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The Government will create a motivated, merit-based, performance-driven, and professional civil service that is resistant to temptations of corruption and which provides efficient, effective and transparent public services that do not force customers to pay bribes.
— (GoIRA, 2006, p. 106)
We were in a black hole! We had an empty glass and had nothing from our side to fill it with! Thus, we accepted anything anybody offered; that is how our glass was filled; that is how we reformed our civil service.
— (Former Advisor to IARCSC, personal communication, August 2015)
How and under what conditions were the post-Taleban Civil Service Reforms of Afghanistan initiated? What were the main components of the reforms? What were their objectives and to which extent were they achieved? Who were the leading domestic and foreign actors involved in the process? Finally, what specific factors influenced the success and failure Afghanistan’s Civil Service Reforms since 2002? Guided by such fundamental questions, this research studies the wicked process of reforming the Afghan civil service in an environment where a variety of contextual, programmatic, and external factors affected the design and implementation of reforms that were entirely funded and technically assisted by the international community.
Focusing on the core components of reforms—recruitment, remuneration, and appraisal of civil servants—the qualitative study provides a detailed picture of the pre-reform civil service and its major human resources developments in the past. Following discussions on the content and purposes of the main reform programs, it will then analyze the extent of changes in policies and practices by examining the outputs and effects of these reforms.
Moreover, the study defines the specific factors that led the reforms toward a situation where most of the intended objectives remain unachieved. Doing so, it explores and explains how an overwhelming influence of international actors with conflicting interests, large-scale corruption, political interference, networks of patronage, institutionalized nepotism, culturally accepted cronyism and widespread ethnic favoritism created a very complex environment and prevented the reforms from transforming Afghanistan’s patrimonial civil service into a professional civil service, which is driven by performance and merit.
In the past decades, development cooperation (DC) led by conventional bi- and multilateral donors has been joined by a large number of small, private or public-private donors. This pluralism of actors raises questions as to whether or not these new donors are able to implement projects more or less effectively than their conventional counterparts. In contrast to their predecessors, the new donors have committed themselves to be more pragmatic, innovative and flexible in their development cooperation measures. However, they are also criticized for weakening the function of local civil society and have the reputation of being an intransparent and often controversial alternative to public services. With additional financial resources and their new approach to development, the new donors have been described in the literature as playing a controversial role in transforming development cooperation. This dissertation compares the effectiveness of initiatives by new and conventional donors with regard to the provision of public goods and services to the poor in the water and sanitation sector in India.
India is an emerging country but it is experiencing high poverty rates and poor water supply in predominantly rural areas. It lends itself for analyzing this research theme as it is currently being confronted by a large number of actors and approaches that aim to find solutions for these challenges .
In the theoretical framework of this dissertation, four governance configurations are derived from the interaction of varying actor types with regard to hierarchical and non-hierarchical steering of their interactions. These four governance configurations differ in decision-making responsibilities, accountability and delegation of tasks or direction of information flow. The assumption on actor relationships and steering is supplemented by possible alternative explanations in the empirical investigation, such as resource availability, the inheritance of structures and institutions from previous projects in a project context, gaining acceptance through beneficiaries (local legitimacy) as a door opener, and asymmetries of power in the project context.
Case study evidence from seven projects reveals that the actors' relationship is important for successful project delivery. Additionally, the results show that there is a systematic difference between conventional and new donors. Projects led by conventional donors were consistently more successful, due to an actor relationship that placed the responsibility in the hands of the recipient actors and benefited from the trust and reputation of a long-term cooperation. The trust and reputation of conventional donors always went along with a back-up from federal level and trickled down as reputation also at local level implementation. Furthermore, charismatic leaders, as well as the acquired structures and institutions of predecessor projects, also proved to be a positive influencing factor for successful project implementation.
Despite the mixed results of the seven case studies, central recommendations for action can be derived for the various actors involved in development cooperation. For example, new donors could fulfill a supplementary function with conventional donors by developing innovative project approaches through pilot studies and then implementing them as a supplement to the projects of conventional donors on the ground. In return, conventional donors would have to make room the new donors by integrating their approaches into already programs in order to promote donor harmonization. It is also important to identify and occupy niches for activities and to promote harmonization among donors on state and federal sides.
The empirical results demonstrate the need for a harmonization strategy of different donor types in order to prevent duplication, over-experimentation and the failure of development programs. A transformation to successful and sustainable development cooperation can only be achieved through more coordination processes and national self-responsibility.
World market governance
(2014)
Democratic capitalism or liberal democracy, as the successful marriage of convenience between market liberalism and democracy sometimes is called, is in trouble. The market economy system has become global and there is a growing mismatch with the territoriality of the nation-states. The functional global networks and inter-governmental order can no longer keep pace with the rapid development of the global market economy and regulatory capture is all too common. Concepts like de-globalization, self-regulation, and global government are floated in the debate. The alternatives are analysed and found to be improper, inadequate or plainly impossible. The proposed route is instead to accept that the global market economy has developed into an independent fundamental societal system that needs its own governance. The suggestion is World Market Governance based on the Rule of Law in order to shape the fitness environment for the global market economy and strengthen the nation-states so that they can regain the sovereignty to decide upon the social and cultural conditions in each country. Elements in the proposed Rule of Law are international legislation decided by an Assembly supported by a Council, and an independent Judiciary. Existing international organisations would function as executors. The need for broad sustained demand for regulations in the common interest is identified.
Lokale Politiknetzwerke werden sowohl in der öffentlichen Sozialstaatsdebatte als auch in der sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung als vielversprechende Instrumente zur Optimierung von Wohlfahrtsmärkten propagiert. So auch in der Diskussion um den deutschen Pflegemarkt und seine Steuerungsdefizite. Im Gegensatz zu den mit dem Steuerungsinstrument Pflegekonferenz verknüpften Erwartungen, sind dessen genaues Steuerungspotential und mögliche Erklärungsfaktoren bisher jedoch nicht systematisch untersucht worden. Den methodologischen Kern dieser Arbeit bilden eine strukturelle Politikfeldanalyse des deutschen Pflegemarktes in Kombination mit einer empirischen Einzelfallstudie zu den Steuerungsleistungen einer Pflegekonferenz. Grundlage ist ein spezifisches Analyseraster auf Basis des akteurzentrierten Institutionalismus, welches die Aufmerksamkeit in der Analyse der Erklärungsfaktoren auf die Kombination der Koordinationsinstrumente Markt und Netzwerk sowie die Ausgestaltung des institutionellen Rahmens durch Gesetzgebung und Selbstverwaltung lenken soll. Im Rahmen der empirischen Erhebung konnten kaum direkte und nur wenige indirekte Steuerungsleistungen nachgewiesen werden. Als Ergebnis der Analyse lässt sich festhalten, dass lokale Politiknetzwerke im Umfeld des deutschen Pflegemarktes grundsätzlich mit erheblichen Herausforderungen hinsichtlich ihrer Steuerungsfunktion zu kämpfen haben. Dies lässt sich zum einen darauf zurückführen, dass ein gemeinsames Steuerungsinteresse der Akteure nur in wenigen Bereichen vorhanden ist, da die Grundbedingung der Interdependenz selten gegeben ist und auch nur sehr eingeschränkt innerhalb von Pflegekonferenzen entwickelt werden kann. Zum anderen sind die steuerungsrelevanten Handlungsressourcen oftmals lokal nicht verfügbar, wodurch erschwerend die Steuerungsmöglichkeiten eingeschränkt werden. Je nach Steuerungsbereich sind diese Faktoren jedoch verschieden ausgeprägt, sodass sich unterschiedliche Steuerungspotentiale ergeben.
This diploma thesis deals with the process of political and administrative decentralisation in the Kingdom of Lesotho. Although decentralization in itself does not automatically lead to development it became an integral part of reform processes in many developing countries. Governments and international donors consider efficient decentralized political and administrative structures as essential elements of “good governance” and a prerequisite for structural poverty alleviation. This paper seeks to analyse how the given decentralization strategy and its implementation is affecting different features of good governance in the case of Lesotho. The results of the analysis confirm that the decentralisation process significantly improved political participation of the local population. However, the second objective of enhancing efficiency through decentralisation was not achieved. To the contrary, in the institutional design of the newly created local authorities and in the civil service recruitment policy efficiency considerations did not matter. Additionally, the created mechanisms for political participation generate relevant costs. Thus it is impossible to judge unambiguously on the contribution of decentralisation to the achievement of good governance. Different subtargets of good governance are influenced contrarily. Consequently, the adequacy of the concept of good governance as a guiding concept for decentralisation policies can be questioned. The assessment of the success of decentralisation policies requires a normative framework that takes into account the relations between both participation and efficiency. Despite the partly reduced administrative efficiency the author’s overall impression of the decentralisation process in Lesotho is positive. The establishment of democratically legitimised and participatory local governments justifies certain additional expenditure. However, mistakes in the design and the implementation of the decentralisation strategy would have been avoidable.