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We know exactly what you want the development of a completely individualised conjoint analysis
(2013)
Improving the predictive validity of conjoint analysis has been an important research objective for many years. Whereas the majority of attempts have been different approaches to preference modelling, data collection or product presentation, only a few scholars have tried to improve predictive validity by individualising conjoint designs. This comes as a surprise because many markets have observed an augmented demand for customised products and highly heterogeneous customers' preferences. Against this background, the authors develop a conjoint variant based on a completely individualised conjoint design. More concretely, the new approach not only individualises the attributes, but also the attribute levels. The results of a comprehensive empirical study yield a significantly higher validity than existing standardised-level conjoint approaches. Consequently, they help marketers to gain deeper insights into their customers' preferences.
Vorwort
(2013)
1. Porter strategic competitive analysis 2. A Porter analysis of the competitive advantage of banks in business lending and proprietary trading 3. Summary, competitive advantage of banks in business lending and proprietary trading 4. JPMorgan’s “London Whale” speculation 5. A common misapprehension about hedged positions in corporate debt 6. Conclusion
The literature on performance information use explains how public managers deal with mainly quantitative data that are systematically collected and formally reported. This article argues that such a narrow understanding is incomplete, as it excludes all kinds of nonroutine performance information, including verbal, ad hoc, and qualitative feedback. To understand how responsive public managers are to performance feedback, alternative sources of performance information need to be taken into account. A literature review suggests considering two important sources of nonroutine feedback: organizational insiders and relevant external stakeholders. Using survey data from German local government, this article shows that public managers prefer to use nonroutine feedback over routine data from performance reports. Furthermore, a regression analysis indicates that different sources of performance information require different determinants to trigger their use. This finding is essential because it suggests that explanations of performance information use can covary with the information source studied.
1. Introduction 2. The growth of China’s SMBs and the changes of the banking market structure – a land of small- and medium-sized companies 2.1 The characteristics of China’s banking market structure 2.2 The growth of China’s SMBs 2.3 The changes of China’s banking market structure 3. The opportunities and challenges facing SMBs in China 3.1 Opportunities 3.2 Challenges 4. Conclusion
The German Banking System
(2013)
1. Motivation and introduction 2. International asset allocation 2.1 Risk and return drivers in international asset allocation 2.2 Passive and active investment approaches 2.3 Is international diversification advantageous? 3. Case 4. Interaction levels of the exchange rate dimension 4.1 Role of the reference currency 4.2 Decision on hedging exchange rate risks 4.3 Role of the investment currency 4.4 Role of the investment claim 5. Conclusion
1. Abstract 2. Introduction to the main monetary policy tools in China 2.1 Reserve requirements 2.2 Open market operations 2.3 Interest rate policy 2.4 Credit policy and window guidance 2.5 Real estate credit control 3. Loosening monetary policy and its effect on the banking 3.1 Loosening monetary policy measures 3.2 The effect of the expansionary monetary policy on the banking 4. Sound monetary policy with tight trend and its effect on banking 4.1 Main measures of the sound monetary policy with tight trend 4.2 The effect of sound monetary policy with tight trend on banking 5. Conclusion
1. Introduction 2. The role of banks and what is different in banks? 3. Corporate Governance and risk management 4. Risk taking and executive board composition 5. Compensation structures – how to improve models for banks? 6. Banking supervision and regulation 7. Reform of European institutions for financial stability
Reporting Self-Made Errors - The Impact of Organizational Error-Management Climate and Error Type
(2013)
We study how an organization's error-management climate affects organizational members' beliefs about other members' willingness to report errors that they discover when chance of error detection by superiors and others is extremely low. An error-management climate, as a component of the organizational climate, is said to be "high" when errors are accepted as part of everyday life as long as they are learned from and not repeated. Alternatively, the error-management climate is said to be an "error averse" climate when discovery of errors invokes the laying of blame on those admitting to or found committing errors. We examine the effects of this error-management climate in a professional services environment where uncorrected errors may have severe consequences and discovery of work errors is crucial for organizational success. We find that error-management climate affects organizational members' beliefs about what other members will report about discovered self-made errors, with a high error-management (versus error averse) climate leading to greater reporting willingness. We also find a significant interaction with a key contextual variable, error type (conceptual or calculation), that suggests the effect is more significant for conceptual errors than calculation errors. Our findings suggest that an organization's error-management climate is an important factor in promoting ethical behavior of employees, especially junior employees, carrying out routine tasks whose failure to report errors discovered incidental to those tasks may have severe implications for their organizations.
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is a prominent example of the mix of public and private authority in global climate policy-making. While national governments hold the supreme authority in the CDM, the oversight and daily supervision of the project-based mechanism have been delegated via an intergovernmental body to private corporations that evaluate the environmental performance of individual CDM projects. By focusing on the CDM as a particular instance of private authority in global climate governance, this article analyses the consequences associated with the delegation of authority to private actors. The article critically assesses the role of private auditing corporations, labelled Designated Operational Entities, in the regulatory framework of the CDM and points to serious trade-offs which accompany the privatisation of authority. The article's findings suggest that the promise of innovative modes of governance to increase the effectiveness of international regulation is seriously compromised by the profit-seeking behaviour of private actors. Hence, the article underscores the need to reconsider the balance between public and private authority in global (climate) governance.
1. Introduction 2. The architecture of the financial market regulation in Europe prior to the crisis 3. The new architecture of the financial market regulation in Europe 4. Actual issues of the political discussion on further needs to adapt the regulation and the structure of the financial markets in Europe 5. A brief summary