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Wie können Verpflichtungen gegenüber zukünftigen Generationen vertragstheoretisch begründet werden?
(1998)
Of Rawls's two principles of justice only the second has received attention from economists. The second principle is concerned with the social and economic conditions in a just society. The first principle, however, has largely been neglected. It claims, that all people in society should have equal basic liberties. In this paper Rawls's first principle is characterised in a freedom of choice framework. The analysis reveals conceptual problems of the Rawlsian approach to justice.
The value concept of traditional resource economics is welfare. Therefore, sustainability of welfare is often taken to characterise our obligations to future generations. This paper argues that this view is inappropriate because it leaves no room for future generations autonomy. Future generations should be free to make their own decisions. Consequently freedom of choice is the appropriate value concept on which resource economics should be based. The concept of sustainability receives a new interpretation. Sustainability is a principle of intertemporal distributive justice which requires equitable opportunities across generations.
In socialist economies firms have provided various social benefits, like child care, health care, food subsidies, housing etc. Using panel data from Bulgarian and Polish firms, this paper attempts to explain firm-specific provision of social benefits in the process of transition. We investigate empirically with the help of qualitative response models, how ownership type and structure, firm size, profitability, change in management, foreign direct investment, wage and employment policies, union involvement and employee power have impacted the state of non-wage benefits provision.
Self-Ownership, Erstaneignung und gerechter Transfer : zur Legimitation privater Eigentumsrechte
(1998)
The paper is an enquiry into dynamic social contract theory. The social contract defines the rules of resource use. An intergenerational social contract in an economy with a single exhaustible resource is examined within a framework of an overlapping generations model. It is assumed that new generations do not accept the old social contract, and access to resources will be renegotiated between any incumbent generation and their successors. It turns out that later generations will be in an unfortunate position regardless of their bargaining power.