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The hospitality industry worldwide is among the hardest-hit industries from the COVID-19 lockdowns. Initial theoretical and practical observations in the hospitality industry indicate that business model innovation (BMI) might be a solution to recover from and successfully cope with the COVID-19 crisis. Interestingly, some firms in the hospitality industry already started to successfully adapt their business models. This study explores the why and how of these successful recovery attempts through BMI by conducting a multiple case study of six hospitality firms in Austria. We rely on interview data from managers together with one of their main stammgasts for each case, which we triangulate with secondary data for the analysis. Findings show that BMI is applied during and after the crisis to create new revenue streams and secure a higher level of liquidity, with an important role of stammgasts.
Reacting, fast and slow
(2021)
The COVID-19 pandemic created extraordinary challenges for governments to safeguard the well-being of their people. To what extent has leaders' reliance on scientific advice shaped government responses to the COVID-19 outbreak? We argue that leaders who tend to orient themselves on expert advice realized the extent of the crisis earlier. Consequently, these governments would adopt containment measures relatively quickly, despite the high uncertainty they faced. Over time, differences in government responses based on the use of science would dissipate due to herding effects. We test our argument on data combining 163 government responses to the pandemic with national- and individual-level characteristics. Consistent with our argument, we find that countries governed by politicians with a stronger technocratic mentality, approximated by holding a PhD, adopted restrictive containment measures faster in the early, but not in the later, stages of the crisis. This importance of expert-based leadership plausibly extends to other large-scale societal crises.
This dissertation investigates the impact of the economic and fiscal crisis starting in 2008 on EU climate policy-making. While the overall number of adopted greenhouse gas emission reduction policies declined in the crisis aftermath, EU lawmakers decided to introduce new or tighten existing regulations in some important policy domains. Existing knowledge about the crisis impact on EU legislative decision-making cannot explain these inconsistencies. In response, this study develops an actor-centred conceptual framework based on rational choice institutionalism that provides a micro-level link to explain how economic crises translate into altered policy-making patterns. The core theoretical argument draws on redistributive conflicts, arguing that tensions between ‘beneficiaries’ and ‘losers’ of a regulatory initiative intensify during economic crises and spill over to the policy domain. To test this hypothesis and using social network analysis, this study analyses policy processes in three case studies: The introduction of carbon dioxide emission limits for passenger cars, the expansion of the EU Emissions Trading System to aviation, and the introduction of a regulatory framework for biofuels. The key finding is that an economic shock causes EU policy domains to polarise politically, resulting in intensified conflict and more difficult decision-making. The results also show that this process of political polarisation roots in the industry that is the subject of the regulation, and that intergovernmental bargaining among member states becomes more important, but also more difficult in times of crisis.
Back to bureaucracy?
(2024)
In this contribution, the emergence of the neo-Weberian state (NWS) is analyzed with regard to German public administration. Drawing on the concept of a governance space, which consists of a hierarchy, markets, and networks, we distinguish between four empirical manifestations of the NWS, namely, the NWS as (1) come back of the public/ re-municipalization; (2) re-hierarchization; (3) de-agencification; (4) de-escalation in performance management. These movements can, on the one hand, be interpreted as a (partial) reversal of New Public Management (NPM) approaches and a “swinging back of the pendulum” (see Kuhlmann & Wollmann, 2019) toward public and classical Weberian principles (e.g., hierarchy, regulation, institutional re-aggregation). This reversal re-strengthened the hierarchy within the overall governance space to the detriment of, but without completely replacing, market mechanisms and networks. NPM’s failure to deliver what it promised and its inappropriateness as a response to more recent challenges connected to crises and wicked problems have engendered a partial return of the public and a move away from the economization logic of NPM. On the other hand, post-NPM reversals and managerial de-escalation gave rise to hybrid models that merge NPM and classic Weberian administration. While some well-functioning combinations of NPM and Weberianism exist, the hybridization of “old” and “neo” elements has also provoked ambivalent and negative assessments regarding the actual functioning of the NWS in Germany. Our analysis suggests that the NWS is only partially suitable as a model for reform and future administrative modernization, largely depending on the context surrounding reform and implementation practices.
This article is aimed at analysing local and intergovernmental responses to the COVID-19 pandemic in Germany during the ‘first wave’ of the pandemic. It will answer the question of how the intergovernmental system in Germany responded to the crisis and to what extent the pandemic has changed patterns of multi-level governance (MLG). The article argues that the coordination of pandemic management in Germany shifted between two ideal types of multi-level governance. While in the first phase of the pandemic the territorially defined multi-level system with the sub-national and local authorities as key actors of crisis management was predominant, in the second phase a more functional orientation with increased vertical coordination gained in importance. Later on, more reliance was given again on local decision-making. Based on this analysis, we will draw some preliminary conclusions on how effective MLG in Germany has been for coordinating pandemic management and point out the shortcomings.
Die vorliegende Studie zeigt, dass Daten in der Krise eine herausragende Bedeutung für die wissenschaftliche Politikberatung, administrative Entscheidungsvorbereitung und politische Entscheidungsfindung haben. In der Krise gab es jedoch gravierende Kommunikationsprobleme und Unsicherheiten in der wechselseitigen Erwartungshaltung von wissenschaftlichen Datengebern und politisch-administrativen Datennutzern. Die Wissensakkumulation und Entscheidungsabwägung wurde außerdem durch eine unsichere und volatile Datenlage zum Pandemiegeschehen, verbunden mit einer dynamischen Lageentwicklung, erschwert. Nach wie vor sind das Bewusstsein und wechselseitige Verständnis für die spezifischen Rollenprofile der am wissenschaftlichen Politikberatungsprozess beteiligten Akteure sowie insbesondere deren Abgrenzung als unzureichend einzuschätzen.
Die Studie hat darüber hinaus vielfältige Defizite hinsichtlich der Verfügbarkeit, Qualität, Zugänglichkeit, Teilbarkeit und Nutzbarkeit von Daten identifiziert, die Datenproduzenten und -verwender vor erhebliche Herausforderungen stellen und einen umfangreichen Reformbedarf aufzeigen, da zum einen wichtige Datenbestände für eine krisenbezogene Politikberatung fehlen. Zum anderen sind die Tiefenschärfe und Differenziertheit des verfügbaren Datenbestandes teilweise unzureichend. Dies gilt z.B. für sozialstrukturelle Daten zur Schwere der Pandemiebetroffenheit verschiedener Gruppen oder für kleinräumige Daten über Belastungs- und Kapazitätsparameter, etwa zur Personalabdeckung auf Intensivstationen, in Gesundheitsämtern und Pflegeeinrichtungen. Datendefizite sind ferner im Hinblick auf eine ganzheitliche Pandemiebeurteilung festzustellen, zum Beispiel bezüglich der Gesundheitseffekte im weiteren Sinne, die aufgrund der ergriffenen Maßnahmen entstanden sind (Verschiebung oder Wegfall von Operationen, Behandlungen und Prävention, aber auch häusliche Gewalt und psychische Belastungen). Mangels systematischer Begleitstudien und evaluativer Untersuchungen, u.a. auch zu lokalen Pilotprojekten und Experimenten, bestehen außerdem Datendefizite im Hinblick auf die Wirkungen von Eindämmungsmaßnahmen oder deren Aufhebung auf der gebietskörperschaftlichen Ebene.
Insgesamt belegt die Studie, dass es zur Optimierung der datenbasierten Politikberatung und politischen Entscheidungsfindung in und außerhalb von Krisen nicht nur darum gehen kann, ein „Mehr“ an Daten zu produzieren sowie deren Qualität, Verknüpfung und Teilung zu verbessern. Vielmehr müssen auch die Anreizstrukturen und Interessenlagen in Politik, Verwaltung und Wissenschaft sowie die Kompetenzen, Handlungsorientierungen und kognitiv-kulturellen Prägungen der verschiedenen Akteure in den Blick genommen werden. Es müssten also Anreize gesetzt und Strukturen geschaffen werden, um das Interesse, den Willen und das Können (will and skill) zur Datennutzung auf Seiten politisch-administrativer Entscheider und zur Dateneinspeisung auf Seiten von Wissenschaftlern zu stärken. Neben adressatengerechter Informationsaufbereitung geht es dabei auch um die Gestaltung eines normativen und institutionellen Rahmens, innerhalb dessen die Nutzung von Daten für Entscheidungen effektiver, qualifizierter, aber auch transparenter, nachvollziehbarer und damit demokratisch legitimer erfolgen kann.
Vor dem Hintergrund dieser empirischen Befunde werden acht Cluster von Optimierungsmaßnahmen vorgeschlagen:
(1) Etablierung von Datenstrecken und Datenteams,
(2) Schaffung regionaler Datenkompetenzzentren,
(3) Stärkung von Data Literacy und Beschleunigung des Kulturwandels in der öffentlichen Verwaltung,
(4) Datenstandardisierung, Interoperabilität und Registermodernisierung,
(5) Ausbau von Public Data Pools und Open Data Nutzung,
(6) Effektivere Verbindung von Datenschutz und Datennutzung,
(7) Entwicklung eines hochfrequenten, repräsentativen Datensatzes,
(8) Förderung der europäischen Daten-Zusammenarbeit.
This cross-country comparison of administrative responses to the COVID-19 pandemic in France, Germany and Sweden is aimed at exploring how institutional contexts and administrative cultures have shaped strategies of problem-solving and governance modes during the pandemic, and to what extent the crisis has been used for opportunity management. The article shows that in France, the central government reacted determinedly and hierarchically, with tough containment measures. By contrast, the response in Germany was characterized by an initial bottom-up approach that gave way to remarkable federal unity in the further course of the crisis, followed again by a return to regional variance and local discretion. In Sweden, there was a continuation of 'normal governance' and a strategy of relying on voluntary compliance largely based on recommendations and less - as in Germany and France - on a strategy of imposing legally binding regulations. The comparative analysis also reveals that relevant stakeholders in all three countries have used the crisis as an opportunity for changes in the institutional settings and administrative procedures.
Points for practitioners
COVID-19 has shown that national political and administrative standard operating procedures in preparation for crises are, at best, partially helpful. Notwithstanding the fact that dealing with the unpredictable is a necessary part of crisis management, a need to further improve the institutional preparedness for pandemic crises in all three countries examined here has also become clear. This should be done particularly by way of shifting resources to the health and care sectors, strengthening the decentralized management of health emergencies, stocking and/or self-producing protection material, assessing the effects of crisis measures, and opening the scientific discourse to broader arenas of experts.
This cross-country comparison of administrative responses to the COVID-19 pandemic in France, Germany and Sweden is aimed at exploring how institutional contexts and administrative cultures have shaped strategies of problem-solving and governance modes during the pandemic, and to what extent the crisis has been used for opportunity management. The article shows that in France, the central government reacted determinedly and hierarchically, with tough containment measures. By contrast, the response in Germany was characterized by an initial bottom-up approach that gave way to remarkable federal unity in the further course of the crisis, followed again by a return to regional variance and local discretion. In Sweden, there was a continuation of ‘normal governance’ and a strategy of relying on voluntary compliance largely based on recommendations and less – as in Germany and France – on a strategy of imposing legally binding regulations. The comparative analysis also reveals that relevant stakeholders in all three countries have used the crisis as an opportunity for changes in the institutional settings and administrative procedures.
Struggling over crisis
(2018)
If you put two economists in a room, you get two opinions, unless one of them is Lord Keynes, in which case you get three opinions.” Following the premise of this quotation attributed to Winston Churchill, varying perceptions of the European crisis by academic economists and their structural homology to economists’ positions in the field of economics are examined. The dataset analysed using specific multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) and hierarchical agglomerative clustering (HAC) comprises information on the careers of 480 German-speaking economists and on statements they made concerning crisis-related issues. It can be shown that the main structural differences in the composition and amount of scientific and academic capital held by economists as well as their age and degree of transnationalisation are linked to how they see the crisis: as a national sovereign debt crisis, as a European banking crisis, or as a crisis of European integration and institutions.
It is the intention of this study to contribute to further rethinking and innovating in the Microcredit business which stands at a turning point – after around 40 years of practice it is endangered to fail as a tool for economic development and to become a doubtful finance product with a random scope instead. So far, a positive impact of Microfinance on the improvement of the lives of the poor could not be confirmed. Over-indebtment of borrowers due to the pre-dominance of consumption Microcredits has become a widespread problem. Furthermore, a rising number of abusive and commercially excessive practices have been reported.
In fact, the Microfinance sector appears to suffer from a major underlying deficit: there does not exist a coherent and transparent understanding of its meaning and objectives so that Microfinance providers worldwide follow their own approaches of Microfinance which tend to differ considerably from each other.
In this sense the study aims at consolidating the multi-faced and very often confusingly different Microcredit profiles that exist nowadays. Subsequently, in this study, the Microfinance spectrum will be narrowed to one clear-cut objective, in fact away from the mere monetary business transactions to poor people it has gradually been reduced to back towards a tool for economic development as originally envisaged by its pioneers.
Hence, the fundamental research question of this study is whether, and under which conditions, Microfinance may attain a positive economic impact leading to an improvement of the living of the poor.
The study is structured in five parts: the three main parts (II.-IV.) are surrounded by an introduction (I.) and conclusion (V.). In part II., the Microfinance sector is analysed critically aiming to identify the challenges persisting as well as their root causes. In the third part, a change to the macroeconomic perspective is undertaken in oder to learn about the potential and requirements of small-scale finance to enhance economic development, particularly within the economic context of less developed countries. By consolidating the insights gained in part IV., the elements of a new concept of Microfinance with the objecitve to achieve economic development of its borrowers are elaborated.
Microfinance is a rather sensitive business the great fundamental idea of which is easily corruptible and, additionally, the recipients of which are predestined victims of abuse due to their limited knowledge in finance. It therefore needs to be practiced responsibly, but also according to clear cut definitions of its meaning and objectives all institutions active in the sector should be devoted to comply with. This is especially relevant as the demand for Microfinance services is expected to rise further within the years coming. For example, the recent refugee migration movement towards Europe entails a vast potential for Microfinance to enable these people to make a new start into economic life. This goes to show that Microfinance may no longer mainly be associated with a less developed economic context, but that it will gain importance as a financial instrument in the developed economies, too.