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The Implicit Association Test (IAT) aims to measure participants' automatic evaluation of an attitude object and is useful especially for the measurement of attitudes related to socially sensitive subjects, e.g. doping in sports. Several studies indicate that IAT scores can be faked on instruction. But fully or semi-instructed research scenarios might not properly reflect what happens in more realistic situations, when participants secretly decide to try faking the test. The present study is the first to investigate IAT faking when there is only an implicit incentive to do so. Sixty-five athletes (22.83 years +/- 2.45; 25 women) were randomly assigned to an incentive-to-fake condition or a control condition. Participants in the incentive-to-fake condition were manipulated to believe that athletes with lenient doping attitudes would be referred to a tedious 45-minute anti-doping program. Attitudes were measured with the pictorial doping brief IAT (BIAT) and with the Performance Enhancement Attitude Scale (PEAS). A one-way MANOVA revealed significant differences between conditions after the manipulation in PEAS scores, but not in the doping BIAT. In the light of our hypothesis this suggests that participants successfully faked an exceedingly negative attitude to doping when completing the PEAS, but were unsuccessful in doing so on the reaction time-based test. This study assessed BIAT faking in a setting that aimed to resemble a situation in which participants want to hide their attempts to cheat. The two measures of attitude were differentially affected by the implicit incentive. Our findings provide evidence that the pictorial doping BIAT is relatively robust against spontaneous and naive faking attempts. (B) IATs might be less prone to faking than implied by previous studies.
Background:
Deception can distort psychological tests on socially sensitive topics. Understanding the cerebral
processes that are involved in such faking can be useful in detection and prevention of deception. Previous research
shows that faking a brief implicit association test (BIAT ) evokes a characteristic ERP response. It is not yet known
whether temporarily available self-control resources moderate this response. We randomly assigned 22 participants
(15 females, 24.23
±
2.91
years old) to a counterbalanced repeated-measurements design. Participants first com-
pleted a Brief-IAT (BIAT ) on doping attitudes as a baseline measure and were then instructed to fake a negative dop
-
ing attitude both when self-control resources were depleted and non-depleted. Cerebral activity during BIAT perfor
-
mance was assessed using high-density EEG.
Results:
Compared to the baseline BIAT, event-related potentials showed a first interaction at the parietal P1,
while significant post hoc differences were found only at the later occurring late positive potential. Here, signifi-
cantly decreased amplitudes were recorded for ‘normal’ faking, but not in the depletion condition. In source space,
enhanced activity was found for ‘normal’ faking in the bilateral temporoparietal junction. Behaviorally, participants
were successful in faking the BIAT successfully in both conditions.
Conclusions:
Results indicate that temporarily available self-control resources do not affect overt faking success on
a BIAT. However, differences were found on an electrophysiological level. This indicates that while on a phenotypical
level self-control resources play a negligible role in deliberate test faking the underlying cerebral processes are markedly different.