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Although past research has emphasized the importance of international regimes for international gover-nance, systematic assessments of regime effects are missing. This article derives a standardized measure-ment concept for the effectiveness of international environmental regimes. It is based on a simultaneous evaluation of actual policy against a no-regime counterfactual and a collective optimum. Subsequently, the empirical feasibility of the measurement concept is demonstrated by way of two international treaties regu-lating transboundary air pollution in Europe. The results demonstrate that the regimes indeed show positive effects;but fall substantially short of the collective optima.
Political Science research encounters inferences across levels of analysis; however, they are fraught with challenges. After introducing voting examples of aggregation bias, problems posed by aggregation bias are summarized more generally. Subsequently, the article reviews the major methodological approaches to overcome aggregation bias and to solve the ecological inference (disaggregation) problem. The article highlights the possibility that aggregation bias may lead governments to accept (or reject) international climate agreements when negotiating as blocs of countries as compared to the distribution of the preferences of all countries involved in the negotiations.
Perhaps like no other country, Germany has radically changed its policies towards regulating air pollution in the European context. Acting originally as a dragger in the 1970s to regulate transboundary air pollutants due to pessimism about the relationship between causes and effects, Germany responded very decisively to its own damage assessment in the early 1980s. In particular the adverse effects to forests (Waldsterben" or forest decline) led to the formulation of strict air pollution regulations in the domestic context, efforts to spread the regulatory system within the European Union, and activities within the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe to foster stronger, continent-wide emission reductions. Using three conceptual models (rational actor, domestic politics, and social learning), we show that Germany deviated strongly from the ideal policy cycle consisting of (i) domestic policy formulation, (ii) international negotiations, as well as (iii) implementation and compliance with the provisions of international environmental agreements. Both national policy-making as well as partial implementation have been well on the way towards compliance even before Germany entered international negotiations on substantive protocols. Therefore, one may conclude from this country study that push countries may use the results of their national policy processes to influence the policy of other countries.
Previous research has documented only a modest success rate for imposed sanctions. By contrast, the success rate is higher in cases that are settled at the threat stage. In this article, the authors provide new insights about the circumstances under which sanctions cause behavioral change only after being imposed. First, the target must initially underestimate the impact of sanctions, miscalculate the sender's determination to impose them, or wrongly believe that sanctions will be imposed and maintained whether it yields or not. Second, the target's misperceptions must be corrected after sanctions are imposed. A game-theoretical model with incomplete information is used to develop and clarify the argument
Whereas the US President signed the Kyoto Protocol, the failure of the US Congress to ratify it seriously hampered subsequent international climate cooperation. This recent US trend, of signing environmental treaties but failing to ratify them, could thwart attempts to come to a future climate agreement. Two complementary explanations of this trend are proposed. First, the political system of the US has distinct institutional features that make it difficult for presidents to predict whether the Senate will give its advice and consent to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and whether Congress will pass the required enabling legislation. Second, elected for a fixed term, US presidents might benefit politically from supporting MEAs even when knowing that legislative support is not forthcoming. Four policy implications are explored, concerning the scope for unilateral presidential action, the potential for bipartisan congressional support, the effectiveness of a treaty without the US, and the prospects for a deep, new climate treaty.
Policy relevance
Why does the failure of US ratification of multilateral environmental treaties occur? This article analyses the domestic political mechanisms involved in cases of failed US ratification. US non-participation in global environmental institutions often has serious ramifications. For example, it sharply limited Kyoto's effectiveness and seriously hampered international climate negotiations for years. Although at COP 17 in Durban the parties agreed to negotiate a new agreement by 2015, a new global climate treaty may well trigger a situation resembling the one President Clinton faced in 1997 when he signed Kyoto but never obtained support for it in the Senate. US failure to ratify could thwart future climate agreements.