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Faced with the triad of time-cost-quality, the realization of knowledge-intensive tasks at economic conditions is not trivial. Since the number of knowledge-intensive processes is increasing more and more nowadays, the efficient design of knowledge transfers at business processes as well as the target-oriented improvement of them is essential, so that process outcomes satisfy high quality criteria and economic requirements. This particularly challenges knowledge management, aiming for the assignment of ideal manifestations of influence factors on knowledge transfers to a certain task. Faced with first attempts of knowledge transfer-based process improvements [1], this paper continues research about the quantitative examination of knowledge transfers and presents a ready-to-go experiment design that is able to examine quality of knowledge transfers empirically and is suitable to examine knowledge transfers on a quantitative level. Its use is proven by the example of four influence factors, which namely are stickiness, complexity, competence and time pressure.
Leadership plays an important role for the efficient and fair solution of social dilemmas but the effectiveness of a leader can vary substantially. Two main factors of leadership impact are the ability to induce high contributions by all group members and the (expected) fair use of power. Participants in our experiment decide about contributions to a public good. After all contributions are made, the leader can choose how much of the joint earnings to assign to herself; the remainder is distributed equally among the followers. Using machine learning techniques, we study whether the content of initial open statements by the group members predicts their behavior as a leader and whether groups are able to identify such clues and endogenously appoint a “good” leader to solve the dilemma. We find that leaders who promise fairness are more likely to behave fairly, and that followers appoint as leaders those who write more explicitly about fairness and efficiency. However, in their contribution decision, followers focus on the leader’s first-move contribution and place less importance on the content of the leader’s statements.
Does working in a gender-atypical occupation reduce individuals’ likelihood of finding a different-sex romantic partner, and do such occupational partnership penalties contribute to occupational gender segregation? To answer this question, we theorized partnership penalties for working in gender-atypical occupations by drawing on insights from evolutionary psychology, social constructivism, and rational choice theory and exploited the stability of occupational pathways in Germany. In Study 1, we analyzed observational data from a national probability sample (N= 1,634,944) to assess whether individuals in gender-atypical occupations were less likely to be partnered than individuals who worked in gender typical occupations. To assess whether the observed partnership gaps found in Study 1 were causally related to the gender typicality of men’s and women’s occupations, we conducted a field experiment on a dating app (N = 6,778). Because the findings from Study 2 suggested that young women and men indeed experienced penalties for working in a gender-atypical occupation (at least when they were not highly attractive), we employed a choice-experimental design in Study 3 (N = 1,250) to assess whether women and men were aware of occupational partnership penalties and showed that anticipating occupational partnership penalties may keep young and highly educated women from working in gender-atypical occupations. Our main conclusion therefore is that that observed penalties and their anticipation seem to be driven by unconscious rather than conscious processes.
In dieser Arbeit werden nichtlineare Kopplungsmechanismen von akustischen Oszillatoren untersucht, die zu Synchronisation führen können. Aufbauend auf die Fragestellungen vorangegangener Arbeiten werden mit Hilfe theoretischer und experimenteller Studien sowie mit Hilfe numerischer Simulationen die Elemente der Tonentstehung in der Orgelpfeife und die Mechanismen der gegenseitigen Wechselwirkung von Orgelpfeifen identifiziert. Daraus wird erstmalig ein vollständig auf den aeroakustischen und fluiddynamischen Grundprinzipien basierendes nichtlinear gekoppeltes Modell selbst-erregter Oszillatoren für die Beschreibung des Verhaltens zweier wechselwirkender Orgelpfeifen entwickelt. Die durchgeführten Modellrechnungen werden mit den experimentellen Befunden verglichen. Es zeigt sich, dass die Tonentstehung und die Kopplungsmechanismen von Orgelpfeifen durch das entwickelte Oszillatormodell in weiten Teilen richtig beschrieben werden. Insbesondere kann damit die Ursache für den nichtlinearen Zusammenhang von Kopplungsstärke und Synchronisation des gekoppelten Zwei-Pfeifen Systems, welcher sich in einem nichtlinearen Verlauf der Arnoldzunge darstellt, geklärt werden. Mit den gewonnenen Erkenntnissen wird der Einfluss des Raumes auf die Tonentstehung bei Orgelpfeifen betrachtet. Dafür werden numerische Simulationen der Wechselwirkung einer Orgelpfeife mit verschiedenen Raumgeometrien, wie z. B. ebene, konvexe, konkave, und gezahnte Geometrien, exemplarisch untersucht. Auch der Einfluss von Schwellkästen auf die Tonentstehung und die Klangbildung der Orgelpfeife wird studiert. In weiteren, neuartigen Synchronisationsexperimenten mit identisch gestimmten Orgelpfeifen, sowie mit Mixturen wird die Synchronisation für verschiedene, horizontale und vertikale Pfeifenabstände in der Ebene der Schallabstrahlung, untersucht. Die dabei erstmalig beobachteten räumlich isotropen Unstetigkeiten im Schwingungsverhalten der gekoppelten Pfeifensysteme, deuten auf abstandsabhängige Wechsel zwischen gegen- und gleichphasigen Sychronisationsregimen hin. Abschließend wird die Möglichkeit dokumentiert, das Phänomen der Synchronisation zweier Orgelpfeifen durch numerische Simulationen, also der Behandlung der kompressiblen Navier-Stokes Gleichungen mit entsprechenden Rand- und Anfangsbedingungen, realitätsnah abzubilden. Auch dies stellt ein Novum dar.
This paper presents an experiment on the effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes on buyers’ repeated purchase decisions. Such schemes promise buyers a reduced price for all units that are bought in a certain time frame if the total quantity that is purchased passes a given threshold. This study finds a loyalty-enhancing effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes only if the buyers ex-ante expected that entering into the scheme would maximize their monetary gain, but later learn that they should leave the scheme. Furthermore, the effect crucially hinges on the framing of the price reduction.
Stochastic uncertainty can cause difficult coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can do so. To test this, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeatedly played Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not entail an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two main reasons for this finding: First, the stochastic uncertainty forces proposers to accept high strategic uncertainty if they intend to cooperate by claiming a low amount (which many proposers do not). Second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperative by transferring too little (which hinders cooperation in future periods).
Stochastic uncertainty can cause coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can increase efficiency. To test this transfer mechanism, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeated Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not lead to an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two major reasons for this failure: first, stochastic uncertainty forces proposers intending to cooperate to accept high strategic uncertainty, which many proposers avoid; second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperatively, which hinders cooperation in future periods.
This study examines whether incentives affect public employees' intention to share knowledge. Tested incentives satisfy needs for either achievement or appreciation. Both treatments were tested on implicit as well as explicit knowledge sharing. A 2 x 3 factorial survey experiment was designed to observe within-person and between-person effects. Data were collected from public employees in the core administration and healthcare sector (n = 623) in 2018. The analysis indicates that both treatments positively affect knowledge-sharing intention if it is explicit knowledge that ought to be shared. However, no effects of either treatment can be found in either type of knowledge sharing. No negative effect of the tested incentives on knowledge sharing was observed. Hence, incentives might not harm knowledge sharing but also do not pay off in organizational practice. In contrast to these motivation-enhancing human resource practices, ability and opportunity-enhancing practices should be tested to foster knowledge sharing.
This paper studies how individuals discount the utility they derive from their provision of goods over spatial distance. In a controlled laboratory experiment in Germany, we elicit preferences for the provision of the same good at different locations. To isolate spatial preferences from any other direct value of the goods being close to the individual, we focus on goods with “existence value.” We find that individuals put special weight on the provision of these goods in their immediate vicinity. This “vicinity bias” represents a spatial analogy to the “present bias” in the time dimension.
This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices.