Alexander Rhode investigates performance-oriented measures of Contracting Authorities in public tenders conducted within the EU. He finds that Contracting Authorities can improve their performance and attract more suppliers by publishing (as precise as possible) starting prices in the beginning of a tender. First, he reports that compared with private-sector negotiations, starting prices do not create entry barriers in public procurement. Second, he finds that increased numerical precision of starting prices is linearly correlated with better performance and a higher number of bids. In public procurement, suppliers tend to attribute increased credibility to precise starting prices which reduces their (perceived) entry risks.

Die deutschen Wirtschaftsverbände geraten zunehmend unter Konkurrenzdruck. Immer mehr Verbände werben um dieselbe Mitgliederklientel und haben einen ähnlichen Themenzuschnitt. Darüber hinaus betreiben immer mehr Mitgliedsunternehmen eigene politische Interessenvertretung. Die vorliegende Studie untersucht auf der Grundlage des aus der Evolutionsbiologie stammenden Population Ecology-Ansatzes, wie die Verbände mit dieser Konkurrenz umgehen.

There are numerous situations in which people ask for something or make a request, e.g. asking a favor, asking for help or requesting compliance with specific norms. For this reason, how to ask for something in order to increase people’s willingness to fulfill such requests is one of the most important question for many people working in various different fields of responsibility such as charitable giving, marketing, management or policy making. This dissertation consists of four chapters that deal with the effects of small changes in the decision-making environment on altruistic decision-making and compliance behavior. Most notably, written communication as an influencing factor is the focus of the first three chapters. The starting point was the question how to devise a request in order to maximize its chance of success (Chapter 1). The results of the first chapter originate the ideas for the second and third chapter. Chapter 2 analyzes how communication by a neutral third-party, i.e. a text from the experimenters that either reminds potential benefactors of their responsibility or highlights their freedom of choice, affects altruistic decision-making. Chapter 3 elaborates on the effect of thanking people in advance when asking them for help. While being not as closely related to the other chapters as the three first ones are, the fourth chapter deals as well with the question how compliance (here: compliance with norms and rules) is affected by subtle manipulations of the environment in which decisions are made. This chapter analyzes the effect of default settings in a tax return on tax compliance. In order to study the research questions outlined above, controlled experiments were conducted. Chapter 1, which analyzes the effect of text messages on the decision to give something to another person, employs a mini-dictator game. The recipient sends a free-form text message to the dictator before the latter makes a binary decision whether or not to give part of her or his endowment to the recipient. We find that putting effort into the message by writing a long note without spelling mistakes increases dictators’ willingness to give. Moreover, writing in a humorous way and mentioning reasons why the money is needed pays off. Furthermore, men and women seem to react differently to some message categories. Only men react positively to efficiency arguments, while only women react to messages that emphasize the dictator’s power and responsibility. Building on this last result, Chapter 2 attempts to disentangle the effect of reminding potential benefactors of their responsibility for the potential beneficiary and the effect of highlighting their decision power and freedom of choice on altruistic decision-making by studying the effects of two different texts on giving in a dictator game. We find that only men react positively to a text that stresses their responsibility for the recipient by giving more to her or him, whereas only women seem to react positively to a text that emphasizes their decision power and freedom of choice. Chapter 3 focuses on the compliance with a request. In the experiment, participants are asked to provide a detailed answer to an open question. Compliance is measured by the effort participants spend on answering the question. The treatment variable is whether or not they see the text “thanks in advance.” We find that participants react negatively by putting less effort into complying with the request in response to the phrase “thanks in advance.” Chapter 4 studies the effect of prefilled tax returns with mostly inaccurate default values on tax compliance. In a laboratory experiment, participants earn income by performing a real-effort task and must subsequently file a tax return for three consecutive rounds. In the main treatment, the tax return is prefilled with a default value, resulting from participants’ own performance in previous rounds, which varies in its relative size. The results suggest that there is no lasting effect of a default value on tax honesty, neither for relatively low nor relatively high defaults. However, participants who face a default that is lower than their true income in the first round evade significantly and substantially more taxes in this round than participants in the control treatment without a default.

The present dissertation investigates profit-maximizing behavior in different phases of the negotiation process. Over the last decades, research dealt in detail with behavior of negotiation actors with the aim of identifying performance enhancing factors. The majority of those studies focused on behavior within the main negotiation phase. This work, however, considers phases which are, so far, underrepresented in research but show an impact on the negotiation process and outcome. Those phases are the pre-negotiation, the first offer, and the main negotiation phase which is further divided by breaks into several rounds. Within these phases, traits of behavior are analyzed that can be used strategically in order to impact the negotiation outcome. The dissertation contains three papers, each one dealing with a specific strategy within one phase. The first paper investigates communication behavior in the pre-negotiation phase. Content analysis of a negotiation experiment shows that the employment of positive communication elements such as the generation of enthusiasm for an upcoming project results in an increase of agreements on entering a negotiation and also leads to a higher willingness to make concessions. The second paper explores the impact of a semantic first anchor, which does not contain a specific number but only gives a numerical direction, on the opponent’s concession behavior and the final outcome. By means of two scenario-based questionnaires and a negotiation experiment it is demonstrated that semantic offers reveal an anchoring effect and lead to better negotiation outcomes. The third paper deals with the introduction of breaks and their effect on the following negotiation process. Therefore, content and outcome of another negotiation experiment are investigated. The analysis shows that breaks evoke a dominant impression but can negatively impact the atmosphere and thereby also the outcome. Finally, the gathered insights are brought together and discussed. The dissertation closes with implications for practice, limitations of the work, and ideas for future research.