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As part of the current overall process of de-formalization in international law States increasingly chose informal, non-legally binding agreements or ‘Memoranda of Understanding’ (‘MOUs') to organize their international affairs. The increasing conclusion of such legally non-binding instruments in addition to their flexibility, however, also leads to uncertainties in international relations. Against this background, this article deals with possible indirect legal consequences produced by MOUs. It discusses the different legal mechanisms and avenues that may give rise to secondary legal effects of MOUs through a process of interaction with and interpretation in line with other (formal) sources of international law. The article further considers various strategies how to avoid such eventual possible unintended or unexpected indirect legal effects of MOUs when drafting such instruments and when dealing with them subsequent to their respective ‘adoption’.
Legal shades of grey?
(2021)
As part of the current process of de-formalization in international law, States increasingly chose informal, non-legally binding agreements or 'Memoranda of Understanding' ('MOUs') to organize their international affairs. The increasing conclusion of such legally non-binding instruments in addition to their flexibility, however, also leads to uncertainties in international relations. Against this background, this article deals with possible indirect legal consequences produced by MOUs. It discusses the different legal mechanisms and avenues that may give rise to such secondary legal effects of MOUs through a process of interaction with, and interpretation in line with, other (formal) sources of international law. The article further considers various strategies how to avoid such eventual possible unintended or unexpected indirect legal effects of MOUs when drafting such instruments and when dealing with them subsequent to their respective 'adoption'.
This paper consists of two parts: In the first part, some of the challenges with which the Internationaal Criminal Court is currently confronted are being presented. First of all, the article will describe the current state of the International Criminal Court and the Rome Statue. Afterwards, the article analyses the Court’s efforts to deal with cases against third-country nationals and the challenges it is facing in that regard. In addition, the Court’s case law will be analyzed in order to determine an increasing ‘emancipation’ of the case law of the International Criminal Court from international humanitarian law. The second part of the paper will briefly discuss the role of domestic international criminal law and domestic courts in the further development and enforcement of international criminal law. As an example of the role that domestic courts may have in clarifying classic issues in international law, the judgment of the German Supreme Court of January 28, 2021 (3 StR 564/19), which deals with the status of costumary international law on functional immunity of State officials before domestic courts, shall be assessed.
In its Burmych and Others v. Ukraine judgment of October 2017 the European Court of Human Rights dismissed more than 12,000 applications due to the fact that they were not only repetitive in nature, but also mutatis mutandis identical to applications covered by a previous pilot judgment rendered against Ukraine. This raises fundamental issues as to the role of the Court within the human rights protection system established by the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as those concerning the interrelationship between the Court and the Committee of Ministers.
On 14 December 2017, the Assembly of States Parties of the Rome Statute decided to activate the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. In doing so, it however seems to have rescinded the Kampala amendment adopted in 2010, and in particular, the need for State Parties to eventually opt out from the Court’s aggression-related jurisdiction. This reversal, while being more in line with the Rome Statute than the Kampala amendment itself, raises new (and old) and challenging legal questions which are highlighted in this article.
Draft Article 15 of the International Law Commission’s project on crimes against humanity — dealing with the settlement of disputes arising from a proposed convention — attempts to strike a balance between state autonomy and robust judicial supervision. It largely follows Article 22 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which renders the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) conditional upon prior negotiations. Hence, the substance of the clause can be interpreted in light of the recent case law of the ICJ, especially in the case Georgia v. Russia. In addition, this contribution discusses several issues regarding the scope ratione temporis of the compromissory clause. It advances several proposals to improve the current draft, addressing its relationship with state responsibility — an explicit reference to which is currently missing — as well as the relationship between the ICJ and a possible treaty body. It also proposes to recalibrate the interplay of the requirement of prior negotiations with, respectively, the possibility of seizing a future treaty body and the indication of provisional measures by the ICJ.
Over the years, the Security Council has on several occasions dealt with humanitarian assistance issues. However, it is Security Council Resolution 2165(2014), related to the situation in Syria, that has brought the role of the Security Council to the forefront of the debate. It is against this background that the article discusses the legal issues arising from Security Council action facilitating humanitarian assistance to be delivered in situations of non-international armed conflict.
Following a brief survey of relevant practice of the Security Council related to humanitarian assistance, the article considers the relevance, if any, of Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations (UN) to humanitarian assistance to be delivered in such situations. It then moves on to analyse whether a rejection by the territorial state of humanitarian aid to be delivered by third parties may amount to a situation under Article 39 of the UN Charter. It then considers in detail whether (at least implicitly) Resolution 2165 has been adopted under Chapter VII and, if this is not the case, whether it can be still considered to be legally binding.
The article finally considers what impact the adoption of Security Council Resolution 2165 might have on the interpretation of otherwise applicable rules of international humanitarian law and, in particular, the right of third parties to provide humanitarian assistance in a situation of a non-international armed conflict in spite of the absence of consent by the territorial state, and the obligations that members of the Security Council, permanent and non-permanent, have under Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions when faced with a draft resolution providing for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, notwithstanding the absence of consent by the territorial state.
In November 2015, the 14th Session of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) adopted, by consensus, an amendment providing for the deletion of Article 124 of the ICC Statute, which so far enables contracting parties, when joining the Statute, to opt out from the ICC’s treaty-based war crimes-related jurisdiction. After considering the genesis of the provision and the practice arising under Article 124 of the ICC Statute so far, this article considers the arguments for and against the deletion of Article 124 in light of the increasingly small number of accessions to the ICC Statute that have been forthcoming in the last few years. It also analyses the quite strict requirements for the entry into force of the amendment, as well as the effect of the entry into force of the amendment on possible declarations having been made pending such entry into force. It ends by considering the positive effect a continued applicability of Article 124 may have on states so far being reluctant to accede to the ICC Statute.