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Der Beitrag widmet sich zwei überaus fruchtbaren theoretischen Ansätzen in der Policy-Forschung und darüber hinaus: der Vetospielertheorie und Vetopunkt-Ansätzen. Neben den Grundzügen beider Ansätze stellen wir grundlegende Entwicklungslinien und Probleme dieser Literaturen anhand beispielhafter Studien dar. Es zeigt sich, dass beide Ansätze teils kontroverse Annahmen treffen, zu denen es plausible Alternativen gibt. Zum Beispiel kann das Verhalten von Koalitionsparteien im Policy-Prozess anders als von der Vetospielertheorie angenommen modelliert werden. Die kausalen Effekte bestimmter Institutionen oder Vetopunkte können zudem je nach Kontext variieren. Diesem Kontext sollte größere Beachtung geschenkt werden.
The literature on international regulatory regimes has highlighted how rival standards can create different points of convergence. Scholarly attention has also focused on how the European Union (EU) and the United States (USA) attempt to ‘export’ their environmental standards internationally. Here, we explore the effectiveness of these attempts by means of third states' decisions to ratify the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, a multilateral environmental agreement regulating genetically modified organisms that is promoted by the EU but opposed by the USA. Our findings confirm that both rivals are able to influence the ratification decision of states, but they also suggest that these effects may have different origins. Countries relying more heavily on US markets for food exports tend to be less likely to ratify the Cartagena Protocol, while countries that have applied for EU membership are more likely to ratify the protocol.
Compliance with EU biofuel targets in South-Eastern and Eastern Europe: Do interest groups matter?
(2015)
The European Union requires its member states to establish national targets for the biofuel content of all diesel and petrol supplies for transport placed on the market. This study explores the adoption of this European Union policy across South-Eastern and Eastern Europe between 2003 and 2012. In theoretical terms, we are specifically interested in examining the role of interest groups for policy adoption. We argue that the oil industry in general and the producers of biofuels in particular will support the establishment of national biofuel targets because they expect economic gains. By contrast, we expect environmental groups with international and regional ties to oppose such targets because biofuels have come under attack for their potential environmental impact including deforestation, a loss in biodiversity, and food insecurity. Empirically, we concentrate on policy adoptions in 21 South-Eastern and Eastern European states with varied relations to the European Union and the Energy Community. Our analysis supports our main arguments in suggesting that a stronger presence of environmental groups decreases the chances of adopting national biofuel targets across our country sample while producer interests tend to increase adoptions. This finding holds true also when controlling for a country's European Union membership and accession perspective, membership in the Energy Community, and additional domestic-level factors. These results add more generally to our understanding about compliance with European Union policies and environmental governance.
Giving less by doing more? Dynamics of social policy expansion and dismantling in 18 OECD countries
(2014)
Protection against social risks is generally popular among voters and should enjoy the benefits of institutional inertia. Yet retrenchment occurs rather frequently in advanced welfare states without this systematically leading to electoral punishment. We solve this paradox by, first, arguing that governments can avoid the blame of retrenchment by pursuing a strategy of expansionary dismantling' where new policies and instruments are used to compensate reform losers and to obfuscate cutbacks. Second, we test our argument with a huge new dataset consisting of changes in unemployment legislation and replacement rates in 18 OECD countries from 1976 to 2000. The statistical tests provide robust support for our argument, suggesting that the introduction of new policies and instruments leads to cutbacks in replacement rates. We also find that left-leaning governments are least likely to engage in expansionary dismantling.