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Der Beitrag widmet sich zwei überaus fruchtbaren theoretischen Ansätzen in der Policy-Forschung und darüber hinaus: der Vetospielertheorie und Vetopunkt-Ansätzen. Neben den Grundzügen beider Ansätze stellen wir grundlegende Entwicklungslinien und Probleme dieser Literaturen anhand beispielhafter Studien dar. Es zeigt sich, dass beide Ansätze teils kontroverse Annahmen treffen, zu denen es plausible Alternativen gibt. Zum Beispiel kann das Verhalten von Koalitionsparteien im Policy-Prozess anders als von der Vetospielertheorie angenommen modelliert werden. Die kausalen Effekte bestimmter Institutionen oder Vetopunkte können zudem je nach Kontext variieren. Diesem Kontext sollte größere Beachtung geschenkt werden.
The literature on international regulatory regimes has highlighted how rival standards can create different points of convergence. Scholarly attention has also focused on how the European Union (EU) and the United States (USA) attempt to ‘export’ their environmental standards internationally. Here, we explore the effectiveness of these attempts by means of third states' decisions to ratify the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, a multilateral environmental agreement regulating genetically modified organisms that is promoted by the EU but opposed by the USA. Our findings confirm that both rivals are able to influence the ratification decision of states, but they also suggest that these effects may have different origins. Countries relying more heavily on US markets for food exports tend to be less likely to ratify the Cartagena Protocol, while countries that have applied for EU membership are more likely to ratify the protocol.
Giving less by doing more? Dynamics of social policy expansion and dismantling in 18 OECD countries
(2014)
Protection against social risks is generally popular among voters and should enjoy the benefits of institutional inertia. Yet retrenchment occurs rather frequently in advanced welfare states without this systematically leading to electoral punishment. We solve this paradox by, first, arguing that governments can avoid the blame of retrenchment by pursuing a strategy of expansionary dismantling' where new policies and instruments are used to compensate reform losers and to obfuscate cutbacks. Second, we test our argument with a huge new dataset consisting of changes in unemployment legislation and replacement rates in 18 OECD countries from 1976 to 2000. The statistical tests provide robust support for our argument, suggesting that the introduction of new policies and instruments leads to cutbacks in replacement rates. We also find that left-leaning governments are least likely to engage in expansionary dismantling.