The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is a prominent example of the mix of public and private authority in global climate policy-making. While national governments hold the supreme authority in the CDM, the oversight and daily supervision of the project-based mechanism have been delegated via an intergovernmental body to private corporations that evaluate the environmental performance of individual CDM projects. By focusing on the CDM as a particular instance of private authority in global climate governance, this article analyses the consequences associated with the delegation of authority to private actors. The article critically assesses the role of private auditing corporations, labelled Designated Operational Entities, in the regulatory framework of the CDM and points to serious trade-offs which accompany the privatisation of authority. The article's findings suggest that the promise of innovative modes of governance to increase the effectiveness of international regulation is seriously compromised by the profit-seeking behaviour of private actors. Hence, the article underscores the need to reconsider the balance between public and private authority in global (climate) governance.

Inhalt: Einleitung Das Konzept der Führungsrolle Die Führungsrolle der EU bis Kopenhagen Die Führungsrolle der EU nach Kopenhagen EU-Energiepolitik EU-Entwicklungspolitik EU-Agrarpolitik Fazit Literatur

Several scholars concerned with global policy-making have recently pointed to a reconfiguration of authority in the area of climate politics. They have shown that various new carbon governance arrangements have emerged, which operate simultaneously at different governmental levels. However, despite the numerous descriptions and mapping exercises of these governance arrangements, we have little systematic knowledge on their workings within national jurisdictions, let alone about their impact on public-administrative systems in developing countries. Therefore, this article opens the black box of the nation-state and explores how and to what extent two different arrangements, that is, Transnational City Networks and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, generate changes in the distribution of public authority in nation-states and their administrations. Building upon conceptual assumptions that the former is likely to lead to more decentralized, and the latter to more centralized policy-making, we provide insights from case studies in Indonesia, South Africa, Brazil, and India. In a nutshell, our analysis underscores that Transnational City Networks strengthen climate-related actions taken by cities without ultimately decentralizing climate policy-making. On the other hand, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation tends to reinforce the competencies of central governments, but apparently does not generate a recentralization of the forestry sector at large.