CEPA Discussion Papers
ISSN (online) 2628-653X
URN urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-series-954
CEPA Discussion Papers are edited by
Rainald Borck, Lisa Bruttel, Marco Caliendo, Maik Heinemann and Alexander Kritikos.
The CEPA Discussion Papers Series is meant to disseminate recent research results by CEPA members to the scientific community and the interested public. Research findings published in a CEPA Discussion Paper reflect on-going research prior to publication in peer-reviewed journal articles. If you consider submitting an article to CEPA, please look at our submission guidelines.
URN urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-series-954
CEPA Discussion Papers are edited by
Rainald Borck, Lisa Bruttel, Marco Caliendo, Maik Heinemann and Alexander Kritikos.
The CEPA Discussion Papers Series is meant to disseminate recent research results by CEPA members to the scientific community and the interested public. Research findings published in a CEPA Discussion Paper reflect on-going research prior to publication in peer-reviewed journal articles. If you consider submitting an article to CEPA, please look at our submission guidelines.
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77
While the economic harm of cartels is caused by their price-increasing effect, sanctioning by courts rather targets at the underlying process of firms reaching a price-fixing agreement. This paper provides experimental evidence on the question whether such sanctioning meets the economic target, i.e., whether evidence of a collusive meeting of the firms and of the content of their communication reliably predicts subsequent prices. We find that already the mere mutual agreement to meet predicts a strong increase in prices. Conversely, express distancing from communication completely nullifies its otherwise price-increasing effect. Using machine learning, we show that communication only increases prices if it is very explicit about how the cartel plans to behave.