Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Working Paper (12)
- Article (11)
- Doctoral Thesis (4)
- Postprint (3)
- Part of a Book (1)
- Conference Proceeding (1)
- Preprint (1)
Is part of the Bibliography
- yes (33) (remove)
Keywords
- experiment (33) (remove)
Institute
- Center for Economic Policy Analysis (CEPA) (12)
- Fachgruppe Volkswirtschaftslehre (12)
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften (8)
- Fachgruppe Betriebswirtschaftslehre (3)
- Extern (2)
- Fachgruppe Soziologie (2)
- Institut für Physik und Astronomie (2)
- Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät (2)
- Department Erziehungswissenschaft (1)
- Department Psychologie (1)
This paper presents an experiment on the effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes on buyers’ repeated purchase decisions. Such schemes promise buyers a reduced price for all units that are bought in a certain time frame if the total quantity that is purchased passes a given threshold. This study finds a loyalty-enhancing effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes only if the buyers ex-ante expected that entering into the scheme would maximize their monetary gain, but later learn that they should leave the scheme. Furthermore, the effect crucially hinges on the framing of the price reduction.
”Thanks in Advance”
(2019)
This paper studies the effect of the commonly used phrase “thanks in advance” on compliance with a small request. In a controlled laboratory experiment we ask participants to give a detailed answer to an open question. The treatment variable is whether or not they see the phrase “thanks in advance.” Our participants react to the treatment by exerting less effort in answering the request even though they perceive the phrase as polite.
Numerous studies investigate which sanctioning institutions prevent cartel formation but little is known as to how these sanctions work. We contribute to understanding the inner workings of cartels by studying experimentally the effect of sanctioning institutions on firms’ communication. Using machine learning to organize the chat communication into topics, we find that firms are significantly less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing when sanctioning institutions are present. At the same time, average prices are lower when communication is less explicit. A mediation analysis suggests that sanctions are effective in hindering cartel formation not only because they introduce a risk of being fined but also by reducing the prevalence of explicit price communication.
In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird untersucht, in wie weit physikalische Experimente ein flow-Erleben bei Lernenden hervorrufen. Flow-Erleben wird als Motivationsursache gesehen und soll den Weg zu Freude und Glück darstellen. Insbesondere wegen dem oft zitierten Fachkräftemangel in naturwissenschaftlichen und technischen Berufen ist eine Motivationssteigerung in naturwissenschaftlichen Unterrichtsfächern wichtig. Denn trotz Leistungssteigerungen in internationalen Vergleichstests möchten in Deutschland deutlich weniger Schüler*innen einen solchen Beruf ergreifen als in anderen Industriestaaten. Daher gilt es, möglichst früh Schüler*innen für naturwissenschaftlich-technische Fächer zu begeistern und insbesondere im regelrecht verhassten Physikunterricht flow-Erleben zu erzeugen.
Im Rahmen dieser Arbeit wird das flow-Erleben von Studierenden in klassischen Laborexperimenten und FELS (Forschend-Entdeckendes Lernen mit dem Smartphone) als Lernumgebung untersucht. FELS ist eine an die Lebenswelt der Schüler*innen angepasste Lernumgebung, in der sie mit Smartphones ihre eigene Lebenswelt experimentell untersuchen.
Es zeigt sich, dass sowohl klassische Laborexperimente als auch in der Lebenswelt durchgeführte, smartphonebasierte Experimente flow-Erleben erzeugen. Allerdings verursachen die smartphonebasierten Experimente kaum Stressgefühle.
Die in dieser Arbeit herausgefundenen Ergebnisse liefern einen ersten Ansatz, der durch Folgestudien erweitert werden sollte.
Stochastic uncertainty can cause difficult coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can do so. To test this, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeatedly played Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not entail an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two main reasons for this finding: First, the stochastic uncertainty forces proposers to accept high strategic uncertainty if they intend to cooperate by claiming a low amount (which many proposers do not). Second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperative by transferring too little (which hinders cooperation in future periods).
Envy is an unpleasant emotion. If individuals anticipate that comparing their payoff with the (potentially higher) payoff of others will make them envious, they may want to actively avoid information about other people’s payoffs. Given the opportunity to reduce another person’s payoff, an individual’s envy may trigger behavior that is detrimental to welfare. In this case, if individuals anticipate that they will react in a welfare-reducing way, they may also avoid information about other people’s payoffs from the outset. We investigated these two hypotheses using three experiments. We found that 13% of our potentially envious subjects avoided information when they did not have the opportunity to reduce another participant’s payoff. Psychological scales do not explain this behavior. We also found that voluntarily uninformed subjects did neither deduct less of the payoff nor less frequently than subjects who could not avoid the information.
Getting a yes
(2020)
This paper studies how the request for a favor has to be devised in order to maximize its chance of success. We present results from a mini-dictator game, in which the recipient can send a free-form text message to the dictator before the latter decides. We find that putting effort into the message, writing in a humorous way and mentioning reasons why the money is needed pays off. Additionally, we find differences in the behavior of male and female dictators. Only men react positively to efficiency arguments, while only women react to messages that emphasize the dictators power and responsibility.
In the time of digitalization the demand for organizational change is rising and demands ways to cope with fundamental changes on the organizational as well as individual level. As a basis, learning and forgetting mechanisms need to be understood in order to guide a change process efficiently and successfully. Our research aims to get a better understanding of individual differences and mechanisms in the change context by performing an experiment where individuals learn and later re-learn a complex production process using a simulation setting. The individual’s performance, as well as retentivity and prior knowledge is assessed. Our results show that higher retentivity goes along with better learning and forgetting performances. Prior knowledge did not reveal such relation to the learning and forgetting performances. The influence of age and gender is discussed in detail.
Faced with the triad of time-cost-quality, the realization of knowledge-intensive tasks at economic conditions is not trivial. Since the number of knowledge-intensive processes is increasing more and more nowadays, the efficient design of knowledge transfers at business processes as well as the target-oriented improvement of them is essential, so that process outcomes satisfy high quality criteria and economic requirements. This particularly challenges knowledge management, aiming for the assignment of ideal manifestations of influence factors on knowledge transfers to a certain task. Faced with first attempts of knowledge transfer-based process improvements [1], this paper continues research about the quantitative examination of knowledge transfers and presents a ready-to-go experiment design that is able to examine quality of knowledge transfers empirically and is suitable to examine knowledge transfers on a quantitative level. Its use is proven by the example of four influence factors, which namely are stickiness, complexity, competence and time pressure.
The experimental literature on antitrust enforcement provides robust evidence that communication plays an important role for the formation and stability of cartels. We extend these studies through a design that distinguishes between innocuous communication and communication about a cartel, sanctioning only the latter. To this aim, we introduce a participant in the role of the competition authority, who is properly incentivized to judge communication content and price setting behavior of the firms. Using this novel design, we revisit the question whether a leniency rule successfully destabilizes cartels. In contrast to existing experimental studies, we find that a leniency rule does not affect cartelization. We discuss potential explanations for this contrasting result.