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Interest rates are central determinants of saving and investment decisions. Costly financial intermediation distorts these price signals by creating a spread between deposit and loan rates. This study investigates how bank spreads affect climate policy in its ambition to redirect capital. We identify various channels through which interest spreads affect carbon emissions in a dynamic general equilibrium model. Interest rate spreads increase abatement costs due to the higher relative price for capital-intensive carbon-free energy, but they also tend to reduce emissions due to lower overall economic growth. For the global average interest rate spread of 5.1 percentage points, global warming increases by 0.2°C compared to the frictionless economy. For a given temperature target to be achieved, interest rate spreads necessitate substantially higher carbon taxes. When spreads arise from imperfect competition in the intermediation sector, the associated welfare costs can be reduced by clean energy subsidies or even eliminated by economy-wide investment subsidies.
Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) moves atmospheric carbon to geological or land-based sinks. In a first-best setting, the optimal use of CDR is achieved by a removal subsidy that equals the optimal carbon tax and marginal damages. We derive second-best policy rules for CDR subsidies and carbon taxes when no global carbon price exists but a national government implements a unilateral climate policy. We find that the optimal carbon tax differs from an optimal CDR subsidy because of carbon leakage and a balance of resource trade effect. First, the optimal removal subsidy tends to be larger than the carbon tax because of lower supply-side leakage on fossil resource markets. Second, net carbon exporters exacerbate this wedge to increase producer surplus of their carbon resource producers, implying even larger removal subsidies. Third, net carbon importers may set their removal subsidy even below their carbon tax when marginal environmental damages are small, to appropriate producer surplus from carbon exporters.