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This study investigates the spatial and temporal distributions of 14 key arboreal taxa and their driving forces during the last 22,000 calendar years before ad 1950 (kyr BP) using a taxonomically harmonized and temporally standardized fossil pollen dataset with a 500-year resolution from the eastern part of continental Asia. Logistic regression was used to estimate pollen abundance thresholds for vegetation occurrence (presence or dominance), based on modern pollen data and present ranges of 14 taxa in China. Our investigation reveals marked changes in spatial and temporal distributions of the major arboreal taxa. The thermophilous (Castanea, Castanopsis, Cyclobalanopsis, Fagus, Pterocarya) and eurythermal (Juglans, Quercus, Tilia, Ulmus) broadleaved tree taxa were restricted to the current tropical or subtropical areas of China during the Last Glacial Maximum (LGM) and spread northward since c. 14.5 kyr BP. Betula and conifer taxa (Abies, Picea, Pinus), in contrast, retained a wider distribution during the LGM and showed no distinct expansion direction during the Late Glacial. Since the late mid-Holocene, the abundance but not the spatial extent of most trees decreased. The changes in spatial and temporal distributions for the 14 taxa are a reflection of climate changes, in particular monsoonal moisture, and, in the late Holocene, human impact. The post-LGM expansion patterns in eastern continental China seem to be different from those reported for Europe and North America, for example, the westward spread for eurythermal broadleaved taxa.
This study investigates the spatial and temporal distributions of 14 key arboreal taxa and their driving forces during the last 22,000 calendar years before ad 1950 (kyr BP) using a taxonomically harmonized and temporally standardized fossil pollen dataset with a 500-year resolution from the eastern part of continental Asia. Logistic regression was used to estimate pollen abundance thresholds for vegetation occurrence (presence or dominance), based on modern pollen data and present ranges of 14 taxa in China. Our investigation reveals marked changes in spatial and temporal distributions of the major arboreal taxa. The thermophilous (Castanea, Castanopsis, Cyclobalanopsis, Fagus, Pterocarya) and eurythermal (Juglans, Quercus, Tilia, Ulmus) broadleaved tree taxa were restricted to the current tropical or subtropical areas of China during the Last Glacial Maximum (LGM) and spread northward since c. 14.5kyr BP. Betula and conifer taxa (Abies, Picea, Pinus), in contrast, retained a wider distribution during the LGM and showed no distinct expansion direction during the Late Glacial. Since the late mid-Holocene, the abundance but not the spatial extent of most trees decreased. The changes in spatial and temporal distributions for the 14 taxa are a reflection of climate changes, in particular monsoonal moisture, and, in the late Holocene, human impact. The post-LGM expansion patterns in eastern continental China seem to be different from those reported for Europe and North America, for example, the westward spread for eurythermal broadleaved taxa.
Theme Park Imitations
(2022)
Theme parks frequently draw not only on historical themes, from antiquity to the roaring twenties, but also on their own history – that is, the history of the medium of the theme park itself. This article uses the example of the Happy World ride at Happy Valley Beijing (China) to discuss theme park imitations, that is, the fact that theme parks frequently borrow individual elements (themes, technologies, visuals, layouts, names) and/or entire units (rides, restaurants, themed areas) from each other. Opened in 2014 in the Greek-themed Aegean Harbour section of Happy Valley Beijing, Happy World may upon first sight look like an almost exact copy of Disney’s ‘it’s a small world’ (opened at Disneyland in California in 1966) but turns out to be, upon closer examination, a complex refunctionalization of central elements of ‘it’s a small world’ that establishes meaningful connections between (ancient) Greece and the city of Beijing via the theme of the Olympic Games: drawing on the origins of ‘it’s a small world’ in the 1964–5 New York World’s Fair and the latter’s motto of ‘Peace through Understanding’, Happy World takes visitors on a journey from the ancient Olympiad to contemporary Beijing (the site of the 2008 Summer and the 2022 Winter Olympic Games) to offer a theme park rendition of the 2008 Olympic torch relay as an homage to ‘the spirit [of peace, respect, and friendship] in the people’s [sic] of the world’.
Russland sieht in der Shanghai-Gruppe ein wichtiges außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Instrument. Damit sollen sowohl das internationale Profil verbessert als auch militärische Interessen (Waffenexporte) umgesetzt werden. Obwohl sich das Verhältnis zu China deutlich verbesserte, ist es russisches Interesse, mittels der SCO Chinas Einfluss in Zentralasien zu begrenzen. Angesichts der strategischen Differenzen zwischen Moskau und Peking stellt sich das Problem des möglichen Bruchs der Shanghai-Gruppe.
Die G8 und Chinas Interessen
(2007)
Die G8 besitzt aus chinesischer Sicht große Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten. Verglichen mit anderen zwischenstaatlichen Organisationen hat die G8 einzigartige Vorteile angesichts ihrer Macht und Flexibilität. Um ihren Einfluss und ihre Kontrolle über die Weltangelegenheiten zu verstärken, sollte die Gruppe reformiert und erweitert werden. China ist gegenwärtig nicht an einem Beitritt zur G8 interessiert, wohl aber an einer engen Zusammenarbeit. Langfristig ist es allerdings nur eine Frage der Zeit, bis China der G8 beitreten wird.
This article draws lessons from experiences of developing the photovoltaic (PV) and onshore wind power sectors in China for the development of Chinese Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) into an internationally competitive industry. We analyze the sectoral development with a framework that expands on the concept of lead markets, identifying factors that determine whether domestic industrial development paths may or may not generate export success. We find that the Chinese CSP sector has good potential for becoming internationally competitive because of a strong Chinese knowledge base, a clear eye for product quality, standard-setting, and a focus on the high-efficiency and large-storage technological routes most likely to see growing demand in future international markets. Chinese solar towers are already cheaper than international competitors and so far, appear reliable. However, continued and stable deployment support for CSP, designed to reward dispatchable solar power generation, enabling continued domestic learning-by-doing and -interacting is likely required to realize this export potential. To date, Chinese CSP policy has done many things right and, if the domestic market is maintained through renewed support, has put the Chinese industry well on the path to international competitiveness.
We analyse the potential for industry entry and catching up by latecomer countries or firms in formative sectors, by deriving a framework that builds on the concept of windows of opportunity for catching up. This framework highlights differences in technological, market, and institutional characteristics between formative and mature sectors, and elaborates how this may affect opportunities for catching up. We apply this framework to the global Concentrated Solar Power sector, in which China has rapidly narrowed the gap to the global forefront in terms of technological capabilities and market competitiveness. We find that the formative nature of the sector resulted in turbulent development of the technological, market, and institutional dimensions, making it more difficult for early leaders to retain leadership, and therefore easier for latecomer firms or countries to catch up. This signals an increased role in early-stage technology development in the next phase of the energy transition.
China ist auf dem Weg zu einer offeneren Gesellschaft mit zunehmender Partizipation, größerer rechtlicher Sicherheit und individueller Autonomie. Der Staat zog sich aus vielen Bereichen zurück, ökonomische Ziele bestimmen seine Prioritäten. Die Entwicklungserfolge brachten jedoch eine Legitimationskrise des Staates mit sich. Vier Dilemmata, die China heute konfrontieren, werden aufgezeigt und Hypothesen zur Charakterisierung des chinesischen party state diskutiert.
Mediale Aufregung wie selten, aber auch intensive Gespräche und Verhandlungen über Investitionsabkommen. So könnte man knapp das jüngste Treffen zwischen der Europäischen Union und der Volksrepublik China Ende September dieses Jahres umreißen. Es gab sehr kritische Worte vom chinesischen Premier Wen Jiabao an die Adresse der EU. Peking kritisierte die Nichtanerkennung als Marktwirtschaft, das Waffenembargo und die Behinderung des Zugangs zum EU-Markt. Brüssel hielt entgegen: Nichteinhaltung individueller Menschenrechte, Raubbau an der Natur und die Tatsache, dass geistiges Eigentum nicht geschützt ist. Neben der Kritik offerierte China eine erste Skizze für ein Handels- und Partnerschaftsabkommens, dass den Beziehungen eine wahrhaft strategische Perspektive geben kann. Der jüngste EU-China-Gipfel zeigte (erneut) das zwiespältige Verhältnis zwischen den „strategischen Partnern“.
In the Shadow of Ukraine
(2022)
In 2022, India captured global attention over its response to the war in Ukraine. While calling for both parties' return to diplomacy, India abstained from several United Nations resolutions condemning Russian aggression. For a country that ostensibly subscribes to the values of democracy and territorial integrity, its response appeared frustrating and contradictory, but it is broadly consistent with its long-standing policy of non-alignment. Although India's relationship with China is increasingly contentious, New Delhi is not yet fully convinced that it is in India's interest to swing westwards. The country's relations with Russia and China are deep, complex and substantive. In addition to the military and economic benefits it derives from its connection with Russia, New Delhi and Moscow share an avowed preference for a more equal, multipolar world. India will eventually have to reflect on the extent to which it can sustain its balancing act.