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This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices.
While the economic harm of cartels is caused by their price-increasing effect, sanctioning by courts rather targets at the underlying process of firms reaching a price-fixing agreement. This paper provides experimental evidence on the question whether such sanctioning meets the economic target, i.e., whether evidence of a collusive meeting of the firms and of the content of their communication reliably predicts subsequent prices. We find that already the mere mutual agreement to meet predicts a strong increase in prices. Conversely, express distancing from communication completely nullifies its otherwise price-increasing effect. Using machine learning, we show that communication only increases prices if it is very explicit about how the cartel plans to behave.
The present paper proposes a novel approach for equilibrium selection in the infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma where players can communicate before choosing their strategies. This approach yields a critical discount factor that makes different predictions for cooperation than the usually considered sub-game perfect or risk dominance critical discount factors. In laboratory experiments, we find that our factor is useful for predicting cooperation. For payoff changes where the usually considered factors and our factor make different predictions, the observed cooperation is consistent with the predictions based on our factor.
Internet, Macht, Politik
(2005)
Vor Jahren haben wir, die Politikwissenschaftler, politischen Wandel, der durch das Internet vermittelt wurde, meist nicht ernst genommen: Entweder schoben wir ihn in den Bereich der Kommunikationsforschung ab oder betrachteten ihn als virtuellen Annex des öffentlichen Lebens. Inzwischen gehört die Internet-und-Politik-Forschung zum „Pflicht“-Bereich der Regierungslehre und der Vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft. Politik findet heutzutage auch in der digitalen Arena statt. Das beschränkt sich keineswegs nur auf die Herstellung von Öffentlichkeit und das Abwägen von Standpunkten. Mitunter schlägt sich cyberweltlicher Schlagabtausch bereits direkt auf die politische Wirklichkeit nieder. In diesem Sinne bietet das Thema dieses WeltTrends-Heftes eine tour d’horizon digitaler Demokratie.