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In their comment on our paper (Caesar et al 2020 Environ. Res. Lett. 15 024003), Chen and Tung (hereafter C&T) argue that our analysis, showing that over the last decades Atlantic meridional overturning circulation (AMOC) strength and global mean surface temperature (GMST) were positively correlated, is incorrect. Their claim is mainly based on two arguments, neither of which is justified: first, C&T claim that our analysis is based on 'established evidence' that was only true for preindustrial conditions-this is not the case. Using data from the modern period (1947-2012), we show that the established understanding (i.e. deep-water formation in the North Atlantic cools the deep ocean and warms the surface) is correct, but our analysis is not based on this fact. Secondly, C&T claim that our results are based on a statistical analysis of only one cycle of data which was furthermore incorrectly detrended. This, too, is not true. Our conclusion that a weaker AMOC delays the current surface warming rather than enhances it, is based on several independent lines of evidence. The data we show to support this covers more than one cycle and the detrending (which was performed to avoid spurious correlations due to a common trend) does not affect our conclusion: the correlation between AMOC strength and GMST is positive. We do not claim that this is strong evidence that the two time series are in phase, but rather that this means that the two time series are not anti-correlated.
Der Klimawandel
(2020)
According to established understanding, deep-water formation in the North Atlantic and Southern Ocean keeps the deep ocean cold, counter-acting the downward mixing of heat from the warmer surface waters in the bulk of the world ocean. Therefore, periods of strong Atlantic meridional overturning circulation (AMOC) are expected to coincide with cooling of the deep ocean and warming of the surface waters. It has recently been proposed that this relation may have reversed due to global warming, and that during the past decades a strong AMOC coincides with warming of the deep ocean and relative cooling of the surface, by transporting increasingly warmer waters downward. Here we present multiple lines of evidence, including a statistical evaluation of the observed global mean temperature, ocean heat content, and different AMOC proxies, that lead to the opposite conclusion: even during the current ongoing global temperature rise a strong AMOC warms the surface. The observed weakening of the AMOC has therefore delayed global surface warming rather than enhancing it.
Social Media Abstract:
The overturning circulation in the Atlantic Ocean has weakened in response to global warming, as predicted by climate models. Since it plays an important role in transporting heat, nutrients and carbon, a slowdown will affect global climate processes and the global mean temperature. Scientists have questioned whether this slowdown has worked to cool or warm global surface temperatures. This study analyses the overturning strength and global mean temperature evolution of the past decades and shows that a slowdown acts to reduce the global mean temperature. This is because a slower overturning means less water sinks into the deep ocean in the subpolar North Atlantic. As the surface waters are cold there, the sinking normally cools the deep ocean and thereby indirectly warms the surface, thus less sinking implies less surface warming and has a cooling effect. For the foreseeable future, this means that the slowing of the overturning will likely continue to slightly reduce the effect of the general warming due to increasing greenhouse gas concentrations.
According to established understanding, deep-water formation in the North Atlantic and Southern Ocean keeps the deep ocean cold, counter-acting the downward mixing of heat from the warmer surface waters in the bulk of the world ocean. Therefore, periods of strong Atlantic meridional overturning circulation (AMOC) are expected to coincide with cooling of the deep ocean and warming of the surface waters. It has recently been proposed that this relation may have reversed due to global warming, and that during the past decades a strong AMOC coincides with warming of the deep ocean and relative cooling of the surface, by transporting increasingly warmer waters downward. Here we present multiple lines of evidence, including a statistical evaluation of the observed global mean temperature, ocean heat content, and different AMOC proxies, that lead to the opposite conclusion: even during the current ongoing global temperature rise a strong AMOC warms the surface. The observed weakening of the AMOC has therefore delayed global surface warming rather than enhancing it.
Social Media Abstract:
The overturning circulation in the Atlantic Ocean has weakened in response to global warming, as predicted by climate models. Since it plays an important role in transporting heat, nutrients and carbon, a slowdown will affect global climate processes and the global mean temperature. Scientists have questioned whether this slowdown has worked to cool or warm global surface temperatures. This study analyses the overturning strength and global mean temperature evolution of the past decades and shows that a slowdown acts to reduce the global mean temperature. This is because a slower overturning means less water sinks into the deep ocean in the subpolar North Atlantic. As the surface waters are cold there, the sinking normally cools the deep ocean and thereby indirectly warms the surface, thus less sinking implies less surface warming and has a cooling effect. For the foreseeable future, this means that the slowing of the overturning will likely continue to slightly reduce the effect of the general warming due to increasing greenhouse gas concentrations.
Estimating global mean sea-level rise and its uncertainties by 2100 and 2300 from an expert survey
(2020)
Sea-level rise projections and knowledge of their uncertainties are vital to make informed mitigation and adaptation decisions. To elicit projections from members of the scientific community regarding future global mean sea-level (GMSL) rise, we repeated a survey originally conducted five years ago. Under Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) 2.6, 106 experts projected a likely (central 66% probability) GMSL rise of 0.30-0.65 m by 2100, and 0.54-2.15 m by 2300, relative to 1986-2005. Under RCP 8.5, the same experts projected a likely GMSL rise of 0.63-1.32 m by 2100, and 1.67-5.61 m by 2300. Expert projections for 2100 are similar to those from the original survey, although the projection for 2300 has extended tails and is higher than the original survey. Experts give a likelihood of 42% (original survey) and 45% (current survey) that under the high-emissions scenario GMSL rise will exceed the upper bound (0.98 m) of the likely range estimated by the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which is considered to have an exceedance likelihood of 17%. Responses to open-ended questions suggest that the increases in upper-end estimates and uncertainties arose from recent influential studies about the impact of marine ice cliff instability on the meltwater contribution to GMSL rise from the Antarctic Ice Sheet.
Estimating global mean sea-level rise and its uncertainties by 2100 and 2300 from an expert survey
(2020)
Sea-level rise projections and knowledge of their uncertainties are vital to make informed mitigation and adaptation decisions. To elicit projections from members of the scientific community regarding future global mean sea-level (GMSL) rise, we repeated a survey originally conducted five years ago. Under Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) 2.6, 106 experts projected a likely (central 66% probability) GMSL rise of 0.30-0.65 m by 2100, and 0.54-2.15 m by 2300, relative to 1986-2005. Under RCP 8.5, the same experts projected a likely GMSL rise of 0.63-1.32 m by 2100, and 1.67-5.61 m by 2300. Expert projections for 2100 are similar to those from the original survey, although the projection for 2300 has extended tails and is higher than the original survey. Experts give a likelihood of 42% (original survey) and 45% (current survey) that under the high-emissions scenario GMSL rise will exceed the upper bound (0.98 m) of the likely range estimated by the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which is considered to have an exceedance likelihood of 17%. Responses to open-ended questions suggest that the increases in upper-end estimates and uncertainties arose from recent influential studies about the impact of marine ice cliff instability on the meltwater contribution to GMSL rise from the Antarctic Ice Sheet.
We review the evidence for a putative early 21st-century divergence between global mean surface temperature (GMST) and Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) projections. We provide a systematic comparison between temperatures and projections using historical versions of GMST products and historical versions of model projections that existed at the times when claims about a divergence were made. The comparisons are conducted with a variety of statistical techniques that correct for problems in previous work, including using continuous trends and a Monte Carlo approach to simulate internal variability. The results show that there is no robust statistical evidence for a divergence between models and observations. The impression of a divergence early in the 21st century was caused by various biases in model interpretation and in the observations, and was unsupported by robust statistics.
Persistent episodes of extreme weather in the Northern Hemisphere summer have been associated with high-amplitude quasi-stationary atmospheric Rossby waves, with zonal wave numbers 6 to 8 resulting from the phenomenon of quasi-resonant amplification (QRA). A fingerprint for the occurrence of QRA can be defined in terms of the zonally averaged surface temperature field. Examining state-of-the-art [Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5)] climate model projections, we find that QRA events are likely to increase by similar to 50% this century under business-as-usual carbon emissions, but there is considerable variation among climate models. Some predict a near tripling of QRA events by the end of the century, while others predict a potential decrease. Models with amplified Arctic warming yield the most pronounced increase in QRA events. The projections are strongly dependent on assumptions regarding the nature of changes in radiative forcing associated with anthropogenic aerosols over the next century. One implication of our findings is that a reduction in midlatitude aerosol loading could actually lead to Arctic de-amplification this century, ameliorating potential increases in persistent extreme weather events.