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(Moralisch) guter Sex
(2023)
In einem kürzlich erschienenen Artikel argumentiert Almut v. Wedelstaedt überzeugend, warum Zustimmung zwar „die Bedingung für die Legitimation von Sex“ ist (2020, 127), dass die moralische Güte von Sex aber nur dann einzuschätzen ist, wenn wir darauf achten, ob die Beteiligten der Handlung sich auf Augenhöhe begegnen. Die Idee ist: Es gibt legitime sexuelle Handlungen, die moralisch gut sind, und es gibt legitime sexuelle Handlungen, die moralisch besser sind. Hier möchte ich die Idee des besseren Sexes genauer ausloten. Während v. Wedelstaedt von moralisch gelungenem Sex spricht und somit auf der Ebene der moralischen Bewertung von Sex bleibt, möchte ich die Frage danach stellen, was Sex qualitativ gut macht. Tatsächlich wird in der Zustimmungsdebatte meist davon ausgegangen, dass diese zwei Fragen wenig gemeinsam haben; ob eine sexuelle Handlung legitim ist, hat zunächst nichts damit zu tun, ob diese auch gut ist. Ich werde drei Argumente liefern, warum wir legitimen Sex und qualitativ guten Sex zusammen betrachten sollten – und es wird sich zeigen, dass die gegenwärtige philosophische und rechtstheoretische Debatte Zustimmung verkürzt diskutiert und daher alleingenommen wenig hilfreich ist, stattdessen benötigt die Zustimmungsdebatte auch eine Untersuchung von qualitativ gutem Sex.
Analyzing social wrongs
(2023)
Background:
Contamination detection is a important step that should be carefully considered in early stages when designing and performing microbiome studies to avoid biased outcomes. Detecting and removing true contaminants is challenging, especially in low-biomass samples or in studies lacking proper controls. Interactive visualizations and analysis platforms are crucial to better guide this step, to help to identify and detect noisy patterns that could potentially be contamination. Additionally, external evidence, like aggregation of several contamination detection methods and the use of common contaminants reported in the literature, could help to discover and mitigate contamination.
Results:
We propose GRIMER, a tool that performs automated analyses and generates a portable and interactive dashboard integrating annotation, taxonomy, and metadata. It unifies several sources of evidence to help detect contamination. GRIMER is independent of quantification methods and directly analyzes contingency tables to create an interactive and offline report. Reports can be created in seconds and are accessible for nonspecialists, providing an intuitive set of charts to explore data distribution among observations and samples and its connections with external sources. Further, we compiled and used an extensive list of possible external contaminant taxa and common contaminants with 210 genera and 627 species reported in 22 published articles.
Conclusion:
GRIMER enables visual data exploration and analysis, supporting contamination detection in microbiome studies. The tool and data presented are open source and available at https://gitlab.com/dacs-hpi/grimer.
In the debate on epistemic injustice, it is generally assumed that testimonial injustice as one form of epistemic injustice cannot be committed (fully) deliberately or intentionally because it involves unconscious identity prejudices. Drawing on the case of sexual violence against refugees in European refugee camps, this paper argues that there is a form of testimonial injustice—willful testimonial injustice—that is deliberate. To do so, the paper argues (a) that the hearer intentionally utilizes negative identity prejudices for a particular purpose and (b) that the hearer is aware of the fact that the intentionally used prejudices are in fact prejudices. Furthermore, the paper shows how testimonial injustice relates to recognition failures both in terms of a causal as well as a constitutive claim. In fact, introducing willful testimonial injustice can support the constitutive claim of such a relation that has so far received little attention. Besides arguing for a novel form of testimonial injustice and contributing to the recent debate on the relation between epistemic injustice and recognition failures, this paper is also motivated by the attempt to draw attention to the inhumane conditions for refugees at the border of Europe as well as elsewhere.