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This study examines how the size of trade unions relative to the labor force impacts on the desirability of different organizational forms of self- financing unemployment insurance (UI) for workers, firms, and with reference to an efficiency criterion. For this purpose, we respectively numerically compare the outcome of a model with a uniform payroll tax to a model where workers pay taxes according to their systematic risk of unemployment. Our results highlight the importance of the bargaining structure for the assessment of a particular UI scheme. Most importantly, it depends on the size of the unions whether effciency favors a uniform or a differentiated UI scheme.
A casual look at regional unemployment rates reveals that there are vast differences, which cannot be explained by different institutional settings. Our paper attempts to trace these differences in the labor market performance back to the regions' specialization in products that are more or less advanced in their product cycle. The model we develop shows how individual profit and utility maximization endogenously yields higher employment levels in the beginning. In later phases, however, employment decreases in the presence of process innovation. Our model suggests that the only way to escape from this vicious circle is to specialize in products that are at the beginning of their "economic life". The model is based on an interaction of demand and supply side forces.
Textbook wisdom says that competition yields lower prices and higher consumer surplus than monopoly. We show in two versions of a simple location-product differentiation model with and without endogenous choice of products that these two results have to be qualified. In both models, more than half of the reasonable parameter values lead to higher prices with duopoly than with monopoly. If the product characteristics are exogenous to the firms, consumers may even be be better off with monopoly in average.
Instability in competition
(2005)
In this paper we show that Puu (2002) does not provide a stable solution to the location game, according to his own definition of stability. If the usual two-stage game is considered, where in the first stage a location is chosen once and forever, and in the second stage prices are determined, the equilibrium proves stable for a sizeable interval of parameters, however. Even though this procedure is most common in analyzing Hotelling's location problem, it is not satisfying because it exhibits an inconsistent informational structure. The search for a better concept of stability is imperative.
In Mikro- und Industrieökonomik ist scheinbar gewiss, dassWettbewerb zu niedrigeren Preisen führt und dass Konsumenten von Wettbewerb profitieren, während die etablierten Unternehmen einen Nachteil erleiden. Dieser Beitrag verwendet ein raumwirtschaftliches Standardmodell, um zu zeigen, dass dies nicht immer so sein muss. Der Grund ist, dass durch den Marktzutritt gerade die Konsumenten, deren Preiselastizität am größten ist, von dem Unternehmen bei der Preisbildung nicht berücksichtigt werden.
Economy vs. history
(2004)
The aim of this study is to examine in which cases economic forces or historical singularities prevail in the determination of the long-run distribution of firms. We develop a relatively general model of heterogenous firms' location choice in discrete space. The main force towards an agglomerated structure is the reduction of transaction costs for consumers if firms are located closely, whilst competition and transport costs work towards a more disperse structure. We then assess the importance of the initial conditions by simulating and comparing the resulting distribution of firms for identical economic parameters but varying initial settings. If the equilibrium distributions of firms are similar we conclude that economic forces have prevailed, while differences in the resulting distributions indicate that 'history' is more important. The (dis)similarity of distributions of firms is calculated by means of a measure, which exhibits a number of desirable features.
(De)regulatory interventions frequently have unintended cross- market effects, which may or may not be desirable. We assess the effects of three policies on aggregate variables, in particular real income, from a theoretical perspective. Our results suggest that instruments acting upon wages have only a weak impact on real income, whereas the distribution of income is affected strongly. In contrast, a policy that enhances product market competition is fostering real income, but also impacts strongly on union wages and the distribution of income.
Existing theoretical literature fails to explain the differences between the pay of workers that are covered by union agreements and others who are not. This study aims at closing this gap by a single general- equilibrium approach that integrates a dual labor market and a two- sector product market. Our results suggest that the so called 'union wage gap' is largely determined by the degree of centralization of the bargains, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, by the expenditure share of the unionized sector's goods.