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In 2015, Germany introduced a statutory hourly minimum wage that was not only universally binding but also set at a relatively high level. We discuss the short-run effects of this new minimum wage on a wide set of socio-economic outcomes, such as employment and working hours, earnings and wage inequality, dependent and self-employment, as well as reservation wages and satisfaction. We also discuss difficulties in the implementation of the minimum wage and the measurement of its effects related to non-compliance and suitability of data sources. Two years after the minimum wage introduction, the following conclusions can be drawn: while hourly wages increased for low-wage earners, some small negative employment effects are also identifiable. The effects on aspired goals, such as poverty and inequality reduction, have not materialized in the short run. Instead, a tendency to reduce working hours is found, which alleviates the desired positive impact on monthly income. Additionally, the level of non-compliance was substantial in the short run, thus drawing attention to problems when implementing such a wide-reaching policy.
The worldwide populist wave has contributed to a perception that international law is currently in a state of crisis. This article examines in how far populist governments have challenged prevailing interpretations of international law. The article links structural features of populism with an analysis of populist governmental strategies and argumentative practices. It demonstrates that, in their rhetoric, populist governments promote an understanding of international law as a mere law of coordination. This is, however, not entirely reflected in their legal practices where an instrumental, cherry-picking approach prevails. The article concludes that policies of populist governments affect the current state of international law on two different levels: In the political sphere their practices alter the general environment in which legal rules are interpreted. In the legal sphere populist governments push for changes in the interpretation of established international legal rules. The article substantiates these propositions by focusing on the principle of nonintervention and foreign funding for NGOs.
International adjudication is currently under assault, encouraging a number of States to withdraw, or to consider withdrawing, from treaties providing for international dispute settlement. This Working Paper argues that the act of treaty withdrawal is not merely as the unilateral executive exercise of the individual sovereign prerogative of a State. International law places checks upon the exercise of withdrawal, recognising that it is an act that of its nature affects the interests of other States parties, which have a collective interest in constraining withdrawal. National courts have a complementary function in restraining unilateral withdrawal in order to support the domestic constitution. The arguments advanced against international adjudication in the name of popular democracy at the national level can serve as a cloak for the exercise of executive power unrestrained by law. The submission by States of their disputes to peaceful settlement through international adjudication is central, not incidental, to the successful operation of the international legal system.
The paper aims to lay out a framework for evaluating value shifts in the international legal order for the purposes of a forthcoming book. In view of current contestations it asks whether we are observing yet another period of norm change (Wandel) or even a more fundamental transformation of international law – a metamorphosis (Verwandlung). For this purpose it suggests to look into the mechanisms of how norms change from the perspective of legal and political science and also to approximate a reference point where change turns into metamorphosis. It submits that such a point may be reached where specific legally protected values are indeed changing (change of legal values) or where the very idea of protecting certain values through law is renounced (delegalizing of values). The paper discusses the benefits of such an interdisciplinary exchange and tries to identify differences and commonalities among both disciplinary perspectives.
Unfolding the history of one of the oldest human val-ues, the freedom of expression, while defining its limits, is a complicated task. Does freedom stop where hate starts? This very old dilemma is -now more than ever before- revealing new dimensions. Politicians and new laws aim at regulating free expression, while disagree-ments over such regulation gradually become a source of endless conflict in newly formed multicultural, inter-connected, and digitized societies. The example of the Network Enforcement Act is used to understand the idea of restrictive legal practices in Germany, but also to enlighten the fact that law is a human construction which was created in order to regulate communication among individuals. Alternative practices, to straight legal ones, are summarized to show other dimensions of regulating hate speech without involving top-down approaches. The article proposes the approach of re-storative justice as a combination of legal and medita-tive practices in cases of hate speech. One advantage of the restorative justice approach elaborated in this arti-cle is the potential to remedy the inner hate and the pain, both of the victim and perpetrator. Finally, reveal-ing parts of history and new aspects of the ‘hate speech-puzzle’, leads to a questioning of contemporary social structures that possibly generate hate itself.
International women’s rights
(2019)
This paper explores current contestations of women’s rights and the implications thereof for international legislation. While contestation over women’s rights is a far from new phenomenon, over the past two decades opposition to gender equality has become better organized at the transnational level, mobilizing a dispersed set of state and non-state actors, and is becoming more successful in halting the progress of women’s rights. I argue that the position of oppositional actors vis-à-vis women rights activism appears to be strengthened by two recent political developments: democratic backsliding and the closure of civic space. Some preliminary findings show how these interrelated developments lead to an erosion of women’s rights at the national level. Governments use low key tactics to dismantle institutional and implementation arrangements and sideline women’s organisations. Next, I explore the implications of these developments for gender equality norms at the national and international level. The active strategy of counter norming adopted by conservative and religious state and non-state actors, designed to circumvent and also undermine Western norms, is increasingly successful. In addition to this, the threatened position of domestic actors monitoring compliance of international treaties, makes the chances of backsliding on international commitments much higher.
Underpinning a legal system with certain values and helping to resolve norm conflicts is in domestic legal systems usually achieved through hierarchical superiority of certain norms of a constitutional nature. The present paper examines the question whether jus cogens can discharge this function within the traditionally horizontal and decentralized international legal order. In so doing, it commences with an overview of the historical origins of peremptory norms in legal scholarship, followed by its endorsement by positive law and courts and tribunals. This analysis illustrates that there are lingering uncertainties pertaining to the process of identification of peremptory norms. Even so, the concept has been invoked in State executive practice (although infrequently) and has been endorsed by various courts. However, such invocation thus far has had a limited impact from a legal perspective. It was mainly confined to a strengthened moral appeal and did in particular not facilitate the resolution of norm conflicts. The contribution further suggests that this limited impact results from the fact that the content of peremptory obligations is either very narrow or very vague. This, in turn, implies a lack of consensus amongst States regarding the content (scope) of jus cogens, including the values underlying these norms. As a result, it is questionable whether the construct of jus cogens is able to provide meaningful legal protection against the erosion of legal norms. It is too rudimentary in character to entrench and stabilize core human rights values as the moral foundation of the international legal order.
Matters of Interpretation
(2018)
This article analyses, from a methodological and theoretical perspective, how international legal method deals with change. Section 2 sets the stage, develops a legal perspective on change of norms and values in the international legal order and distinguishes between structural change and norm change. This is followed in sections 3 and 4 by an examination of doctrinal categories that provide techniques to process change in international legal practice. International legal method is equipped with several techniques to process—and to conceptualize and evaluate—change: ‘Formal’ norm change is a matter of the doctrine of sources. International law can also change ‘informally’ through the shifting meaning of norm texts. Both formal and informal change is a matter of interpretation. Therefore, section 5 aims at theorizing interpretive change. It examines the relationship between the sources of law and legal interpretation as categories of change and analyses theoretical perceptions of interpretive change.
This paper assesses, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the work of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) with respect to peace support operations. It seeks to know whether the establishment of the PSC in 2002 is leading or has led to a rise or a decline of collective security in Africa. It is demonstrated that in regard to its relative legal and institutional robustness, the PSC can be perceived as a rise of collective security compared with its predecessor, the Central Organ of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). However, it stagnates in terms of quantity and quality of actions on the ground. The main problem lies in the lack of sufficient operational autonomy from member states and international partners, such as the United Nations. Therefore, the PSC’s contribution to the maintenance of peace and security, and so the rise of the international rule of law in Africa is limited. The continent is still a war-torn region, affected by political crises and the expansion of terrorism in many countries. To solve this problem, AU member states should strengthen the PSC’s capacity, starting with the quick operationalisation of the African Standby Force. The implementation of the 2016 decision on alternative sources of financing AU’s institutions and activities is also a priority. In this regard, the political will of African states that may show that they want to take their organisation more seriously is required. This can further the AU self-reliance policy in collective security though the promotion of African solutions to African problems, and reduce the burden of the United Nations and other non-African actors’ interventions in the continent.
The author discusses the question of authority when determining the content of an international legal rule. Taking Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute as a point of departure, he determines through meticolous analysis what ranks as judicial decisions as well as teachings within the meaning of the norm. The author then proceeds to a number of factors to determine authoritativeness: objectivity, knowledgeability, depth of analysis, and the presence or otherwise of reasoning and, in particular, the persuasiveness of an opinion. In the case of judicial pronouncements, the author points out that the paradox between Article 59 and Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute is only an apparent one. While judgments of the Court are binding only between the parties, it is merely the underlying reasoning that can be taken into account in the context of Article 38(1)(d) if considered persuasive. Without central authority, authoritativenes in international law must always be earned which is also the reason for the lack of an hierarchical order between as well as within judicial pronouncements and learned writings though the former are usually more likely to fulfil the criteria of authoritativeness. In both cases, however, previously acquired reputation of a court or even an individual judge as well as of a learned writer can create a presumption of authoritativeness. On a more general level, the author concludes with a call for a more careful differentiation between the determination of law and its application. Putting the issue discussed into perspective, the author argues that situations of law determination arise, contrary to common understanding, in fact far less often than situations of law application.