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Mass loss from the Antarctic Ice Sheet constitutes the largest uncertainty in projections of future sea level rise. Ocean-driven melting underneath the floating ice shelves and subsequent acceleration of the inland ice streams are the major reasons for currently observed mass loss from Antarctica and are expected to become more important in the future. Here we show that for projections of future mass loss from the Antarctic Ice Sheet, it is essential (1) to better constrain the sensitivity of sub-shelf melt rates to ocean warming and (2) to include the historic trajectory of the ice sheet. In particular, we find that while the ice sheet response in simulations using the Parallel Ice Sheet Model is comparable to the median response of models in three Antarctic Ice Sheet Intercomparison projects - initMIP, LARMIP-2 and ISMIP6 - conducted with a range of ice sheet models, the projected 21st century sea level contribution differs significantly depending on these two factors. For the highest emission scenario RCP8.5, this leads to projected ice loss ranging from 1:4 to 4:0 cm of sea level equivalent in simulations in which ISMIP6 ocean forcing drives the PICO ocean box model where parameter tuning leads to a comparably low sub-shelf melt sensitivity and in which no surface forcing is applied. This is opposed to a likely range of 9:1 to 35:8 cm using the exact same initial setup, but emulated from the LARMIP-2 experiments with a higher melt sensitivity, even though both projects use forcing from climate models and melt rates are calibrated with previous oceanographic studies. Furthermore, using two initial states, one with a previous historic simulation from 1850 to 2014 and one starting from a steady state, we show that while differences between the ice sheet configurations in 2015 seem marginal at first sight, the historic simulation increases the susceptibility of the ice sheet to ocean warming, thereby increasing mass loss from 2015 to 2100 by 5% to 50 %. Hindcasting past ice sheet changes with numerical models would thus provide valuable tools to better constrain projections. Our results emphasize that the uncertainty that arises from the forcing is of the same order of magnitude as the ice dynamic response for future sea level projections.
Acceleration of the flow of ice drives mass losses in both the Antarctic and the Greenland Ice Sheet. The projections of possible future sea-level rise rely on numerical ice-sheet models, which solve the physics of ice flow, melt, and calving. While major advancements have been made by the ice-sheet modeling community in addressing several of the related uncertainties, the flow law, which is at the center of most process-based ice-sheet models, is not in the focus of the current scientific debate. However, recent studies show that the flow law parameters are highly uncertain and might be different from the widely accepted standard values. Here, we use an idealized flow-line setup to investigate how these uncertainties in the flow law translate into uncertainties in flow-driven mass loss. In order to disentangle the effect of future warming on the ice flow from other effects, we perform a suite of experiments with the Parallel Ice Sheet Model (PISM), deliberately excluding changes in the surface mass balance. We find that changes in the flow parameters within the observed range can lead up to a doubling of the flow-driven mass loss within the first centuries of warming, compared to standard parameters. The spread of ice loss due to the uncertainty in flow parameters is on the same order of magnitude as the increase in mass loss due to surface warming. While this study focuses on an idealized flow-line geometry, it is likely that this uncertainty carries over to realistic three-dimensional simulations of Greenland and Antarctica.
Year-to-year variations in crop yields can have major impacts on the livelihoods of subsistence farmers and may trigger significant global price fluctuations, with severe consequences for people in developing countries. Fluctuations can be induced by weather conditions, management decisions, weeds, diseases, and pests. Although an explicit quantification and deeper understanding of weather-induced crop-yield variability is essential for adaptation strategies, so far it has only been addressed by empirical models. Here, we provide conservative estimates of the fraction of reported national yield variabilities that can be attributed to weather by state-of-the-art, process-based crop model simulations. We find that observed weather variations can explain more than 50% of the variability in wheat yields in Australia, Canada, Spain, Hungary, and Romania. For maize, weather sensitivities exceed 50% in seven countries, including the United States. The explained variance exceeds 50% for rice in Japan and South Korea and for soy in Argentina. Avoiding water stress by simulating yields assuming full irrigation shows that water limitation is a major driver of the observed variations in most of these countries. Identifying the mechanisms leading to crop-yield fluctuations is not only fundamental for dampening fluctuations, but is also important in the context of the debate on the attribution of loss and damage to climate change. Since process-based crop models not only account for weather influences on crop yields, but also provide options to represent human-management measures, they could become essential tools for differentiating these drivers, and for exploring options to reduce future yield fluctuations.
Earth’s surface temperature will continue to rise for another 20 to 30 years even with the strongest carbon emission reduction currently considered. The associated changes in rainfall patterns can result in an increased flood risk worldwide. We compute the required increase in flood protection to keep high-end fluvial flood risk at present levels. The analysis is carried out worldwide for subnational administrative units. Most of the United States, Central Europe, and Northeast and West Africa, as well as large parts of India and Indonesia, require the strongest adaptation effort. More than half of the United States needs to at least double their protection within the next two decades. Thus, the need for adaptation to increased river flood is a global problem affecting industrialized regions as much as developing countries.
After the United Kingdom has left the European Union it remains unclear whether the two parties can successfully negotiate and sign a trade agreement within the transition period. Ongoing negotiations, practical obstacles and resulting uncertainties make it highly unlikely that economic actors would be fully prepared to a “no-trade-deal” situation. Here we provide an economic shock simulation of the immediate aftermath of such a post-Brexit no-trade-deal scenario by computing the time evolution of more than 1.8 million interactions between more than 6,600 economic actors in the global trade network. We find an abrupt decline in the number of goods produced in the UK and the EU. This sudden output reduction is caused by drops in demand as customers on the respective other side of the Channel incorporate the new trade restriction into their decision-making. As a response, producers reduce prices in order to stimulate demand elsewhere. In the short term consumers benefit from lower prices but production value decreases with potentially severe socio-economic consequences in the longer term.
Recent observations and ice-dynamic modeling suggest that a marine ice-sheet instability (MISI) might have been triggered in West Antarctica. The corresponding outlet glaciers, Pine Island Glacier (PIG) and Thwaites Glacier (TG), showed significant retreat during at least the last 2 decades. While other regions in Antarctica have the topographic predisposition for the same kind of instability, it is so far unclear how fast these instabilities would unfold if they were initiated. Here we employ the concept of similitude to estimate the characteristic timescales of several potentially MISI-prone outlet glaciers around the Antarctic coast. Our results suggest that TG and PIG have the fastest response time of all investigated outlets, with TG responding about 1.25 to 2 times as fast as PIG, while other outlets around Antarctica would be up to 10 times slower if destabilized. These results have to be viewed in light of the strong assumptions made in their derivation. These include the absence of ice-shelf buttressing, the one-dimensionality of the approach and the uncertainty of the available data. We argue however that the current topographic situation and the physical conditions of the MISI-prone outlet glaciers carry the information of their respective timescale and that this information can be partially extracted through a similitude analysis.
There is evidence that a self-sustaining ice discharge from the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS) has started, potentially leading to its disintegration. The associated sea level rise of more than 3m would pose a serious challenge to highly populated areas including metropolises such as Calcutta, Shanghai, New York City, and Tokyo. Here, we show that the WAIS may be stabilized through mass deposition in coastal regions around Pine Island and Thwaites glaciers. In our numerical simulations, a minimum of 7400 Gt of additional snowfall stabilizes the flow if applied over a short period of 10 years onto the region (-2 mm year(-1) sea level equivalent). Mass deposition at a lower rate increases the intervention time and the required total amount of snow. We find that the precise conditions of such an operation are crucial, and potential benefits need to be weighed against environmental hazards, future risks, and enormous technical challenges.
Over large coastal regions in Greenland and Antarctica the ice sheet calves directly into the ocean. In contrast to ice-shelf calving, an increase in calving from grounded glaciers contributes directly to sea-level rise. Ice cliffs with a glacier freeboard larger than approximate to 100 m are currently not observed, but it has been shown that such ice cliffs are increasingly unstable with increasing ice thickness. This cliff calving can constitute a self-amplifying ice loss mechanism that may significantly alter sea-level projections both of Greenland and Antarctica. Here we seek to derive a minimalist stress-based parametrization for cliff calving from grounded glaciers whose freeboards exceed the 100m stability limit derived in previous studies. This will be an extension of existing calving laws for tidewater glaciers to higher ice cliffs. To this end we compute the stress field for a glacier with a simplified two-dimensional geometry from the two-dimensional Stokes equation. First we assume a constant yield stress to derive the failure region at the glacier front from the stress field within the glacier. Secondly, we assume a constant response time of ice failure due to exceedance of the yield stress. With this strongly constraining but very simple set of assumptions we propose a cliff-calving law where the calving rate follows a power-law dependence on the freeboard of the ice with exponents between 2 and 3, depending on the relative water depth at the calving front. The critical freeboard below which the ice front is stable decreases with increasing relative water depth of the calving front. For a dry water front it is, for example, 75 m. The purpose of this study is not to provide a comprehensive calving law but to derive a particularly simple equation with a transparent and minimalist set of assumptions.
Both climate-change damages and climate-change mitigation will incur economic costs. While the risk of severe damages increases with the level of global warming (Dell et al., 2014; IPCC, 2014b, 2018; Lenton et al., 2008), mitigating costs increase steeply with more stringent warming limits (IPCC, 2014a; Luderer et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 2015). Here, we show that the global warming limit that minimizes this century's total economic costs of climate change lies between 1.9 and 2 ∘C, if temperature changes continue to impact national economic growth rates as observed in the past and if instantaneous growth effects are neither compensated nor amplified by additional growth effects in the following years. The result is robust across a wide range of normative assumptions on the valuation of future welfare and inequality aversion. We combine estimates of climate-change impacts on economic growth for 186 countries (applying an empirical damage function from Burke et al., 2015) with mitigation costs derived from a state-of-the-art energy–economy–climate model with a wide range of highly resolved mitigation options (Kriegler et al., 2017; Luderer et al., 2013, 2015). Our purely economic assessment, even though it omits non-market damages, provides support for the international Paris Agreement on climate change. The political goal of limiting global warming to “well below 2 degrees” is thus also an economically optimal goal given above assumptions on adaptation and damage persistence.