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Economic crises as critical junctures for policy and structural changes towards decarbonization
(2024)
Crises may act as tipping points for decarbonization pathways by triggering structural economic change or offering windows of opportunity for policy change. We investigate both types of effects of the global financial and COVID-19 crises on decarbonization in Spain and Germany through a quantitative Kaya-decomposition analysis of CO2 emissions and through a qualitative review of climate and energy policy changes. We show that the global financial crisis resulted in a critical juncture for Spanish CO2 emissions due to the combined effects of the deep economic recession and crisis-induced structural change, resulting in reductions in carbon and energy intensities and shifts in the economic structure. However, the crisis also resulted in a rollback of renewable energy policy, halting progress in the transition to green electricity. The impacts were less pronounced in Germany, where pre-existing decarbonization and policy trends continued after the crisis. Recovery packages had modest effects, primarily due to their temporary nature and the limited share of climate-related spending. The direct short-term impacts of the COVID-19 crisis on CO2 emissions were more substantial in Spain than in Germany. The policy responses in both countries sought to align short-term economic recovery with the long-term climate change goals of decarbonization, but it is too soon to observe their lasting effects. Our findings show that crises can affect structural change and support decarbonization but suggest that such effects depend on pre-existing trends, the severity of the crisis and political manoeuvring during the crisis.
The 2022 Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) and Paris Agreement (PA) are highly complementary agreements where each depends on the other’s success to be effective. The GBF offers a very specific framework of interim goals and targets that break down the objective of the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) into a decade-spanning work plan. Comprised of 10 sections – including a 2050 vision and a 2030 mission, four overarching goals and 23 specific targets – the GBF is expected to guide biodiversity policy around the world in the coming years to decades. A similar set of global interim climate policy targets could translate the global temperature goal into concrete policy milestones that would provide policy makers and civil society with reference points for policy making and efforts to hold governments accountable. Beyond inspiring climate policy experts to convert temperature goals into policy milestones, GBF has the potential to strengthen the implementation of the PA at the nexus of biodiversity and climate (adaptation and mitigation) action. For example, the GBF can help to ensure that nature-based climate solutions are implemented with full consideration of biodiversity concerns, of the rights and interests of Indigenous Peoples and local communities, and with fair and transparent benefit sharing arrangements. In sum, the GBF should be mandatory reading for all climate policy makers.
Energy system developments and investments in the decisive decade for the Paris Agreement goals
(2021)
The Paris Agreement does not only stipulate to limit the global average temperature increase to well below 2 °C, it also calls for 'making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions'. Consequently, there is an urgent need to understand the implications of climate targets for energy systems and quantify the associated investment requirements in the coming decade. A meaningful analysis must however consider the near-term mitigation requirements to avoid the overshoot of a temperature goal. It must also include the recently observed fast technological progress in key mitigation options. Here, we use a new and unique scenario ensemble that limit peak warming by construction and that stems from seven up-to-date integrated assessment models. This allows us to study the near-term implications of different limits to peak temperature increase under a consistent and up-to-date set of assumptions. We find that ambitious immediate action allows for limiting median warming outcomes to well below 2 °C in all models. By contrast, current nationally determined contributions for 2030 would add around 0.2 °C of peak warming, leading to an unavoidable transgression of 1.5 °C in all models, and 2 °C in some. In contrast to the incremental changes as foreseen by current plans, ambitious peak warming targets require decisive emission cuts until 2030, with the most substantial contribution to decarbonization coming from the power sector. Therefore, investments into low-carbon power generation need to increase beyond current levels to meet the Paris goals, especially for solar and wind technologies and related system enhancements for electricity transmission, distribution and storage. Estimates on absolute investment levels, up-scaling of other low-carbon power generation technologies and investment shares in less ambitious scenarios vary considerably across models. In scenarios limiting peak warming to below 2 °C, while coal is phased out quickly, oil and gas are still being used significantly until 2030, albeit at lower than current levels. This requires continued investments into existing oil and gas infrastructure, but investments into new fields in such scenarios might not be needed. The results show that credible and effective policy action is essential for ensuring efficient allocation of investments aligned with medium-term climate targets.
Integrated assessment models (IAMs) form a prime tool in informing about climate mitigation strategies. Diagnostic indicators that allow comparison across these models can help describe and explain differences in model projections. This increases transparency and comparability. Earlier, the IAM community has developed an approach to diagnose models (Kriegler (2015 Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change 90 45–61)). Here we build on this, by proposing a selected set of well-defined indicators as a community standard, to systematically and routinely assess IAM behaviour, similar to metrics used for other modeling communities such as climate models. These indicators are the relative abatement index, emission reduction type index, inertia timescale, fossil fuel reduction, transformation index and cost per abatement value. We apply the approach to 17 IAMs, assessing both older as well as their latest versions, as applied in the IPCC 6th Assessment Report. The study shows that the approach can be easily applied and used to indentify key differences between models and model versions. Moreover, we demonstrate that this comparison helps to link model behavior to model characteristics and assumptions. We show that together, the set of six indicators can provide useful indication of the main traits of the model and can roughly indicate the general model behavior. The results also show that there is often a considerable spread across the models. Interestingly, the diagnostic values often change for different model versions, but there does not seem to be a distinct trend.
In order to achieve the temperature goals of the Paris Agreement, the world must reach net-zero carbon emissions around mid-century, which calls for an entirely new energy system. Carbon pricing, in the shape of taxes or emissions trading schemes, is often seen as the main, or only, necessary climate policy instrument, based on theoretical expectations that this would promote innovation and diffusion of the new technologies necessary for full decarbonization. Here, we review the empirical knowledge available in academic ex-post analyses of the effectiveness of existing, comparatively high-price carbon pricing schemes in the European Union, New Zealand, British Columbia, and the Nordic countries. Some articles find short-term operational effects, especially fuel switching in existing assets, but no article finds mentionable effects on technological change. Critically, all articles examining the effects on zero-carbon investment found that existing carbon pricing scheme have had no effect at all. We conclude that the effectiveness of carbon pricing in stimulating innovation and zero-carbon investment remains a theoretical argument. So far, there is no empirical evidence of its effectiveness in promoting the technological change necessary for full decarbonization. This article is categorized under: Climate Economics > Economics of Mitigation
We investigate whether political ideology has an observable effect on decarbonization ambition, renewable power aims, and preferences for power system balancing technologies in four European countries. Based on the Energy Logics framework, we identify ideologically different transition strategies (state-centered, market-centered, grassroots-centered) contained in government policies and opposition party programs valid in 2019. We compare these policies and programs with citizen poll data. We find that ideology has a small effect: governments and political parties across the spectrum have similar, and relatively ambitious, decarbonization and renewables targets. This mirrors citizens' strong support for ambitious action regardless of their ideological self-description. However, whereas political positions on phasing out fossil fuel power are clear across the policy space, positions on phasing in new flexibility options to balance intermittent renewables are vague or non-existent. As parties and citizens agree on strong climate and renewable power aims, the policy ambition is likely to remain high, even if governments change.
Friends or foes?
(2020)
Energy efficiency measures and the deployment of renewable energy are commonly presented as two sides of the same coin-as necessary and synergistic measures to decarbonize energy systems and reach the temperature goals of the Paris Agreement. Here, we quantitatively investigate the policies and performances of the EU Member States to see whether renewables and energy efficiency policies are politically synergistic or if they rather compete for political attention and resources. We find that Member States, especially the ones perceived as climate leaders, tend to prioritize renewables over energy efficiency in target setting. Further, almost every country performs well in either renewable energy or energy efficiency, but rarely performs well in both. We find no support for the assertion that the policies are synergistic, but some evidence that they compete. However, multi-linear regression models for performance show that performance, especially in energy efficiency, is also strongly associated with general economic growth cycles, and not only efficiency policy as such. We conclude that renewable energy and energy efficiency are not synergistic policies, and that there is some competition between them.
Reaching the Sustainable Development Goals requires a fundamental socio-economic transformation accompanied by substantial investment in low-carbon infrastructure. Such a sustainability transition represents a non-marginal change, driven by behavioral factors and systemic interactions. However, typical economic models used to assess a sustainability transition focus on marginal changes around a local optimum, whichby constructionlead to negative effects. Thus, these models do not allow evaluating a sustainability transition that might have substantial positive effects. This paper examines which mechanisms need to be included in a standard computable general equilibrium model to overcome these limitations and to give a more comprehensive view of the effects of climate change mitigation. Simulation results show that, given an ambitious greenhouse gas emission constraint and a price of carbon, positive economic effects are possible if (1) technical progress results (partly) endogenously from the model and (2) a policy intervention triggering an increase of investment is introduced. Additionally, if (3) the investment behavior of firms is influenced by their sales expectations, the effects are amplified. The results provide suggestions for policy-makers, because the outcome indicates that investment-oriented climate policies can lead to more desirable outcomes in economic, social and environmental terms.
Predicting Paris: Multi-Method Approaches to Forecast the Outcomes of Global Climate Negotiations
(2016)
We examine the negotiations held under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change in Paris, December 2015. Prior to these negotiations, there was considerable uncertainty about whether an agreement would be reached, particularly given that the world’s leaders failed to do so in the 2009 negotiations held in Copenhagen. Amid this uncertainty, we applied three different methods to predict the outcomes: an expert survey and two negotiation simulation models, namely the Exchange Model and the Predictioneer’s Game. After the event, these predictions were assessed against the coded texts that were agreed in Paris. The evidence suggests that combining experts’ predictions to reach a collective expert prediction makes for significantly more accurate predictions than individual experts’ predictions. The differences in the performance between the two different negotiation simulation models were not statistically significant.
Developed countries have relied heavily on aid budgets to fulfill their pledges to boost funding for addressing climate change in developing countries. However, little is known about how interaction between aid and other ministries has shaped contributors' diverse approaches to climate finance. This paper investigates intra-governmental dynamics in decision-making on climate finance in seven contributor countries (Australia, Denmark, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the UK, and the US). While aid agencies retained considerable control over implementation, environment and finance ministries have played an influential and often contrasting role on key policy issues, including distribution between mitigation and adaptation and among geographical regions. (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is a prominent example of the mix of public and private authority in global climate policy-making. While national governments hold the supreme authority in the CDM, the oversight and daily supervision of the project-based mechanism have been delegated via an intergovernmental body to private corporations that evaluate the environmental performance of individual CDM projects. By focusing on the CDM as a particular instance of private authority in global climate governance, this article analyses the consequences associated with the delegation of authority to private actors. The article critically assesses the role of private auditing corporations, labelled Designated Operational Entities, in the regulatory framework of the CDM and points to serious trade-offs which accompany the privatisation of authority. The article's findings suggest that the promise of innovative modes of governance to increase the effectiveness of international regulation is seriously compromised by the profit-seeking behaviour of private actors. Hence, the article underscores the need to reconsider the balance between public and private authority in global (climate) governance.
In diesem einleitenden Beitrag des Themenschwerpunktes wird der
Hintergrund der internationalen Klimaverhandlungen erläutert und
die Ergebnisse des Kopenhagen-Akkords vorgestellt. Angesichts des
Scheiterns der Kopenhagener Konferenz muss die zeitnahe Schließung
eines rechtlich bindenden, globalen Klimaabkommens als unwahrscheinlich
gelten. Die Klimapolitik wird zukünftig verstärkt auf nationalstaatlicher
und transnationaler Ebene erfolgen.
Abschied von KyotoPlus?
(2012)
Die Ergebnisse des Klimagipfels von Kopenhagen sind eine bittere
Enttäuschung für die EU. Ihr ist es nicht gelungen, ihren Führungsambitionen
beim globalen Klimaschutz gerecht zu werden und die
Konferenz zur Weichenstellung für ein rechtsverbindliches Klimaabkommen
nach 2012 zu nutzen. Damit steht die Union vor grundlegenden
strategischen Fragen zum Kurs ihrer Klimapolitik.
Gescheiterte Klimapolitik?
(2012)
Der Kopenhagener Klimagipfel 2009 ist mit Spannung erwartet worden.
Erreicht wurde lediglich ein Minimalkonsens. Der Autor liefert eine
akteurszentrierte Deutung des Kopenhagener Abkommens und stellt die
Frage nach dem Präzedenzcharakter der Verhandlungen: Handelte es sich
um ein einmaliges Versagen multilateraler Diplomatie oder um einen
Vorgeschmack auf die weltpolitische Routine des 21. Jahrhunderts?
Die Zivilgesellschaft hat dazu beigetragen, dass die Klimakonferenz in
Kopenhagen zu einem Medienereignis wurde. Fernab großer Demonstrationen
haben Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NRO) seit Jahren
einen guten Zugang zu den internationalen Klimaverhandlungen. Am
Beispiel von Chile wird gezeigt, wie Nichtregierungsorganisationen
durch professionellen Lobbyismus ihre Positionen in politische Prozesse
einspeisen. Sie befinden sich in einem Spannungsfeld von Kooperation
und Instrumentalisierung durch politische Entscheidungsträger.
Wie Klimaschutz finanzieren?
(2012)
Zur Finanzierung von Klimaschutz müssen öffentliche Mittel gezielt
eingesetzt werden. Dies beinhaltet auch die Rahmenbedingungen für
private Finanzströme signifikant zu verbessern. Anhand einer Problemanalyse
bestimmen die Autoren Eckdaten für diese Hebelwirkung.
Öffentliche Anschubfinanzierung kann somit die Grundlage für private
Investitionen sein. Dies wird exemplarisch an der Internationalen
Klimaschutzinitiative des Bundesumweltministeriums diskutiert.
China und Indien
(2012)
Der Artikel analysiert die neue Rolle aufsteigender Schwellenländer
in den internationalen Klimaverhandlungen am Beispiel Chinas und
Indiens. Die Ablehnung verbindlicher Reduktionsziele für Treibhausgase
wurde in Kopenhagen als Blockadepolitik beider Länder gewertet.
China und Indien können sich in ihrer Position behaupten, da ihr
gestiegenes Gewicht in der multipolaren Weltordnung und die Untätigkeit
führender Industrieländer ihre Verhandlungsposition stärkt. Die
Autorin diskutiert Kooperationsmöglichkeiten auf subnationaler Ebene,
die die Blockadeposition nationaler Regierungen umgehen können.
Der Autor diskutiert die Chancen und Risiken bei der Einbindung
des Südens in die internationale Klimapolitik. Lange Zeit hatten die
Entwicklungsländer am wenigsten zum Klimawandel beigetragen,
wären aber am stärksten von ihm betroffen. Mittlerweile jedoch tragen
diese Länder in erheblichem Maße selbst zum Klimawandel bei. Allerdings
setzen deren Regierungen auf Zeit. Sie erwarten Ressourcentransfers.
Dies verstärkt auch alte Probleme des ‚Rent-Seeking‘.
Klimapolitik am Ende?
(2012)
Einleitung
(2012)