The PhD thesis entitled “Actions through the lens of communicative cues. The influence of verbal cues and emotional cues on action processing and action selection in the second year of life” is based on four studies, which examined the cognitive integration of another person’s communicative cues (i.e., verbal cues, emotional cues) with behavioral cues in 18- and 24-month-olds. In the context of social learning of instrumental actions, it was investigated how the intention-related coherence of either a verbally announced action intention or an emotionally signaled action evaluation with an action demonstration influenced infants’ neuro-cognitive processing (Study I) and selection (Studies II, III, IV) of a novel object-directed action. Developmental research has shown that infants benefit from another’s behavioral cues (e.g., action effect, persistency, selectivity) to infer the underlying goal or intention, respectively, of an observed action (e.g., Cannon & Woodward, 2012; Woodward, 1998). Particularly action effects support infants in distinguishing perceptual action features (e.g., target object identity, movement trajectory, final target object state) from conceptual action features such as goals and intentions. However, less is known about infants’ ability to cognitively integrate another’s behavioral cues with additional action-related communicative cues. There is some evidence showing that in the second year of life, infants selectively imitate a novel action that is verbally (“There!”) or emotionally (positive expression) marked as aligning with the model’s action intention over an action that is verbally (“Whoops!”) or emotionally (negative expression) marked as unintentional (Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998; Olineck & Poulin-Dubois, 2005, 2009; Repacholi, 2009; Repacholi, Meltzoff, Toub, & Ruba, 2016). Yet, it is currently unclear which role the specific intention-related coherence of a communicative cue with a behavioral cue plays in infants’ action processing and action selection that is, whether the communicative cue confirms, contrasts, clarifies, or is unrelated to the behavioral cue. Notably, by using both verbal cues and emotional cues, we examined not only two domains of communicative cues but also two qualitatively distinct relations between behavioral cues on the one hand and communicative cues on the other hand. More specifically, a verbal cue has the potential to communicate an action intention in the absence of an action demonstration and thus a prior-intention (Searle, 1983), whereas an emotional cue evaluates an ongoing or past action demonstration and thus signals an intention-in-action (Searle, 1983). In a first research focus, this thesis examined infants’ capacity to cognitively integrate another’s intention-related communicative cues and behavioral cues, and also focused on the role of the social cues’ coherence in infants’ action processing and action selection. In a second research focus, and to gain more elaborate insights into how the sub-processes of social learning (attention, encoding, response; cf. Bandura, 1977) are involved in this coherence-sensitive integrative processing, we employed a multi-measures approach. More specifically, we used Electroencephalography (EEG) and looking times to examine how the cues’ coherence influenced the compound of attention and encoding, and imitation (including latencies to first-touch and first-action) to address the compound of encoding and response. Based on the action-reconstruction account (Csibra, 2007), we predicted that infants use extra-motor information (i.e., communicative cues) together with behavioral cues to reconstruct another’s action intention. Accordingly, we expected infants to possess a flexibly organized internal action hierarchy, which they adapt according to the cues’ coherence that is, according to what they inferred to be the overarching action goal. More specifically, in a social-learning situation that comprised an adult model, who demonstrated an action on a novel object that offered two actions, we expected the demonstrated action to lead infants’ action hierarchy when the communicative (i.e., verbal, emotional) cue conveyed similar (confirming coherence) or no additional (un-related coherence) intention-related information relative to the behavioral cue. In terms of action selection, this action hierarchy should become evident in a selective imitation of the demonstrated action. However, when the communicative cue questioned (contrasting coherence) the behaviorally implied action goal or was the only cue conveying meaningful intention-related information (clarifying coherence), the verbally/emotionally intended action should ascend infants’ action hierarchy. Consequently, infants’ action selection should align with the verbally/emotionally intended action (goal emulation). Notably, these predictions oppose the direct-matching perspective (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004), according to which the observation of another’s action directly resonates with the observer’s motor repertoire, with this motor resonance enabling the identification of the underlying action goal. Importantly, the direct-matching perspective predicts a rather inflexible action hierarchy inasmuch as the process of goal identification should solely rely on the behavioral cue, irrespective of the behavioral cue’s coherence with extra-motor intention-related information, as it may be conveyed via communicative cues. As to the role of verbal cues, Study I used EEG to examine the influence of a confirming (Congruent) versus contrasting (Incongruent) coherence of a verbal action intention with the same action demonstration on 18-month-olds’ conceptual action processing (as measured via mid-latency mean negative ERP amplitude) and motor activation (as measured via central mu-frequency band power). The action was demonstrated on a novel object that offered two action alternatives from a neutral position. We expected mid-latency ERP negativity to be enhanced in Incongruent compared to Congruent, because past EEG research has demonstrated enhanced conceptual processing for stimuli that mismatched rather than matched the semantic context (Friedrich & Friederici, 2010; Kaduk et al., 2016). Regarding motor activation, Csibra (2007) posited that the identification of a clear action goal constitutes a crucial basis for motor activation to occur. We therefore predicted reduced mu power (indicating enhanced motor activation) for Congruent than Incongruent, because in Congruent, the cues’ match provides unequivocal information about the model’s action goal, whereas in Incongruent, the conflict may render the model’s action goal more unclear. Unexpectedly, in the entire sample, 18-month-olds’ mid-latency ERP negativity during the observation of the same action demonstration did not differ significantly depending on whether this action was congruent or incongruent with the model’s verbal action intention. Yet, post hoc analyses revealed the presence of two subgroups of infants, each of which exhibited significantly different mid-latency ERP negativity for Congruent versus Incongruent, but in opposing directions. The subgroups differed in their productive action-related language skills, with the linguistically more advanced infants exhibiting the expected response pattern of enhanced ERP mean negativity in Incongruent than Congruent, indicating enhanced conceptual processing of an action demonstration that was contrasted rather than confirmed by the verbal action context. As expected, central mu power in the entire sample was reduced in Congruent relative to Incongruent, indicating enhanced motor activation when the action demonstration was preceded by a confirming relative to a contrasting verbal action intention. This finding may indicate the covert preparation for a preferential imitation of the congruent relative to the incongruent action (Filippi et al., 2016; Frey & Gerry, 2006). Overall, these findings are in line with the action-reconstruction account (Csibra, 2007), because they suggest a coherence-sensitive attention to and encoding of the same perceptual features of another’s behavior and thus a cognitive integration of intention-related verbal cues and behavioral cues. Yet, because the subgroup constellation in infants’ ERPs was only discovered post hoc, future research is clearly required to substantiate this finding. Also, future research should validate our interpretation that enhanced motor activation may reflect an electrophysiological marker of subsequent imitation by employing EEG and imitation in a within-subjects design. Study II built on Study I by investigating the impact of coherence of a verbal cue and a behavioral cue on 18- and 24-month-olds’ action selection in an imitation study. When infants of both age groups observed a confirming (Congruent) or unrelated (Pseudo-word: action demonstration was associated with novel verb-like cue) coherence, they selectively imitated the demonstrated action over the not demonstrated, alternative action, with no difference between these two conditions. These findings suggest that, as expected, infants’ action hierarchy was led by the demonstrated action when the verbal cue provided similar (Congruent) or no additional (Pseudo-word) intention-related information relative to a meaningful behavioral cue. These findings support the above-mentioned interpretation that enhanced motor activation during action observation may reflect a covert preparation for imitation (Study I). Interestingly, infants did not seem to benefit from the intention-highlighting effect of the verbal cue in Congruent, suggesting that the verbal cue had an unspecific (e.g., attention-guiding) effect on infants’ action selection. Contrary, when infants observed a contrasting (Incongruent) or clarifying (Failed-attempt: model failed to manipulate the object but verbally announced a certain action intention) coherence, their action selection varied with age and also varied across the course of the experiment (block 1 vs. block 2). More specifically, the 24-month-olds made stronger use of the verbal cue for their action selection in block 1 than did the 18-month-olds. However, while the 18-month-olds’ use of the verbal cue increased across blocks, particularly in Incongruent, the 24-month-olds’ use of the verbal cue decreased across blocks. Overall, these results suggest that, as expected, infants’ action hierarchy in Incongruent (both age groups) and Failed-attempt (only 24-month-olds) drew on the verbal action intention, because in both age groups, infants emulated the verbal intention about as often as they imitated the demonstrated action or even emulated the verbal action intention preferentially. Yet, these findings were confined to certain blocks. It may be argued that the younger age group had a harder time inferring and emulating the intended, yet never observed action, because this requirement is more demanding in cognitive and motor terms. These demands may explain why the 18-month-olds needed some time to take account of the verbal action intention. Contrary, it seems that the 24-month-olds, although demonstrating their principle capacity to take account of the verbal cue in block 1, lost trust in the model’s verbal cue, maybe because the verbal cue did not have predictive value for the model’s actual behavior. Supporting this interpretation, research on selective trust has demonstrated that already infants evaluate another’s reliability or competence, respectively, based on how that model handles familiar objects (behavioral reliability) or labels familiar objects (verbal reliability; for reviews, see Mills, 2013; Poulin-Dubois & Brosseau-Liard, 2016). Relatedly, imitation research has demonstrated that the interpersonal aspects of a social-learning situation gain increasing relevance for infants during the second year of life (Gellén & Buttelmann, 2019; Matheson, Moore, & Akhtar, 2013; Uzgiris, 1981). It may thus be argued that when the 24-month-olds were repeatedly faced with a verbally unreliable model, they de-evaluated the verbal cue as signaling the model’s action intention and instead relied more heavily on alternative cues such as the behavioral cue (Incongruent) or the action context (e.g., object affordances, salience; Failed-attempt). Infants’ first-action latencies were higher in Incongruent and Failed-attempt than in both Congruent and Pseudo-word, and were also higher in Failed-attempt than in Incongruent. These latency-findings thus indicate that situations involving a meaningful verbal cue that deviated from the behavioral cue are cognitively more demanding, resulting in a delayed initiation of a behavioral response. In sum, the findings of Study II suggest that both age groups were highly flexible in their integration of a verbal cue and behavioral cue. Moreover, our results do not indicate a general superiority of either cue. Instead, it seems to depend on the informational gain conveyed by the verbal cue whether it exerts a specific, intention-highlighting effect (Incongruent, Failed-attempt) or an unspecific (e.g., attention-guiding) effect (Congruent, Pseudo-word). Studies III and IV investigated the impact of another’s action-related emotional cues on 18-month-olds’ action selection. In Study III, infants observed a model, who demonstrated two actions on a novel object in direct succession, and who combined one of the two actions with a positive (happy) emotional expression and the other action with a negative (sad) emotional expression. As expected, infants imitated the positively emoted (PE) action more often than the negatively emoted (NE) action. This preference arose from an increase in infants’ readiness to perform the PE action from the baseline period (prior to the action demonstrations) to the test period (following the action demonstrations), rather than from a decrease in readiness to the perform the NE action. The positive cue thus had a stronger behavior-regulating effect than the negative cue. Notably, infants’ more general object-directed behavior in terms of first-touch latencies remained unaffected by the emotional cues’ valence, indicating that infants had linked the emotional cues specifically to the corresponding action and not the object as a whole (Repacholi, 2009). Also, infants’ looking times during the action demonstration did not differ significantly as a function of emotional valence and were characterized by a predominant attentional focus to the action/object rather than to the model’s face. Together with the findings on infants’ first-touch latencies, these results indicate a sensitivity for the notion that emotions can have very specific referents (referential specificity; Martin, Maza, McGrath, & Phelps, 2014). Together, Study III provided evidence for selective imitation based on another’s intention-related (particularly positive) emotional cues in an action-selection task, and thus indicates that infants’ action hierarchy flexibly responds to another’s emotional evaluation of observed actions. According to Repacholi (2009), we suggest that infants used the model’s emotional evaluation to re-appraise the corresponding action (effect), for instance in terms of desirability. Study IV followed up on Study III by investigating the role of the negative emotional cue for infants’ action selection in more detail. Specifically, we investigated whether a contrasting (negative) emotional cue alone would be sufficient to differentially rank the two actions along infants’ action hierarchy or whether instead infants require direct information about the model’s action intention (in the form of a confirming action-emotion pair) to align their action selection with the emotional cues. Also, we examined whether the absence of a direct behavior-regulating effect of the negative cue in Study III was due to the negative cue itself or to the concurrently available positive cue masking the negative cue’s potential effect. To this end, we split the demonstration of the two action-emotion pairs across two trials. In each trial, one action was thus demonstrated and emoted (PE, NE action), and one action was not demonstrated and un-emoted (UE action). For trial 1, we predicted that infants, who observed a PE action demonstration, would selectively imitate the PE action, whereas infants, who observed a NE action demonstration would selectively emulate the UE action. As to trial 2, we expected the complementary action-emotion pair to provide additional clarifying information as the model’s emotional evaluation of both actions, which should either lead to adaptive perseveration (if infants’ action selection in trial 1 had already drawn on the emotional cue) or adaptive change (if infants’ action selection in trial 1 signaled a disregard of the emotional cue). As to trial 1, our findings revealed that, as expected, infants imitated the PE action more often than they emulated the UE action. Like in Study III, this selectivity arose from an increase in infants’ propensity to perform the PE action from baseline to trial 1. Also like in Study III, infants performed the NE action about equally often in baseline and trial 1, which speaks against a direct behavior-regulating effect of the negative cue also when presented in isolation. However, after a NE action demonstration, infants emulated the UE action more often in trial 1 than in baseline, suggesting an indirect behavior-regulating effect of the negative cue. Yet, this indirect effect did not yield a selective emulation of the UE action, because infants performed both action alternatives about equally often in trial 1. Unexpectedly, infants’ action selection in trial 2 was unaffected by the emotional cue. Instead, infants perseverated their action selection of trial 1 in trial 2, irrespective of whether it was adaptive or non-adaptive with respect to the model’s emotional evaluation of the action. It seems that infants changed their strategy across trials, from an initial adherence to the emotional (particularly positive) cue, towards bringing about a salient action effect (Marcovich & Zelazo, 2009). In sum, Studies III and IV indicate a dynamic interplay of different action-selection strategies, depending on valence and presentation order. Apparently, at least in infancy, action reconstruction as one basis for selective action performance reaches its limits when infants can only draw on indirect intention-related information (i.e., which action should be avoided). Overall, our findings favor the action-reconstruction account (Csibra, 2007), according to which actions are flexibly organized along a hierarchy, depending on inferential processes based on extra-motor intention-related information. At the same time, the findings question the direct-matching hypothesis (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004), according to which the identification (and pursuit) of action goals hinges on a direct simulation of another’s behavioral cues. Based on the studies’ findings, a preliminary working model is introduced, which seeks to integrate the two theoretical accounts by conceptualizing the routes that activation induced by social cues may take to eventually influence an infant’s action selection. Our findings indicate that it is useful to strive a differentiated conceptualization of communicative cues, because they seem to operate at different places within the process of cue integration, depending on their potential to convey direct intention-related information. Moreover, we suggest that there is bidirectional exchange within each compound of adjacent sub-processes (i.e., between attention and encoding, and encoding and response), and between the compounds. Hence, our findings highlight the benefits of a multi-measures approach when studying the development of infants’ social-cognitive abilities, because it provides a more comprehensive picture how the concerted use of social cues from different domains influences infants’ processing and selection of instrumental actions. Finally, this thesis points to potential future directions to substantiate our current interpretation of the findings.. Moreover, an extension to additional kinds of coherence is suggested to get closer to infants’ everyday-world of experience.

The relationship among cyberbullying victimization, lower self-esteem, and internet addiction has been well-established. Yet, little research exists that explains the nature of these associations, and no previous work has considered the inability to identify or describe one’s emotions, namely, alexithymia, as a potential mediator of these links. The present study sought to investigate the indirect effects of cyberbullying victimization on self-esteem and internet addiction, mediated by alexithymia. The sample consisted of 1,442 participants between 12 and 17 years (Mage = 14.17, SD = 1.38, 51.5% male) from Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States. Results showed a direct relationship between cyberbullying victimization and self-esteem and an indirect association mediated by alexithymia in the Dutch sample. However, in the German and U.S. samples, only an indirect relationship via alexithymia, but not a direct effect of cyberbullying victimization on self-esteem, was found. Consistent across the three country samples, cyberbullying victimization and internet addiction were directly and also indirectly associated via alexithymia. In sum, findings indicate that alexithymia might help better understand which detrimental effects cyberbullying victimization has on adolescent psychological health. Thus, cyberbullying prevention programs should consider implementing elements that educate adolescents on the ability to identify and describe their own emotions.

This study presents the evaluation of a computer-based learning program for children with developmental dyscalculia and focuses on factors affecting individual responsiveness. The adaptive training program Calcularis 2.0 has been developed according to current neuro-cognitive theory of numerical cognition. It aims to automatize number representations, supports the formation and access to the mental number line and trains arithmetic operations as well as arithmetic fact knowledge in expanding number ranges. Sixty-seven children with developmental dyscalculia from second to fifth grade (mean age 8.96 years) were randomly assigned to one of two groups (Calcularis group, waiting control group). Training duration comprised a minimum of 42 training sessions à 20 min within a maximum period of 13 weeks. Compared to the waiting control group, children of the Calcularis group demonstrated a higher benefit in arithmetic operations and number line estimation. These improvements were shown to be stable after a 3-months post training interval. In addition, this study examines which predictors accounted for training improvements. Results indicate that this self-directed training was especially beneficial for children with low math anxiety scores and without an additional reading and/or spelling disorder. In conclusion, Calcularis 2.0 supports children with developmental dyscalculia to improve their arithmetical abilities and their mental number line representation. However, it is relevant to further adapt the setting to the individual circumstances.

Previous clinical research found that invasive vagus nerve stimulation (VNS) enhanced word recognition memory in epileptic patients, an effect assumed to be related to the activation of brainstem arousal systems. In this study, we applied non-invasive transcutaneous auricular VNS (tVNS) to replicate and extend the previous work. Using a single-blind, randomized, between-subject design, 60 healthy volunteers received active or sham stimulation during a lexical decision task, in which emotional and neutral stimuli were classified as words or non-words. In a subsequent recognition memory task (1 day after stimulation), participants' memory performance on these words and their subjective memory confidence were tested. Salivary alpha-amylase (sAA) levels, a putative indirect measure of central noradrenergic activation, were also measured before and after stimulation. During encoding, pleasant words were more accurately detected than neutral and unpleasant words. However, no tVNS effects were observed on task performance or on overall sAA level changes. tVNS also did not modulate overall recognition memory, which was particularly enhanced for pleasant emotional words. However, when hit rates were split based on confidence ratings reflecting familiarity- and recollection-based memory, higher recollection-based memory performance (irrespective of emotional category) was observed during active stimulation than during sham stimulation. To summarize, we replicated prior findings of enhanced processing and memory for emotional (pleasant) words. Whereas tVNS showed no effects on word processing, subtle effects on recollection-based memory performance emerged, which may indicate that tVNS facilitates hippocampus-mediated consolidation processes.

Although a relatively large number of studies on acquired language impairments have tested the case of derivational morphology, none of these have specifically investigated whether there are differences in how prefixed and suffixed derived words are impaired. Based on linguistic and psycholinguistic considerations on prefixed and suffixed derived words, differences in how these two types of derivations are processed, and consequently impaired, are predicted. In the present study, we investigated the errors produced in reading aloud simple, prefixed, and suffixed words by three German individuals with agrammatic aphasia (NN, LG, SA). We found that, while NN and LG produced similar numbers of errors with prefixed and suffixed words, SA showed a selective impairment for prefixed words. Furthermore, NN and SA produced more errors specifically involving the affix with prefixed words than with suffixed words. We discuss our findings in terms of relative position of stem and affix in prefixed and suffixed words, as well as in terms of specific properties of prefixes and suffixes.