Ria De Bleser

• Background: A prominent model of semantic processing in modern cognitive psychology proposes that semantic memory originates in everyday life experience with concrete objects such as plants, animals, and tools (Martin Chao, 2001). When the meaning of a concrete content word is being acquired, the learner is confronted with stimuli of various modalities related to the word's meaning. This comes to be stored as sensory knowledge about the object. It is further postulated that there is a conceptual domain remote from the mechanisms of perception, which is often referred to as functional knowledge or verbal semantics. There is a large body of neuropsychological literature trying to establish how much sensory and functional semantics is needed to access a name, and whether the relative contribution of these types of knowledge is the same for all categories of objects. Another controversial issue is whether naming requires access to semantic knowledge, or whether object names can be accessed directly from vision without the intervention ofBackground: A prominent model of semantic processing in modern cognitive psychology proposes that semantic memory originates in everyday life experience with concrete objects such as plants, animals, and tools (Martin Chao, 2001). When the meaning of a concrete content word is being acquired, the learner is confronted with stimuli of various modalities related to the word's meaning. This comes to be stored as sensory knowledge about the object. It is further postulated that there is a conceptual domain remote from the mechanisms of perception, which is often referred to as functional knowledge or verbal semantics. There is a large body of neuropsychological literature trying to establish how much sensory and functional semantics is needed to access a name, and whether the relative contribution of these types of knowledge is the same for all categories of objects. Another controversial issue is whether naming requires access to semantic knowledge, or whether object names can be accessed directly from vision without the intervention of semantics, as is generally accepted for written word naming. Some support for this assumption seems to come from cases of so-called non-optic aphasia, a condition in which patients can name from visual presentation only but not from any other modality of presentation such as auditory, verbal, tactile, etc. In optic aphasia, a condition far better established, naming is possible from all modalities except vision. Aims: The aim of this paper is to draw attention to the first case description of non-optic or negative optic aphasia described by Wolff (1897, 1904). Methods Procedures: The case describes the results of a re-examination of Voit, who was seen by several neurologists in the course of a decade in classical aphasiology. The patient demonstrated anomia in oral but not in written naming of objects in view. Wolff's examination involves extensive testing of semantic processing in several modalities, especially with respect to the status of functional and sensory semantic features Outcomes Results: The re-examination of patient Voit by Wolff in 1897 with new procedures revealed a specific impairment in processing sensory knowledge, while functional knowledge of objects was relatively preserved. This led to a naming impairment in all modalities of presentation except the visual one. Using more refined tasks, Wolff also demonstrated receptive impairments, in contrast to previous researchers who had concluded that the impairment was restricted to oral production. Conclusions: Although Wolff's (1904) case of negative optic aphasia has been almost completely forgotten (but see Bartels Wallesch, 1996), it is astonishingly modern in its conceptual approach and in the central questions it addresses on the mechanisms involved in the process of naming and on the structure of the semantic system. As is usual in classical cases, the methodology may appear less stringent than in most contemporary work, but the approach was brilliant.…