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Der Beitrag widmet sich zwei überaus fruchtbaren theoretischen Ansätzen in der Policy-Forschung und darüber hinaus: der Vetospielertheorie und Vetopunkt-Ansätzen. Neben den Grundzügen beider Ansätze stellen wir grundlegende Entwicklungslinien und Probleme dieser Literaturen anhand beispielhafter Studien dar. Es zeigt sich, dass beide Ansätze teils kontroverse Annahmen treffen, zu denen es plausible Alternativen gibt. Zum Beispiel kann das Verhalten von Koalitionsparteien im Policy-Prozess anders als von der Vetospielertheorie angenommen modelliert werden. Die kausalen Effekte bestimmter Institutionen oder Vetopunkte können zudem je nach Kontext variieren. Diesem Kontext sollte größere Beachtung geschenkt werden.
Typen von Forschungsdesigns
(2022)
Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschungsdesigns umfassen alle wesentlichen Entscheidungen, die im Forschungsprozess getroffen werden müssen. Der Beitrag unterscheidet drei rundlegende Typen von Forschungsdesigns: x-zentriert, y-zentriert und kontrastiv. Das x-zentrierte Design versucht einen theoretisch spezifizierten kausalen Effekt zu identifizieren und dessen Größe möglichst genau und ohne Verzerrungen zu schätzen. Das y-zentrierte Design versucht mehrere komplementäre Theorien über kausale Effekte so zu kombinieren, dass bestimmte Phänomene möglichst gut erklärt werden. Das kontrastive Design vergleicht die Erklärungskraft von zwei oder mehr konkurrierenden Theorien. Die Unterscheidung der drei Typen ist für qualitative Fallstudien ebenso relevant wie für Experimente oder statistische Studien mit Beobachtungsdaten. Der Beitrag grenzt die drei Typen voneinander ab, erklärt ihre jeweiligen Annahmen und diskutiert ihre Vor- und Nachteile sowie die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen ihrer Kombination. Daneben diskutiert er den Unterschied zwischen Modellen und Theorien sowie die Bedeutung des Sparsamkeitsprinzips bei der Entwicklung und Bewertung wissenschaftlicher Theorien und Erklärungen.
A comprehensive typology of basic executive formats is presented and linked to a discussion of tradeoffs in the design of executive-legislative relations. The focus is on the tradeoffs between three goals: (1) programmatic parties, (2) identifiable cabinets and (3) issue -specific legislative coalitions. To include semi-presidentialism into the typology in a logically consistent manner, a heretofore neglected executive format has to be defined, which is labelled semi-parliamentarism. Based on a discussion of Australian states, it is argued that semi-parliamentarism has the potential to mitigate the trilemma.
Veto player theory is a powerful approach to comparative politics. This article argues that the debate about its explanatory success would benefit from more systematic distinctions. The theory not only comes in different theoretical variants, it is also used in radically different ways empirically. Starting from recent debates about the ‘testing’ of theoretical models, the article distinguishes five ways in which theoretical models can be used empirically: contrastive, axiomatic, exploratory, presumptive and modular. The typology is applied to veto player theory and illustrated with exemplary studies and debates. The article concludes that each type raises different questions that should be answered in individual studies. Moreover, while veto player theory has an excellent track record on four empirical uses, the picture on its contrastive use is far more nuanced. More explicitly contrastive testing of the theory is desirable.
The article responds to four commentaries on the concept of semi-parliamentary government and its application to Australian bicameralism. It highlights four main points: (1) Our preferred typology is not more ‘normative’ than existing approaches, but applies the criterion of ‘direct election’ equally to executive and legislature; (2) While the evolution of semi-parliamentary government had contingent elements, it plausibly also reflects the ‘equilibrium’ nature of certain institutional configurations; (3) The idea that a pure parliamentary system with pure proportional representation has absolute normative priority over ‘instrumentalist’ concerns about cabinet stability, identifiability and responsibility is questionable; and (4) The reforms we discuss may be unlikely to occur in Australia, but deserve consideration by scholars and institutional reformers in other democratic systems.
Schritt für Schritt
(2008)
Review symposium
(2023)
Steffen Ganghof’s Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: Democratic Design and the Separation of Powers (Oxford University Press, 2021) posits that “in a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not” (Ganghof, 2021). To consider, examine and theorise about this, Ganghof urges engagement with semi-parliamentarism. As explained by Ganghof, legislative power is shared between two democratically legitimate sections of parliament in a semi-parliamentary system, but only one of those sections selects the government and can remove it in a no-confidence vote. Consequently, power is dispersed and not concentrated in the hands of any one person, which, Ganghof argues, can lead to an enhanced form of parliamentary democracy. In this book review symposium, George Tsebelis, Michael Thies, José Antonio Cheibub, Rosalind Dixon and Daniel Bogéa review Steffen Ganghof’s book and engage with the author about aspects of research design, case selection and theoretical argument. This symposium arose from an engaging and constructive discussion of the book at a seminar hosted by Texas A&M University in 2022. We thank Prof José Cheibub (Texas A&M) for organising that seminar and Dr Anna Fruhstorfer (University of Potsdam) for initiating this book review symposium.
Review article: Democratic inclusiveness : a reinterpretation of Lijphart's patterns of democracy
(2010)
This contribution to the study or democratic inclusiveness advances three main claims, based on Lijphart's original data First, his measurement of executive inclusiveness is incoherent and invalid. Secondly, executive inclusiveness is best explained by the interaction of many parties and strong legislative veto points. This implies that executive inclusiveness should not be contained in either of Lijphart's two dimensions of democracy. Thirdly, parties have incentives to economize on the costs of inclusive coalitions by avoiding strong legislative veto points, and these incentives are greater in parliamentary than in presidential systems. Hence. Lijphart's favourite version of consensus democracy - characterized by a parliamentary system and a high degree of executive inclusiveness - is unlikely to be a behavioural-institutional equilibrium.
Die politikwissenschaftliche Literatur unterscheidet zwei Grundtypen von Forschungsdesigns: x- und y-zentriert. Dieser Beitrag argumentiert, dass ein „kontrastives“ Forschungsdesign als dritter Grundtyp abgegrenzt werden sollte. Die drei Designs unterscheiden sich durch die Anzahl der betrachteten Theorien und dadurch, ob mehrere Theorien konkurrierend oder komplementär sind. Die typologische Abgrenzung des kontrastiven Designs verdeutlicht auch die Vor- und Nachteile x- und y-zentrierter Designs. Anhand verschiedener Beispielstudien (experimentell und nicht-experimentell, quantitativ und qualitativ) werden die Charakteristika der drei Designs sowie ihre Kombinationsmöglichkeiten herausgearbeitet. Darüber hinaus wird das kontrastive Design als verbindendes Element zwischen den quantitativen und qualitativen Forschungs-„Kulturen“ hervorgehoben.
The political science literature distinguishes two basic types of research designs: x- and y-centered. The article argues for the distinction of a third basic type: the "contrastive" design. The three designs differ in the number of relevant theories and in whether they see theories as competing or complementary. The typological differentiation of the contrastive research design helps to clarify the pros and cons of x- and y-centered designs. The article uses exemplary studies (experimental and observational, quantitative and qualitative) to illustrate the characteristics of the three designs as well as the possibilities of combining them. The contrastive design also constitutes a common element of the quantitative and qualitative research, "cultures".