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Climate science provides strong evidence of the necessity of limiting global warming to 1.5 °C, in line with the Paris Climate Agreement. The IPCC 1.5 °C special report (SR1.5) presents 414 emissions scenarios modelled for the report, of which around 50 are classified as '1.5 °C scenarios', with no or low temperature overshoot. These emission scenarios differ in their reliance on individual mitigation levers, including reduction of global energy demand, decarbonisation of energy production, development of land-management systems, and the pace and scale of deploying carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies. The reliance of 1.5 °C scenarios on these levers needs to be critically assessed in light of the potentials of the relevant technologies and roll-out plans. We use a set of five parameters to bundle and characterise the mitigation levers employed in the SR1.5 1.5 °C scenarios. For each of these levers, we draw on the literature to define 'medium' and 'high' upper bounds that delineate between their 'reasonable', 'challenging' and 'speculative' use by mid century. We do not find any 1.5 °C scenarios that stay within all medium upper bounds on the five mitigation levers. Scenarios most frequently 'over use' CDR with geological storage as a mitigation lever, whilst reductions of energy demand and carbon intensity of energy production are 'over used' less frequently. If we allow mitigation levers to be employed up to our high upper bounds, we are left with 22 of the SR1.5 1.5 °C scenarios with no or low overshoot. The scenarios that fulfil these criteria are characterised by greater coverage of the available mitigation levers than those scenarios that exceed at least one of the high upper bounds. When excluding the two scenarios that exceed the SR1.5 carbon budget for limiting global warming to 1.5 °C, this subset of 1.5 °C scenarios shows a range of 15–22 Gt CO2 (16–22 Gt CO2 interquartile range) for emissions in 2030. For the year of reaching net zero CO2 emissions the range is 2039–2061 (2049–2057 interquartile range).
Pathways toward limiting global warming to well below 2 ∘C, as used by the IPCC in the Fifth Assessment Report, do not consider the climate impacts already occurring below 2 ∘C. Here we show that accounting for such damages significantly increases the near-term ambition of transformation pathways. We use econometric estimates of climate damages on GDP growth and explicitly model the uncertainty in the persistence time of damages. The Integrated Assessment Model we use includes the climate system and mitigation technology detail required to derive near-term policies. We find an optimal carbon price of $115 per tonne of CO2 in 2030. The long-term persistence of damages, while highly uncertain, is a main driver of the near-term carbon price. Accounting for damages on economic growth increases the gap between the currently pledged nationally determined contributions and the welfare-optimal 2030 emissions by two thirds, compared to pathways considering the 2 ∘C limit only.
The large majority of climate change mitigation scenarios that hold warming below 2 °C show high deployment of carbon dioxide removal (CDR), resulting in a peak-and-decline behavior in global temperature. This is driven by the assumption of an exponentially increasing carbon price trajectory which is perceived to be economically optimal for meeting a carbon budget. However, this optimality relies on the assumption that a finite carbon budget associated with a temperature target is filled up steadily over time. The availability of net carbon removals invalidates this assumption and therefore a different carbon price trajectory should be chosen. We show how the optimal carbon price path for remaining well below 2 °C limits CDR demand and analyze requirements for constructing alternatives, which may be easier to implement in reality. We show that warming can be held at well below 2 °C at much lower long-term economic effort and lower CDR deployment and therefore lower risks if carbon prices are high enough in the beginning to ensure target compliance, but increase at a lower rate after carbon neutrality has been reached.
The employment implications of decarbonizing the energy sector have received far less attention than the technology dimension of the transition, although being of critical importance to policymakers. In this work, we adapt a methodology based on employment factors to project future changes in quantity and composition of direct energy supply jobs for two scenarios - (1) relatively weak emissions reductions as pledged in the nationally determined contributions (NDC) and (2) stringent reductions compatible with the 1.5 °C target. We find that in the near-term the 1.5°C-compatible scenario results in a net increase in jobs through gains in solar and wind jobs in construction, installation, and manufacturing, despite significant losses in coal fuel supply; eventually leading to a peak in total direct energy jobs in 2025. In the long run, improvements in labour productivity lead to a decrease of total direct energy employment compared to today, however, total jobs are still higher in a 1.5 °C than in an NDC scenario. Operation and maintenance jobs dominate future jobs, replacing fuel supply jobs. The results point to the need for active policies aimed at retraining, both inside and outside the renewable energy sector, to complement climate policies within the concept of a “just transition”.
We present an application of imprecise probability theory to the quantification of uncertainty in the integrated assessment of climate change. Our work is motivated by the fact that uncertainty about climate change is pervasive, and therefore requires a thorough treatment in the integrated assessment process. Classical probability theory faces some severe difficulties in this respect, since it cannot capture very poor states of information in a satisfactory manner. A more general framework is provided by imprecise probability theory, which offers a similarly firm evidential and behavioural foundation, while at the same time allowing to capture more diverse states of information. An imprecise probability describes the information in terms of lower and upper bounds on probability. For the purpose of our imprecise probability analysis, we construct a diffusion ocean energy balance climate model that parameterises the global mean temperature response to secular trends in the radiative forcing in terms of climate sensitivity and effective vertical ocean heat diffusivity. We compare the model behaviour to the 20th century temperature record in order to derive a likelihood function for these two parameters and the forcing strength of anthropogenic sulphate aerosols. Results show a strong positive correlation between climate sensitivity and ocean heat diffusivity, and between climate sensitivity and absolute strength of the sulphate forcing. We identify two suitable imprecise probability classes for an efficient representation of the uncertainty about the climate model parameters and provide an algorithm to construct a belief function for the prior parameter uncertainty from a set of probability constraints that can be deduced from the literature or observational data. For the purpose of updating the prior with the likelihood function, we establish a methodological framework that allows us to perform the updating procedure efficiently for two different updating rules: Dempster's rule of conditioning and the Generalised Bayes' rule. Dempster's rule yields a posterior belief function in good qualitative agreement with previous studies that tried to constrain climate sensitivity and sulphate aerosol cooling. In contrast, we are not able to produce meaningful imprecise posterior probability bounds from the application of the Generalised Bayes' Rule. We can attribute this result mainly to our choice of representing the prior uncertainty by a belief function. We project the Dempster-updated belief function for the climate model parameters onto estimates of future global mean temperature change under several emissions scenarios for the 21st century, and several long-term stabilisation policies. Within the limitations of our analysis we find that it requires a stringent stabilisation level of around 450 ppm carbon dioxide equivalent concentration to obtain a non-negligible lower probability of limiting the warming to 2 degrees Celsius. We discuss several frameworks of decision-making under ambiguity and show that they can lead to a variety of, possibly imprecise, climate policy recommendations. We find, however, that poor states of information do not necessarily impede a useful policy advice. We conclude that imprecise probabilities constitute indeed a promising candidate for the adequate treatment of uncertainty in the integrated assessment of climate change. We have constructed prior belief functions that allow much weaker assumptions on the prior state of information than a prior probability would require and, nevertheless, can be propagated through the entire assessment process. As a caveat, the updating issue needs further investigation. Belief functions constitute only a sensible choice for the prior uncertainty representation if more restrictive updating rules than the Generalised Bayes'Rule are available.
Given the increasing interest in keeping global warming below 1.5°C, a key question is what this would mean for China’s emission pathway, energy restructuring, and decarbonization. By conducting a multimodel study, we find that the 1.5°C-consistent goal would require China to reduce its carbon emissions and energy consumption by more than 90 and 39%, respectively, compared with the “no policy” case. Negative emission technologies play an important role in achieving near-zero emissions, with captured carbon accounting on average for 20% of the total reductions in 2050. Our multimodel comparisons reveal large differences in necessary emission reductions across sectors, whereas what is consistent is that the power sector is required to achieve full decarbonization by 2050. The cross-model averages indicate that China’s accumulated policy costs may amount to 2.8 to 5.7% of its gross domestic product by 2050, given the 1.5°C warming limit.
Cost degression in photovoltaics, wind-power and battery storage has been faster than previously anticipated. In the future, climate policy to limit global warming to 1.5–2 °C will make carbon-based fuels increasingly scarce and expensive. Here we show that further progress in solar- and wind-power technology along with carbon pricing to reach the Paris Climate targets could make electricity cheaper than carbon-based fuels. In combination with demand-side innovation, for instance in e-mobility and heat pumps, this is likely to induce a fundamental transformation of energy systems towards a dominance of electricity-based end uses. In a 1.5 °C scenario with limited availability of bioenergy and carbon dioxide removal, electricity could account for 66% of final energy by mid-century, three times the current levels and substantially higher than in previous climate policy scenarios assessed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The lower production of bioenergy in our high-electrification scenarios markedly reduces energy-related land and water requirements.
Closing the emissions gap between Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and the global emissions levels needed to achieve the Paris Agreement’s climate goals will require a comprehensive package of policy measures. National and sectoral policies can help fill the gap, but success stories in one country cannot be automatically replicated in other countries. They need to be adapted to the local context. Here, we develop a new Bridge scenario based on nationally relevant, short-term measures informed by interactions with country experts. These good practice policies are rolled out globally between now and 2030 and combined with carbon pricing thereafter. We implement this scenario with an ensemble of global integrated assessment models. We show that the Bridge scenario closes two-thirds of the emissions gap between NDC and 2 °C scenarios by 2030 and enables a pathway in line with the 2 °C goal when combined with the necessary long-term changes, i.e. more comprehensive pricing measures after 2030. The Bridge scenario leads to a scale-up of renewable energy (reaching 52%–88% of global electricity supply by 2050), electrification of end-uses, efficiency improvements in energy demand sectors, and enhanced afforestation and reforestation. Our analysis suggests that early action via good-practice policies is less costly than a delay in global climate cooperation.
To achieve the Paris climate target, deep emissions reductions have to be complemented with carbon dioxide removal (CDR). However, a portfolio of CDR options is necessary to reduce risks and potential negative side effects. Despite a large theoretical potential, ocean-based CDR such as ocean alkalinity enhancement (OAE) has been omitted in climate change mitigation scenarios so far. In this study, we provide a techno-economic assessment of large-scale OAE using hydrated lime ('ocean liming'). We address key uncertainties that determine the overall cost of ocean liming (OL) such as the CO2 uptake efficiency per unit of material, distribution strategies avoiding carbonate precipitation which would compromise efficiency, and technology availability (e.g., solar calciners). We find that at economic costs of 130–295 $/tCO2 net-removed, ocean liming could be a competitive CDR option which could make a significant contribution towards the Paris climate target. As the techno-economic assessment identified no showstoppers, we argue for more research on ecosystem impacts, governance, monitoring, reporting, and verification, and technology development and assessment to determine whether ocean liming and other OAE should be considered as part of a broader CDR portfolio.
The goal of limiting global warming to well below 2°C as set out in the Paris Agreement calls for a strategic assessment of societal pathways and policy strategies. Besides policy makers, new powerful actors from the private sector, including finance, have stepped up to engage in forward-looking assessments of a Paris-compliant and climate-resilient future. Climate change scenarios have addressed this demand by providing scientific insights on the possible pathways ahead to limit warming in line with the Paris climate goal. Despite the increased interest, the potential of climate change scenarios has not been fully unleashed, mostly due to a lack of an intermediary service that provides guidance and access to climate change scenarios. This perspective presents the concept of a climate change scenario service, its components, and a prototypical implementation to overcome this shortcoming aiming to make scenarios accessible to a broader audience of societal actors and decision makers.
Despite faster-than-expected progress in clean energy technology deployment, global annual CO2 emissions have increased from 2020 to 2023. The feasibility of limiting warming to 1.5 °C is therefore questioned. Here we present a model intercomparison study that accounts for emissions trends until 2023 and compares cost-effective scenarios to alternative scenarios with institutional, geophysical and technological feasibility constraints and enablers informed by previous literature. Our results show that the most ambitious mitigation trajectories with updated climate information still manage to limit peak warming to below 1.6 °C (‘low overshoot’) with around 50% likelihood. However, feasibility constraints, especially in the institutional dimension, decrease this maximum likelihood considerably to 5–45%. Accelerated energy demand transformation can reduce costs for staying below 2 °C but have only a limited impact on further increasing the likelihood of limiting warming to 1.6 °C. Our study helps to establish a new benchmark of mitigation scenarios that goes beyond the dominant cost-effective scenario design.