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Is the "Constitution of Equality' Parliamentary, Presidential or Hybrid?

  • What does the value of political equality imply for the institutional design of democracies? The existing normative literature highlights the importance of proportional representation and legislative majority rule, but neglects the choice of an executive format. This paper explores two potential egalitarian trade-offs in this choice. First, while presidential systems tend to achieve too little bundling of separable decision-making issues (within political parties), parliamentary systems often tend towards too much bundling (between political parties), thus establishing informal veto positions in the democratic process. This is a trade-off between the adversarial' and deliberative' aspects of equality. Second, there is a trade-off between horizontal' and vertical' equality. Neither pure presidentialism nor pure parliamentarism may be able to maximise both dimensions of equality simultaneously. The paper argues that certain hybrids between parliamentarism and presidentialism have the potential to mitigate both trade-offs. These hybridsWhat does the value of political equality imply for the institutional design of democracies? The existing normative literature highlights the importance of proportional representation and legislative majority rule, but neglects the choice of an executive format. This paper explores two potential egalitarian trade-offs in this choice. First, while presidential systems tend to achieve too little bundling of separable decision-making issues (within political parties), parliamentary systems often tend towards too much bundling (between political parties), thus establishing informal veto positions in the democratic process. This is a trade-off between the adversarial' and deliberative' aspects of equality. Second, there is a trade-off between horizontal' and vertical' equality. Neither pure presidentialism nor pure parliamentarism may be able to maximise both dimensions of equality simultaneously. The paper argues that certain hybrids between parliamentarism and presidentialism have the potential to mitigate both trade-offs. These hybrids establish power separation between the executive and legislature without allowing for popular executive elections. The argument also has potential implications for the democratisation of the European Union.zeige mehrzeige weniger

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Metadaten
Verfasserangaben:Steffen GanghofORCiDGND
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12124
ISSN:0032-3217
ISSN:1467-9248
Titel des übergeordneten Werks (Englisch):Political studies : the journal of the Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom
Verlag:Wiley-Blackwell
Verlagsort:Hoboken
Publikationstyp:Wissenschaftlicher Artikel
Sprache:Englisch
Jahr der Erstveröffentlichung:2015
Erscheinungsjahr:2015
Datum der Freischaltung:27.03.2017
Freies Schlagwort / Tag:democratic theory; equality; forms of government; institutional design; majority rule
Band:63
Ausgabe:4
Seitenanzahl:16
Erste Seite:814
Letzte Seite:829
Fördernde Institution:German Research Foundation (DFG) [GA 1696/2-1]
Organisationseinheiten:Juristische Fakultät / Bürgerliches Recht
Peer Review:Referiert
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