Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Article (23)
- Part of a Book (2)
- Review (2)
- Monograph/Edited Volume (1)
- Part of Periodical (1)
- Postprint (1)
Keywords
- COVID-19 (1)
- Climate Change Conference (1)
- Climate change (1)
- Durban 2011 (1)
- Entwicklungspolitik (1)
- European Union (1)
- Global South (1)
- International (1)
- Klima (1)
- Klimakonferenz (1)
Several scholars concerned with global policy-making have recently pointed to a reconfiguration of authority in the area of climate politics. They have shown that various new carbon governance arrangements have emerged, which operate simultaneously at different governmental levels. However, despite the numerous descriptions and mapping exercises of these governance arrangements, we have little systematic knowledge on their workings within national jurisdictions, let alone about their impact on public-administrative systems in developing countries. Therefore, this article opens the black box of the nation-state and explores how and to what extent two different arrangements, that is, Transnational City Networks and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, generate changes in the distribution of public authority in nation-states and their administrations. Building upon conceptual assumptions that the former is likely to lead to more decentralized, and the latter to more centralized policy-making, we provide insights from case studies in Indonesia, South Africa, Brazil, and India. In a nutshell, our analysis underscores that Transnational City Networks strengthen climate-related actions taken by cities without ultimately decentralizing climate policy-making. On the other hand, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation tends to reinforce the competencies of central governments, but apparently does not generate a recentralization of the forestry sector at large.
This paper focuses on some of the factors explaining recent trends in decentralisation, and some areas where decentralisation has had a positive impact, including bringing citizens into public affairs, improving sub-national public administration, and stimulating local economic development. It concludes by exploring the dangers and the implications for governments of differing capabilities starting out on the decentralisation path. More specifically, the paper stresses the underlying incentive structures within states in reform. It suggests a country-specific discussion of both vertical and horizontal incentive structures in decentralisation, as well as clear-cut accountability within a public sector in change. While vertical incentive structures mean defined rules for intergovernmental relationships, horizontal incentive structures mean defined rules between local governments, their citizens and the local private sector. Both sets of incentives need to be reformed jointly to stimulate better results from decentralisation and for better performance of local government. Neglecting one of them, could harm development. Above all, politics and processes are key to understanding, and eventually, managing decentralisation effectively.
Introduction and Preview
(2004)