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Selecting Investment Arbitrators

  • This paper focuses on one particular issue which has arisen in the course of the ongoing debate on the reform of investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS), namely that of the appointment of arbitrators. Taking as its starting point that there now exists tentative consensus that the present system for the appointment of arbitrators either causes or exacerbates certain problematic aspects of the current ISDS system, the paper explores one option for reform, namely the introduction of an independent panel for the selection of investment arbitrators. In doing so, it is argued that a shift in the normative basis of the rules governing appointments is required in order to accommodate the principles of party autonomy and the international rule of law. Such reform, while not completely removing the initiative that parties presently enjoy, is the most efficient way to introduce rule of law considerations such as a measure of judicial independence into the current appointments system. This, it is argued, would in turn help to address some of theThis paper focuses on one particular issue which has arisen in the course of the ongoing debate on the reform of investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS), namely that of the appointment of arbitrators. Taking as its starting point that there now exists tentative consensus that the present system for the appointment of arbitrators either causes or exacerbates certain problematic aspects of the current ISDS system, the paper explores one option for reform, namely the introduction of an independent panel for the selection of investment arbitrators. In doing so, it is argued that a shift in the normative basis of the rules governing appointments is required in order to accommodate the principles of party autonomy and the international rule of law. Such reform, while not completely removing the initiative that parties presently enjoy, is the most efficient way to introduce rule of law considerations such as a measure of judicial independence into the current appointments system. This, it is argued, would in turn help to address some of the problematic features of the appointment of arbitrators in ISDS.zeige mehrzeige weniger

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Metadaten
Verfasserangaben:James Gerard DevaneyGND
URN:urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-435797
DOI:https://doi.org/10.25932/publishup-43579
Titel des übergeordneten Werks (Englisch):KFG Working Paper Series
Untertitel (Englisch):Reconciling Party Autonomy and the International Rule of Law
Schriftenreihe (Bandnummer):KFG Working Paper Series (33)
Publikationstyp:Arbeitspapier
Sprache:Englisch
Datum der Erstveröffentlichung:04.06.2019
Erscheinungsjahr:2019
Veröffentlichende Institution:Universität Potsdam
Datum der Freischaltung:24.10.2019
Ausgabe:33
Seitenanzahl:27
Quelle:First publication of the paper: SSRN https://ssrn.com/abstract=3388903
RVK - Regensburger Verbundklassifikation:PR 2200, PR 2353
Organisationseinheiten:Extern / Berlin Potsdam Research Group "The International Rule of Law - Rise or Decline?"
DDC-Klassifikation:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 34 Recht
Peer Review:Nicht referiert
Lizenz (Deutsch):License LogoKeine öffentliche Lizenz: Unter Urheberrechtsschutz
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