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Dissociating retention and access in working memory : an age-comparative study of mental arithmetic
(2001)
Two experiments with a working-memory updating task investigated dual-task interference between short-term storage of numerical and spatial material, between execution of a numerical and a spatial updating operation, and between storage and processing. Participants memorised a set of digits and a set of spatial positions, updated elements of both sets by a sequence of operations, and then recalled the final values. In Experiment 1, a single element in each memory set had to be updated several times. There was little interference between storage of the two sets, and between storage and processing, but parallel execution of the two operations was not possible. In Experiment 2, all elements in both memory sets were updated in random order. There was substantial interference between memory for the numerical and the spatial sets, and between storage and processing. Parallel execution of two operations was again not possible. Moreover, trying to do two operations simultaneously resulted in impaired memory of final results. The results support the distinction between the activated part of long-term memory that can hold elements currently not needed for processing, and a more central, capacity-limited part of working memory that provides access to its contents for processing
Effects of directionality in deductive reasoning : II. Premise integration and conclusion evaluation
(2005)
Previous research (Oberauer & Wilhelm, 2000) has shown an inherent directionality between the two terms linked in premises of typical deductive reasoning tasks. With three experiments we investigated the effect of inherent directionality on the time to integrate two premises and for the derivation of a conclusion. We varied figure (i.e., order of terms in the premises) and direction of inference (i.e., order of terms in the conclusion) in deduction tasks from various domains (propositional reasoning, syllogisms, spatial, temporal, and linear order reasoning). Effects of figure on premise reading times varied with the directionality of the relations. Effects of direction of inference reflected the same directionality for a subset of relations. We propose that two factors are jointly responsible for a large part of observed directionality effects in premise integration: the inherent directionality of relational statements and a general advantage for a given-new order of terms in the second premise. Difficulty of deriving a conclusion is affected by the directionality or relations if and only if the relation is semantically asymmetric, so that the directionality must be preserved in the integrated mental model
We tested the independent influences of two content-based factors on dual-task costs, and on the parallel processing ability: The pairing of S-R modalities and the pairing of relevant features between stimuli and responses of two tasks. The two pairing factors were realized across four dual-task groups. Within each group the two tasks comprised two different stimulus modalities (visual and auditory), two different relevant stimulus features (spatial and verbal) and two response modalities (manual and vocal). Pairings of S-R modalities (standard: visual-manual and auditory-vocal, non-standard: visual-vocal and auditory manual) and feature pairings (standard: spatial-manual and verbal-vocal, non-standard: spatial-vocal and verbal-manual) varied across groups. All participants practiced their respective dual-task combination in a paradigm with simultaneous stimulus onset before being transferred to a psychological refractory period paradigm varying stimulus-onset asynchrony. A comparison at the end of practice revealed similar dual-task costs and similar pairing effects in both paradigms. Dual-task costs depended on modality and feature pairings. Groups training with non-standard feature pairings (i.e., verbal stimulus features mapped to spatially separated response keys, or spatial stimulus features mapped to verbal responses) and non-standard modality pairings (i.e., auditory stimulus mapped to manual response, or visual stimulus mapped to vocal responses) had higher dual-task costs than respective standard pairings. In contrast, irrespective of modality pairing dual-task costs virtually disappeared with standard feature pairings after practice in both paradigms. The results can be explained by crosstalk between feature-binding processes for the two tasks. Crosstalk was present for non-standard but absent for standard feature pairings. Therefore, standard feature pairings enabled parallel processing at the end of practice. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
This article reinvestigates the claim by P. Verhaeghen, J. Cerella, and C. Basak (2004) that the focus of attention in working memory can be expanded from 1 to 4 items through practice. Using a modified version of Verhaeghen et al.'s n-back paradigm, Experiments 1 and 3 show that a signature of a one-item focus, the time cost for switching between items in working memory, persists over practice. Verhaeghen et al. reported a shift over practice from a step function to a linear slope of reaction times over set size and argued that it reflects the expansion of the focus. With an improved counterbalancing scheme, a continuously increasing slope was found even without practice in Experiment 2. The results question the hypothesis that the focus is expanded through practice. They are in line with predictions from a model that distinguishes a one-item focus from a direct-access region holding about 4 items
We report two experiments testing a central prediction of the probabilistic account of reasoning provided by Oaksford and Chater (2001): Acceptance of standard conditional inferences, card choices in the Wason selection task, and quantifiers chosen for conclusions from syllogisms should vary as a function of the frequency of the concepts involved. Frequency was manipulated by a probability-learning phase preceding the reasoning tasks to simulate natural sampling. The effects predicted by Oaksford and Chater (2001) were not obtained with any of the three paradigms
Media coverage of the 2003 Iraq War frequently contained corrections and retractions of earlier information. For example, claims that Iraqi forces executed coalition prisoners of war after they surrendered were retracted the day after the claims were made. Similarly, tentative initial reports about the discovery of weapons of mass destruction were all later disconfirmed. We investigated the effects of these retractions and disconfirmations on people's memory for and beliefs about war-related events in two coalition countries (Australia and the United States) and one country that opposed the war (Germany). Participants were queried about (a) true events, (b) events initially presented as fact but subsequently retracted, and (c) fictional events. Participants in the United States did not show sensitivity to the correction of misinformation, whereas participants in Australia and Germany discounted corrected misinformation. Our results are consistent with previous findings in that the differences between samples reflect greater suspicion about the motives underlying the war among people in Australia and Germany than among people in the United States