Inefficient cooperation under stochastic and strategic uncertainty
- Stochastic uncertainty can cause coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can increase efficiency. To test this transfer mechanism, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeated Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not lead to an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two major reasons for this failure: first, stochastic uncertainty forces proposers intending to cooperate to accept high strategic uncertainty, which many proposers avoid; second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperatively, which hinders cooperation in future periods.
| Author details: | Lisa Verena BruttelORCiDGND, Werner GüthORCiDGND, Juri NithammerORCiDGND, Andreas OrlandORCiDGND |
|---|---|
| DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027211066614 |
| ISSN: | 0022-0027 |
| ISSN: | 1552-8766 |
| Title of parent work (English): | Conflict resolution |
| Publisher: | Sage Publ. |
| Place of publishing: | Thousand Oaks |
| Publication type: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Date of first publication: | 2022/02/24 |
| Publication year: | 2022 |
| Release date: | 2024/02/29 |
| Tag: | Game; Ultimatum; cooperation; experiment; stochastic uncertainty; strategic uncertainty |
| Volume: | 66 |
| Issue: | 4-5 |
| Article number: | 00220027211066614 |
| Number of pages: | 28 |
| First page: | 755 |
| Last Page: | 782 |
| Organizational units: | Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät / Sozialwissenschaften / Fachgruppe Soziologie |
| DDC classification: | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 32 Politikwissenschaft / 320 Politikwissenschaft |
| Peer review: | Referiert |
