key aspects of a strategic interaction can represent an advantage rather than a handicap. We study one particular context in which ignorance can be beneficial: iterated strategic interactions in which voluntary cooperation may be sustained into the final round if players voluntarily forego knowledge about the time horizon. We experimentally examine this option to remain ignorant about the time horizon in a finitely repeated two-person prisoners’ dilemma game. We confirm that pairs without horizon knowledge avoid the drop in cooperation that otherwise occurs toward the end of the game. However, this effect is superposed by cooperation declining more rapidly in pairs without horizon knowledge during the middle phase of the game, especially if players do not know that the other player also wanted to remain ignorant of the time horizon.
This paper presents an experiment on the effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes on buyers’ repeated purchase decisions. Such schemes promise buyers a reduced price for all units that are bought in a certain time frame if the total quantity that is purchased passes a given threshold. This study finds a loyalty-enhancing effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes only if the buyers ex-ante expected that entering into the scheme would maximize their monetary gain, but later learn that they should leave the scheme. Furthermore, the effect crucially hinges on the framing of the price reduction.