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There are three different interpretations of Adam Smith's trade theory in modern literature: first, the neoclassical theory of absolute advantage; second, an interpretation based on increasing returns; third, an interpretation of uneven development. These interpretations come to widely different conclusions, especially considering the development of the pattern of trade in Smith's theory. I discuss how these three interpretations emerged. They do not stem from a more detailed analysis of Smith's works itself but reflect changes within international trade theory. They all result from the fact that economists have imposed nineteenth- and twentieth-century modes of thoughts on Smith's theory, forcing his writings into later-developed theoretical frameworks. In contrast to classical economists in the nineteenth century, these subsequent interpretations misrepresent Smith's trade theory in order to portray him as a forerunner of later theories. The differing interpretations can thus be explained only against the backdrop of the development of international trade theory.
Adam Smith's "Two Distinct Benefits" from Trade: The Dead End of "Vent-for-Surplus" Interpretations
(2015)
This thesis deals with two theories of international trade: the theory of comparative advantage, which is connected to the name David Ricardo and is dominating current trade theory, and Adam Smith’s theory of absolute advantage. Both theories are compared and their assumptions are scrutinised. The former theory is rejected on theoretical and empirical grounds in favour of the latter. On the basis of the theory of absolute advantage, developments of free international trade are examined, whereby the focus is on trade between industrial and underdeveloped countries. The main conclusions are that trade patterns are determined by absolute production cost advantages and that the gap between developed and poor countries is not reduced but rather increased by free trade.
Relatively little is known about the relationship between Carl Menger, founder of the Austrian school of economics, and his son, Karl Menger, the mathematician, geometer, logician, and philosopher of science, whose mathematical colloquium at the University of Vienna was essential for the development of mathematical economics. Based on Karl Menger’s diaries and correspondence, the present paper considers the development and struggles of the young Karl Menger, focusing on the years 1919–23, when Vienna was a vanquished city. We discuss the various relations within the Menger family and their significance for Karl Menger’s intellectual development. Additionally, we consider his acquaintances with economists such as Knut Wicksell, David Davidson, and Eli Heckscher as well as the younger Menger’s work in economics. We shed new light on his editorship of the second edition of his father’s Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre.
This paper investigates the views on competition theory and policy of the American institutional economists during the first half of the 20th century. These perspectives contrasted with those of contemporary neoclassical and later mainstream economic approaches. We identify three distinct dimensions to an institutionalist perspective on competition. First, institutionalist approaches focused on describing industry details, so as to bring theory into closer contact with reality. Second, institutionalists emphasized that while competition was sometimes beneficial, it could also be disruptive. Third, institutionalists had a broad view of the objectives of competition policy that extended beyond effects on consumer welfare. Consequently, institutionalists advocated for a wide range of policies to enhance competition, including industrial self-regulation, broad stakeholder representation within corporations, and direct governmental regulations. Their experimental attitude implied that policy would always be evolving, and antitrust enforcement might be only one stage in the development toward a regime of industrial regulation.