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The current German start-up subsidy for unemployed individuals underwent a major reform in 2011 that altered key parameters of the program, leading to ambiguous ex ante predictions on the post-reform effectiveness of the program, making a new evaluation necessary. In our descriptive analysis, we find that participants after the reform differ significantly from pre-reform participants in terms of important characteristics and subsequent labor market performance. Our causal analysis reveals positive and sizable treatment effects on the treated regarding employment and income that are larger effects than what was estimated for the pre-reform program. Potential reasons for this are discussed.
This paper evaluates the short-run impact of the introduction of a statutory minimum wage in Germany on the hourly wages and monthly earnings of workers targeted by the reform. We first provide detailed descriptive evidence of changes to the wage structure in particular at the bottom of the distribution and distinguish between trends for regularly employed and marginally employed workers. In the causal analysis, we then employ a differential trend adjusted difference-in-differences (DTADD) strategy to identify the extent to which these changes in wages and earnings can be attributed to the minimum wage introduction. We find that the minimum wage introduction can account for hourly wage growth in the order of roughly 6.5 % or (sic)0.45/hour and an increase in monthly earnings of 6.6 % or (sic)53/month. Despite finding wage growth at the bottom of the distribution, the paper documents widespread non-compliance with the mandated wage floor of (sic)8.50/hour.
Fünf Jahre Mindestlohn
(2020)
Die Einführung des gesetzlichen Mindestlohns zum 1. Januar 2015 war nach der Agenda 2010 die bedeutendste Arbeitsmarktreform der letzten 20 Jahre. Durch das relativ hohe Eingriffsniveau – etwa 4 Millionen oder 11% aller Erwerbstätigen verdienten vor der Einführung weniger als die neue Bruttolohnuntergrenze von 8,50 Euro pro Stunde – und die nahezu umfassende Gültigkeit, waren Hoffnungen und Befürchtungen gleichermaßen groß und viele Fragen zu den Wirkungen offen. Heute, fünf Jahre nach der Einführung und basierend auf zahlreichen, breit angelegten Evaluationsstudien, ist es Zeit für eine Zwischenbilanz. Die Löhne im unteren Bereich sind gestiegen, ohne dass es zu einem größeren Abbau an Beschäftigung gekommen ist. Gleichzeitig hat der Mindestlohn aber nicht die Zahl der Transferbezieher verringert. Auch das Armutsrisiko hat nicht abgenommen. Der Mindestlohn ist in vielerlei Hinsicht nicht existenzsichernd und wird auch nicht vollumfänglich durchgesetzt. Insofern wurde fünf Jahre nach der Einführung zwar einiges erreicht, wichtige Ziele aber auch verfehlt. Die Politik ist gefordert.
Dealing with spam is very costly, and many organizations have tried to reduce spam-related costs by installing spam filters. Relying on modern econometric methods to reduce the selection bias of installing a spam filter, we use a unique data setting implemented at a German university to measure the costs associated with spam and the costs savings of spam filters. Our methodological framework accounts for effect heterogeneity and can be easily used to estimate the effect of other IS technologies implemented in organizations.
The majority of costs stem from the time that employees spend identifying and deleting spam, amounting to an average of approximately five minutes per employee per day. Our analysis, which accounts for selection bias, finds that the installation of a spam filter reduces these costs by roughly one third. Failing to account for the selection bias would lead to a result that suggests that installing a spam filter does not reduce working time losses.
However, cost savings only occur when the spam burden is high, indicating that spam filters do not necessarily reduce costs and are therefore no universal remedy. The analysis further shows that spam filters alone are a countermeasure against spam that exhibits only limited effectiveness because they only reduce costs by one third.
We propose a combined approach of propensity score matching with difference-in-differences methods for reducing selection biases of products being reviewed by critics. Critics' decision to review products may be driven by observable (e.g., star power) and unobservable (e.g., critics' individual preferences) factors, raising the question of reverse causality and selection biases. Our proposed approach enables to rigorously control for selection biases by observable and unobservable characteristics. We apply our methodological framework on data from the German book market and estimate the sales effect of a well-known TV critic. We identify substantial selection effects of individual critics, which result in serious underestimation of the short-term effect (up to 29 %) and the long-term effect (up to 37 %). The results emphasize the relevance of the proposed methodological framework by demonstrating that observable and unobservable factors drive selection effects.
We model migration across domestic labor markets (internal migration) as the outcome of a job search process in which job seekers form subjective beliefs about the return search effort that are related to their locus of control. Job seekers with an internal locus of control are predicted to search across larger geographic areas and migrate more frequently as a result. We empirically test the relationship between locus of control and the propensity to migrate using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). We find that not only do individuals with an internal locus of control express more willingness to migrate, they do in fact also migrate more often.
We extend standard models of work-related training by explicitly incorporating workers’ locus of control into the investment decision through the returns they expect. Our model predicts that higher internal control results in increased take-up of general, but not specific, training. This prediction is empirically validated using data from the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP). We provide empirical evidence that locus of control influences participation in training through its effect on workers’ expectations about future wage increases rather than actual wage increases. Our results provide an important explanation for underinvestment in training and suggest that those with an external sense of control may require additional training support.
We analyze workers’ risk preferences and training investments. Our conceptual framework differentiates between the investment risk and insurance mechanisms underpinning training decisions. Investment risk leads risk-averse workers to train less; they undertake more training if it insures them against future losses. We use the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) to demonstrate that risk affinity is associated with more training, implying that, on average, investment risks dominate the insurance benefits of training. Crucially, this relationship is evident only for general training; there is no relationship between risk attitudes and specific training. Thus, consistent with our conceptual framework, risk preferences matter more when skills are transferable – and workers have a vested interest in training outcomes – than when they are not. Finally, we provide evidence that the insurance benefits of training are concentrated among workers with uncertain employment relationships or limited access to public insurance schemes.
This study analyses the impact of managers’ risk preferences on their training allocation decisions. We begin by providing nationally representative evidence that managers’ risk-aversion is negatively correlated with the likelihood that their firms engage in any worker training. Using a novel vignette study, we then demonstrate that risk-tolerant and risk-averse decision makers have significantly different training preferences. Risk aversion results in increased sensitivity to turnover risk. Managers who are risk-averse offer less general training and are more reluctant to train workers with a history of job mobility. Adopting a weighting approach to flexibly control for observed differences in the characteristics of risk-averse and risk-tolerant managers, we show that our findings cannot be explained by heterogeneity in either managers’ observed characteristics or the type of firms where they work. All managers, irrespective of their risk preferences, are sensitive to the investment risk associated with training, avoiding training that is more costly or that targets those with less occupational expertise or nearing retirement. This provides suggestive evidence that the risks of training are primarily due to the risk that trained workers will leave the firm (turnover risk) rather than the risk that the benefits of training do not outweigh the costs (investment risk).
We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how locus of control operates through people’s preferences and beliefs to influence their decisions. Using the principal–agent setting of the delegation game, we test four key channels that conceptually link locus of control to decision-making: (i) preference for agency, (ii) optimism and (iii) confidence regarding the return to effort, and (iv) illusion of control. Knowing the return and cost of stated effort, principals either retain or delegate the right to make an investment decision that generates payoffs for themselves and their agents. Extending the game to the context in which the return to stated effort is unknown allows us to explicitly study the relationship between locus of control and beliefs about the return to effort. We find that internal locus of control is linked to the preference for agency, an effect that is driven by women. We find no evidence that locus of control influences optimism and confidence about the return to stated effort, or that it operates through an illusion of control.