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Although party competition is widely regarded as an important part of a working democracy, it is rarely analysed in political science literature. This article discusses the basic properties of party competition, especially the patterns of interaction in contemporary party systems. Competition as a phenomenon at the macro level has to be carefully distinguished from contest and cooperation as the forms of interaction at the micro level. The article gives special attention to the creation of issue innovations. Contrary to existing approaches, I argue that not only responsiveness but also innovation are necessary to guarantee a workable democratic competition. Competition takes place on an issue market, where parties can discover voters' demands. Combined with the concept of institutional veto points, the article presents hypotheses on how institutions shape the possibility for programmatic innovations.
Although the low-wage employment sector has enlarged over the past 20 years in the context of pronounced flexibility in restructured labor markets, gender differences in low-wage employment have declined in Germany, Austria and Switzerland. In this article, the authors examine reasons for declining gender inequalities, and most notably concentrate on explanations for the closing gender gap in low-wage employment risks. In addition, they identify differences and similarities among the German-speaking countries. Based on regression techniques and decomposition analyses (1996-2016), the authors find significantly decreasing labor market risks for the female workforce. Detailed analysis reveals that (1) the concrete positioning in the labor market shows greater importance in explaining declining gender differences compared to personal characteristics. (2) The changed composition of the labor markets has prevented the low-wage sector from increasing even more in general and works in favor of the female workforce and their low-wage employment risks in particular.
As presidents approach the end of their constitutionally defined term in office, they face a number of difficulties, most importantly the deprivation of sources of power, personal enrichment, and protection from prosecution. This leads many of them to attempt to circumvent their term limits. Recent studies explain both the reasons for the extension or full abolition of term limits, and failed attempts to do so. Key explanations include electoral competition and the post-term fate of previous post holders. What we do not know yet is how compliance with term limits may be tied to the current president's expectations for their post-term fate. In particular, we do not know whether leaders who attempt to remove term limits and fail to do so jeopardize their post-term career as a result, and conversely, whether leaders who comply will have better outcomes in terms of security, prestige, and economic gain. Hence, we ask how the decision of a leader to comply or not comply with term limits is conditioned by the expectation of their post-term fate. To address this question, this article introduces new data on the career trajectories of term-limited presidents and its systematic effect on term limit compliance.
The power of business
(2007)
The increased emphasis on labour market activation in many European countries has led to new forms of governance in recent decades. Primarily through qualitative data and document analysis, this article compares the restructuring of labour market service delivery in the UK and Germany. The comparison suggests the emergence of complex governance arrangements that seek to balance public regulation and accountability with the creation of room for market competition. As a result, we can observe in both countries a greater use of markets, but also of rules. While in both countries the relationships between different providers of labour market services can best be described as a mixture of cooperation and competition, differences exist in terms of instruments and the comprehensiveness of coordination initiatives. The findings suggest that the distinctions between governance models may be more important in theory than in practice, although the combinations of theoretical forms vary in different circumstances.
Introduction and Preview
(2004)
A new political system model
(2018)
Semi-parliamentary government is a distinct executive-legislative system that mirrors semi-presidentialism. It exists when the legislature is divided into two equally legitimate parts, only one of which can dismiss the prime minister in a no-confidence vote. This system has distinct advantages over pure parliamentary and presidential systems: it establishes a branch-based separation of powers and can balance the ‘majoritarian’ and ‘proportional’ visions of democracy without concentrating executive power in a single individual. This article analyses bicameral versions of semi-parliamentary government in Australia and Japan, and compares empirical patterns of democracy in the Australian Commonwealth as well as New South Wales to 20 advanced parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. It discusses new semi-parliamentary designs, some of which do not require formal bicameralism, and pays special attention to semi-parliamentary options for democratising the European Union.
Veto player theory is a powerful approach to comparative politics. This article argues that the debate about its explanatory success would benefit from more systematic distinctions. The theory not only comes in different theoretical variants, it is also used in radically different ways empirically. Starting from recent debates about the ‘testing’ of theoretical models, the article distinguishes five ways in which theoretical models can be used empirically: contrastive, axiomatic, exploratory, presumptive and modular. The typology is applied to veto player theory and illustrated with exemplary studies and debates. The article concludes that each type raises different questions that should be answered in individual studies. Moreover, while veto player theory has an excellent track record on four empirical uses, the picture on its contrastive use is far more nuanced. More explicitly contrastive testing of the theory is desirable.
Review article: Democratic inclusiveness : a reinterpretation of Lijphart's patterns of democracy
(2010)
This contribution to the study or democratic inclusiveness advances three main claims, based on Lijphart's original data First, his measurement of executive inclusiveness is incoherent and invalid. Secondly, executive inclusiveness is best explained by the interaction of many parties and strong legislative veto points. This implies that executive inclusiveness should not be contained in either of Lijphart's two dimensions of democracy. Thirdly, parties have incentives to economize on the costs of inclusive coalitions by avoiding strong legislative veto points, and these incentives are greater in parliamentary than in presidential systems. Hence. Lijphart's favourite version of consensus democracy - characterized by a parliamentary system and a high degree of executive inclusiveness - is unlikely to be a behavioural-institutional equilibrium.
Political scientists regularly justify particular democratic institutions. This article explores two desiderata for such justifications. The first is a formal equality baseline which puts the burden of justification on those who favour more unequal institutions. This baseline is seen as an implication of the rule of law. The second desideratum, the comparison requirement, builds on the first: adequate justifications of particular institutions must compare them to the best alternative, and this comparison must consider the costs for political equality. The two desiderata are applied to political science debates about the proportionality of the electoral system and bicameral systems of legislative decision-making.
The project of public-reason liberalism faces a basic problem: publicly justified principles are typically too abstract and vague to be directly applied to practical political disputes, whereas applicable specifications of these principles are not uniquely publicly justified. One solution could be a legislative procedure that selects one member from the eligible set of inconclusively justified proposals. Yet if liberal principles are too vague to select sufficiently specific legislative proposals, can they, nevertheless, select specific legislative procedures? Based on the work of Gerald Gaus, this article argues that the only candidate for a conclusively justified decision procedure is a majoritarian or otherwise 'neutral' democracy. If the justification of democracy requires an equality baseline in the design of political regimes and if justifications for departure from this baseline are subject to reasonable disagreement, a majoritarian design is justified by default. Gaus's own preference for super-majoritarian procedures is based on disputable specifications of justified liberal principles. These procedures can only be defended as a sectarian preference if the equality baseline is rejected, but then it is not clear how the set of justifiable political regimes can be restricted to full democracies.
The article analyses a certain type of bicameralism not merely as a form of legislative organisation, but as a form of government-as a hybrid between parliamentarism and presidentialism. A new typology of pure and hybrid forms of government is proposed, which classifies bicameralism in Australia and Japan as chamber-independent government. This type is systematically compared with other forms of government, including hybrids like semi-presidentialism, elected prime-ministerial government in Israel (from 1996 to 2002) and assembly-independent government in Switzerland. The article highlights how chamber-independent government has the potential to combine different visions of democracy without leading to presidentialisation of political parties.
A comprehensive typology of basic executive formats is presented and linked to a discussion of tradeoffs in the design of executive-legislative relations. The focus is on the tradeoffs between three goals: (1) programmatic parties, (2) identifiable cabinets and (3) issue -specific legislative coalitions. To include semi-presidentialism into the typology in a logically consistent manner, a heretofore neglected executive format has to be defined, which is labelled semi-parliamentarism. Based on a discussion of Australian states, it is argued that semi-parliamentarism has the potential to mitigate the trilemma.
Die politikwissenschaftliche Literatur unterscheidet zwei Grundtypen von Forschungsdesigns: x- und y-zentriert. Dieser Beitrag argumentiert, dass ein „kontrastives“ Forschungsdesign als dritter Grundtyp abgegrenzt werden sollte. Die drei Designs unterscheiden sich durch die Anzahl der betrachteten Theorien und dadurch, ob mehrere Theorien konkurrierend oder komplementär sind. Die typologische Abgrenzung des kontrastiven Designs verdeutlicht auch die Vor- und Nachteile x- und y-zentrierter Designs. Anhand verschiedener Beispielstudien (experimentell und nicht-experimentell, quantitativ und qualitativ) werden die Charakteristika der drei Designs sowie ihre Kombinationsmöglichkeiten herausgearbeitet. Darüber hinaus wird das kontrastive Design als verbindendes Element zwischen den quantitativen und qualitativen Forschungs-„Kulturen“ hervorgehoben.
The political science literature distinguishes two basic types of research designs: x- and y-centered. The article argues for the distinction of a third basic type: the "contrastive" design. The three designs differ in the number of relevant theories and in whether they see theories as competing or complementary. The typological differentiation of the contrastive research design helps to clarify the pros and cons of x- and y-centered designs. The article uses exemplary studies (experimental and observational, quantitative and qualitative) to illustrate the characteristics of the three designs as well as the possibilities of combining them. The contrastive design also constitutes a common element of the quantitative and qualitative research, "cultures".
This article analyses salient trade-offs in the design of democracy. It grounds this analysis in a distinction between two basic models of democracy: simple and complex majoritarianism. These models differ not only in their electoral and party systems, but also in the style of coalition-building. Simple majoritarianism concentrates executive power in a single majority party; complex majoritarianism envisions the formation of shifting, issue-specific coalitions among multiple parties whose programs differ across multiple conflict dimensions. The latter pattern of coalition formation is very difficult to create and sustain under pure parliamentary government. A separation of powers between executive and legislature can facilitate such a pattern, while also achieving central goals of simple majoritarianism: identifiable cabinet alternatives before the election and stable cabinets afterward. The separation of powers can thus balance simple and complex majoritarianism in ways that are unavailable under parliamentarism. The article also compares the presidential and semi-parliamentary versions of the separation of powers. It argues that the latter has important advantages, e.g., when it comes to resolving inter-branch deadlock, as it avoids the concentration of executive power in a single human being.
An egalitarian approach to the fair representation of voters specifies three main institutional requirements: proportional representation, legislative majority rule and a parliamentary system of government. This approach faces two challenges: the under-determination of the resulting democratic process and the idea of a trade-off between equal voter representation and government accountability. Linking conceptual with comparative analysis, the article argues that we can distinguish three ideal-typical varieties of the egalitarian vision of democracy, based on the stages at which majorities are formed. These varieties do not put different relative normative weight onto equality and accountability, but have different conceptions of both values and their reconciliation. The view that accountability is necessarily linked to ‘clarity of responsibility’, widespread in the comparative literature, is questioned – as is the idea of a general trade-off between representation and accountability. Depending on the vision of democracy, the two values need not be in conflict.
The article critically reviews the conceptual ideas of G. Bingham Powell's Elections as Instruments of Democracy and explores ways to develop them further. Powell's conceptual alternative to the Westminster model - the 'proportional' vision of democracy - comes in two variants, one focusing on proportional representation ( PR) and the other on proportional legislative influence. If one focuses on the former, it is possible to distinguish four visions of parliamentary democracy based on the main stage at which majorities are formed. The four stages are: party, alliance, cabinet, and law formation. The corresponding normative visions can be placed on a conceptual continuum between 'simple' and 'complex' majoritarianism. This article discusses the goals and trade-offs associated with them as well as their underlying institutional designs. It also re-emphasises Powell's insight that the congruence between policy makers and the median voter in a unidimensional policy space is a more appropriate normative standard for some visions of democracy than for others.
This article responds to critical reflections on my Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism by Sarah Birch, Kevin J. Elliott, Claudia Landwehr and James L. Wilson. It discusses how different types of representative democracy, especially different forms of government (presidential, parliamentary or hybrid), can be justified. It clarifies, among other things, the distinction between procedural and process equality, the strengths of semi-parliamentary government, the potential instability of constitutional designs, and the difference that theories can make in actual processes of constitutional reform.
The article analyses the type of bicameralism we find in Australia as a distinct executive-legislative system – a hybrid between parliamentary and presidential government – which we call ‘semi-parliamentary government’. We argue that this hybrid presents an important and underappreciated alternative to pure parliamentary government as well as presidential forms of the power-separation, and that it can achieve a certain balance between competing models or visions of democracy. We specify theoretically how the semi-parliamentary separation of powers contributes to the balancing of democratic visions and propose a conceptual framework for comparing democratic visions. We use this framework to locate the Australian Commonwealth, all Australian states and 22 advanced democratic nation-states on a two-dimensional empirical map of democratic patterns for the period from 1995 to 2015.
The article responds to four commentaries on the concept of semi-parliamentary government and its application to Australian bicameralism. It highlights four main points: (1) Our preferred typology is not more ‘normative’ than existing approaches, but applies the criterion of ‘direct election’ equally to executive and legislature; (2) While the evolution of semi-parliamentary government had contingent elements, it plausibly also reflects the ‘equilibrium’ nature of certain institutional configurations; (3) The idea that a pure parliamentary system with pure proportional representation has absolute normative priority over ‘instrumentalist’ concerns about cabinet stability, identifiability and responsibility is questionable; and (4) The reforms we discuss may be unlikely to occur in Australia, but deserve consideration by scholars and institutional reformers in other democratic systems.
Differente Bewegungen : ein Gespräch über politische Aspekte von Transgender und anderen Bewegungen
(2002)
Obwohl Latein eine nicht mehr gesprochene Sprache ist und ihr deswegen kein kommunikativer Nutzen zukommt, ist die Anzahl der Latein als Schulfach wählenden Schüler im Zeitverlauf angestiegen. Mehrere Studien haben zudem gezeigt, dass Lateinkenntnisse weder das logische Denken, noch den Erwerb anderer Sprachen, noch das Gespür für die grammatikalische Struktur der Muttersprache verbessern. Auch wenn sich empirisch keine Vorteile des Erwerbs alter Sprachen nachweisen lassen, können Menschen subjektiv an solche Vorteile glauben und ihr Verhalten an ihrer Konstruktion von Wirklichkeit ausrichten. Auf der Basis einer unter Eltern von Gymnasialschülern durchgeführten Befragung zeigen wir, dass Latein umfassende Transfereffekte zugeschrieben und Personen mit Lateinkenntnissen positiver bewertet werden als Personen mit Kenntnissen moderner Sprachen. Weiterhin zeigt sich, dass die „Illusio“ der Vorteile von Latein zwar in allen Bildungsgruppen wirksam ist, doch besonders von den Hochgebildeten vertreten wird. Sie arbeiten damit an der Konstruktion einer Realität, von der sie selbst die größten Nutznießer sind, indem sie Latein als symbolisches Kapital verwenden.
Real options are widely applied in strategic and operational decision-making, allowing for managerial flexibility in uncertain contexts. Increased scholarly interest has led to an extensive but fragmented research landscape. We aim to measure and systematize the research field quantitatively. To achieve this goal, we conduct bibliometric performance analyses and bibliographic coupling analyses with an in-depth content review. The results of the performance analyses show an increasing interest in real options since the beginning of the 2000s and identity the most influential journals and authors. The science mappings reveal six and seven research clusters over the last two decades. Based on an in-depth analysis of their themes, we develop a research framework comprising antecedents, application areas, internal and external contingencies, and uncertainty resolution through real option valuation or reasoning. We identify several gaps in that framework, which we propose to tackle in future research.