• search hit 8 of 8
Back to Result List

Emissions Trading with Clean-up Certificates

  • We analyze how conventional emissions trading schemes (ETS) can be modified by introducing “clean-up certificates” to allow for a phase of net-negative emissions. Clean-up certificates bundle the permission to emit CO2 with the obligation for its removal. We show that demand for such certificates is determined by cost-saving technological progress, the discount rate and the length of the compliance period. Introducing extra clean-up certificates into an existing ETS reduces near-term carbon prices and mitigation efforts. In contrast, substituting ETS allowances with clean-up certificates reduces cumulative emissions without depressing carbon prices or mitigation in the near term. We calibrate our model to the EU ETS and identify reforms where simultaneously (i) ambition levels rise, (ii) climate damages fall, (iii) revenues from carbon prices rise and (iv) carbon prices and aggregate mitigation cost fall. For reducing climate damages, roughly half of the issued clean-up certificates should replace conventional ETS allowances. In theWe analyze how conventional emissions trading schemes (ETS) can be modified by introducing “clean-up certificates” to allow for a phase of net-negative emissions. Clean-up certificates bundle the permission to emit CO2 with the obligation for its removal. We show that demand for such certificates is determined by cost-saving technological progress, the discount rate and the length of the compliance period. Introducing extra clean-up certificates into an existing ETS reduces near-term carbon prices and mitigation efforts. In contrast, substituting ETS allowances with clean-up certificates reduces cumulative emissions without depressing carbon prices or mitigation in the near term. We calibrate our model to the EU ETS and identify reforms where simultaneously (i) ambition levels rise, (ii) climate damages fall, (iii) revenues from carbon prices rise and (iv) carbon prices and aggregate mitigation cost fall. For reducing climate damages, roughly half of the issued clean-up certificates should replace conventional ETS allowances. In the context of the EU ETS, a European Carbon Central Bank could manage the implementation of cleanup certificates and could serve as an enforcement mechanism.show moreshow less

Download full text files

Export metadata

Metadaten
Author details:Kai LessmannORCiDGND, Friedemann Gruner, Matthias KalkuhlORCiDGND, Ottmar EdenhoferORCiDGND
URN:urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-641368
DOI:https://doi.org/10.25932/publishup-64136
ISSN:2628-653X
Title of parent work (English):CEPA Discussion Papers
Subtitle (English):Deterring Mitigation or Increasing Ambition?
Publication series (Volume number):CEPA Discussion Papers (79)
Publication type:Working Paper
Language:English
Date of first publication:2024/06/17
Publication year:2024
Publishing institution:Universität Potsdam
Release date:2024/06/17
Tag:carbon debt; carbon pricing; carbon removal; net-negative emissions
Issue:79
Number of pages:35
Organizational units:Extern / Extern
Zentrale und wissenschaftliche Einrichtungen / Center for Economic Policy Analysis (CEPA)
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät / Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Fachgruppe Volkswirtschaftslehre
DDC classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft
JEL classification:H Public Economics / H2 Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue / H23 Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Q Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics / Q4 Energy / Q48 Government Policy
Q Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics / Q5 Environmental Economics / Q54 Climate; Natural Disasters; Global Warming
Q Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics / Q5 Environmental Economics / Q58 Government Policy
Peer review:Nicht referiert
License (German):License LogoKeine öffentliche Lizenz: Unter Urheberrechtsschutz
Accept ✔
This website uses technically necessary session cookies. By continuing to use the website, you agree to this. You can find our privacy policy here.