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How much influence did the former communist state security service Darzhavna sigurnost (DS) have during the transformation period in Bulgaria?
For the first time in history, there is empirical data available that allow for an analysis of the role of the Bulgarian secret police and its "afterlife" after 1990.
Bulgarian intelligence archives, which were made partly accessible following the country's admission to the European Union in 2007, provide an excellent basis for an analysis of the relationship between the DS and the Soviet State Committee for Security, the transformation of the Bulgarian security apparatus in 1990, attempts to disclose the state security archives, and continuous infiltration of Bulgarian politics, institutions, and security apparatus by former agents of the communist intelligence and security apparatus.
The empirical data suggest that personal connections, dependencies, and informal networks of former DS agents and officials played an important role during the transformation period in Bulgaria and are at least partly responsible for political corruption, continuous Russian influence, a high degree of politicization of the Bulgarian security apparatus, misuse of intelligence and illegal surveillance practices, and a high degree of domestic and international mistrust and (dis-)loyalty.
After the Second World War, Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini were singled out as evil geniuses who misled the masses and plunged them into an “unwanted war.”
In relation to their armed forces, this narrative argued that the generals under their command had been demoted to powerless tools in the hands of the dictators, having to follow orders and with no sway over decision-making.
It was further asserted that Germany and Italy had not been able to secure a victory due to the dictators’ meddling. Yet, as this chapter shows, there are important differences between the German and Italian cases.
The chapter compares both the command structures in which the dictators operated as well as their grand strategies and how they cooperated during the war.
Their personal relationship will be also analyzed, as it is impossible to look at the Axis without understanding the complex personal relationship at the very top.
The strategies of both Hitler and Mussolini will be looked at and how each leader behaved in terms of working with their closest ally, together with some examples of cooperation on the lower military rungs.
Captive Red Army soldiers made up the majority of victims of Nazi Germany’s starvation policy against Soviet civilians and other non-combatants and thus constituted the largest single victim group of the German war of annihilation against the Soviet Union. Indeed, Soviet prisoners of war were the largest victim group of all National Socialist annihilation policies after the European Jews. Before the launch of Operation Barbarossa, it was clear to the Wehrmacht planning departments on exactly what scale they could expect to capture Soviet troops. Yet, they neglected to make the necessary preparations for feeding and sheltering the captured soldiers, who were viewed by the economic staffs and the military leadership alike as direct competitors of German troops and the German home front for precious food supplies. The number of extra mouths to feed was incompatible with German war aims. The obvious limitations on their freedom of movement and the relative ease with which large numbers could be segregated and their rations controlled were crucial factors in the death of over 3 million Soviet POWs, the vast majority directly or indirectly as a result of deliberate policies of neglect, undernourishment, and starvation while in the ‘care’ of the Wehrmacht. The most reliable figures for the mortality of Soviet POWs in German captivity reveal that up to 3.3 million died from a total of just over 5.7 million captured between June 1941 and February 1945 — a proportion of almost 58 percent. Of these, 2 million were already dead by the beginning of February 1942. In English, there is still neither a single monograph nor a single edited volume dedicated to the subject. This article now provides the first detailed stand-alone synthesis in that language addressing the whole period from 1941 to 1945.
La Wehrmacht tenía muy claro a qué escala podía esperar capturar a las tropas soviéticas, pero aun así descuidó los preparativos necesarios para alimentar y alojar a unos hombres que los planificadores económicos y los jefes militares consideraron que serían competidores directos de las fuerzas armadas en lo que a víveres se refiere. Las obvias limitaciones a su libertad de movimiento y la relativa facilidad con la que grandes cantidades de ellos pudieron ser segregados y sus raciones controladas fueron factores cruciales a la hora de explicar la muerte de más de tres millones de prisioneros de guerra soviéticos, la inmensa mayoría de ellos como consecuencia directa o indirecta del hambre y la desnutrición. El proceso se inició con un claro desinterés por encargarse debidamente de aquella gente, pero con la llegada del otoño derivó en la decisión clara y meditada de matar de hambre a todos los que no pudieran aportar su trabajo a la economía de guerra o a los ejércitos alemanes.