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There is robust evidence showing a link between executive function (EF) and theory of mind (ToM) in 3-to 5-year-olds. However, it is unclear whether this relationship extends to middle childhood. In addition, there has been much discussion about the nature of this relationship. Whereas some authors claim that ToM is needed for EF, others argue that ToM requires EF. To date, however, studies examining the longitudinal relationship between distinct sub components of EF [i.e., attention shifting, working memory (WM) updating, inhibition] and ToM in middle childhood are rare. The present study examined (1) the relationship between three EF subcomponents (attention shifting, WM updating, inhibition) and ToM in middle childhood, and (2) the longitudinal reciprocal relationships between the EF subcomponents and ToM across a 1-year period. EF and ToM measures were assessed experimentally in a sample of 1,657 children (aged 6-11 years) at time point one (t1) and 1 year later at time point two (t2). Results showed that the concurrent relationships between all three EF subcomponents and ToM pertained in middle childhood at t1 and t2, respectively, even when age, gender, and fluid intelligence were partialle dout. Moreover, cross-lagged structural equation modeling (again, controlling for age, gender, and fluid intelligence, as well as for the earlier levels of the target variables), revealed partial support for the view that early ToM predictslater EF, but stronger evidence for the assumption that early EF predictslater ToM. The latter was found for attention shifting and WM updating, but not for inhibition. This reveals the importance of studying the exact interplay of ToM and EF across childhood development, especially with regard to different EF subcomponents. Most likely, understanding others' mental states at different levels of perspective-taking requires specific EF subcomponents, suggesting developmental change in the relations between EF and ToM across childhood.
Executive function (EF) has long been considered to be a unitary, domain-general cognitive ability. However, recent research suggests differentiating "hot" affective and "cool" cognitive aspects of EF. Yet, findings regarding this two-factor construct are still inconsistent. In particular, the development of this factor structure remains unclear and data on school-aged children is lacking. Furthermore, studies linking EF and overweight or obesity suggest that EF contributes to the regulation of eating behavior. So far, however, the links between EF and eating behavior have rarely been investigated in children and non-clinical populations. First, we examined whether EF can be divided into hot and cool factors or whether they actually correspond to a unitary construct in middle childhood. Second, we examined how hot and cool EF are associated with different eating styles that put children at risk of becoming overweight during development. Hot and cool EF were assessed experimentally in a non-clinical population of 1657 elementary-school children (aged 6-11 years). The "food approach" behavior was rated mainly via parent questionnaires. Findings indicate that hot EF is distinguishable from cool EF. However, only cool EF seems to represent a coherent functional entity, whereas hot EF does not seem to be a homogenous construct. This was true for a younger and an older subgroup of children. Furthermore, different EF components were correlated with eating styles, such as responsiveness to food, desire to drink, and restrained eating in girls but not in boys. This shows that lower levels of EF are not only seen in clinical populations of obese patients but are already associated with food approach styles in a normal population of elementary school-aged girls. Although the direction of effect still has to be clarified, results point to the possibility that EF constitutes a risk factor for eating styles contributing to the development of overweight in the long-term.
Research on voluntary action has focused on the question of how we represent our behavior on a motor and cognitive level. However, the question of how we represent voluntary not acting has been completely neglected. The aim of the present study was to investigate the cognitive and motor representation of intentionally not acting. By using an action-effect binding approach, we demonstrate similarities of action and nonaction. In particular, our results reveal that voluntary nonactions can be bound to an effect tone. This finding suggests that effect binding is not restricted to an association between a motor representation and a successive effect (action-effect binding) but can also occur for an intended nonaction and its effect (nonaction-effect binding). Moreover, we demonstrate that nonactions have to be initiated voluntarily in order to elicit nonaction-effect binding.
One of the earliest categorical distinctions to be made by preverbal infants is the animate-inanimate distinction. To explore the neural basis for this distinction in 7-8-month-olds, an equal number of animal and furniture pictures was presented in an ERP-paradigm. The total of 118 pictures, all looking different from each other, were presented in a semi-randomized order for 1000 ms each. Infants' brain responses to exemplars from both categories differed systematically regarding the negative central component (Nc: 400-600 ms) at anterior channels. More specifically, the Nc was enhanced for animals in one subgroup of infants, and for furniture items in another subgroup of infants. Explorative analyses related to categorical priming further revealed category-specific differences in brain responses in the late time window (650-1550 ms) at right frontal channels: Unprimed stimuli (preceded by a different-category item) elicited a more positive response as compared to primed stimuli (preceded by a same-category item). In sum, these findings suggest that the infant's brain discriminates exemplars from both global domains. Given the design of our task, we conclude that processes of category identification are more likely to account for our findings than processes of on-line category formation during the experimental session.
Preschoolers' encoding of rational actions - the role of task features and verbal information
(2013)
In the current study, we first investigated whether preschoolers imitate selectively across three imitation tasks. Second, we examined whether preschoolers' selective imitation is influenced by differences in the modeled actions and/or by the situational context. Finally, we investigated how verbal cues given by the model affect preschoolers' imitation. Participants (3- to 5-year-olds) watched an adult performing an unusual action in three imitation tasks (touch light, house, and obstacle). In two conditions, the model either was or was not restricted by situational constraints. In addition, the model verbalized either the goal that was to be achieved, the movement, or none of the action components. Preschoolers always acted on the objects without constraints. Results revealed differences in preschoolers' selective imitation across the tasks. In the house task, they showed the selective imitation pattern that has been interpreted as rational, imitating the unusual action more often in the no-constraint condition than in the constraint condition. In contrast, in the touch light task, preschoolers imitated the unusual head touch irrespective of the model's constraints or of the verbal cues that had been presented. Finally, in the obstacle task, children mostly emulated the observed goal irrespective of the presence of the constraint, but they increased their imitation of the unusual action when the movement had been emphasized. Overall, our data suggest that preschoolers adjust their imitative behavior to context-specific information about objects, actions, and their interpretations of the model's intention to teach something.
Event-related potentials (ERPs) to single visual stimuli were recorded in 7-month-old infants. In a three-stimulus oddball paradigm, infants watched one frequently occurring standard stimulus (either an animal or a furniture item) and two infrequently occurring oddball stimuli, presenting one exemplar from the same and one from the different super-ordinate category as compared to the standard stimulus. Additionally, visual attributes of the stimuli were controlled to investigate whether infants focus on category membership or on perceptual similarity when processing the stimuli. Infant ERPs indicated encoding of the standard stimulus and discriminating it from the two oddball stimuli by larger Nc peak amplitude and late-slow-wave activity for the infrequent stimuli. Moreover, larger Nc latency and positive-slow-wave activity indicated increased processing for the different-category as compared to the same-category oddball. Thus, 7-month-olds seem to encode single stimuli not only by surface perceptual features, but they also regard information of category membership, leading to facilitated processing of the oddball that belongs to the same domain as the standard stimulus.
We investigated whether 12-month-old infants rely on information about the certainty of goal selection in order to predict observed reaching actions. Infants' goal-directed gaze shifts were recorded as they observed action sequences in a multiple-goals design. We found that 12-month-old infants exhibited gaze shifts significantly earlier when the observed hand reached for the same goal object in all trials (frequent condition) compared with when the observed hand reached for different goal objects across trials (nonfrequent condition). Infants in the frequent condition were significantly more accurate at predicting the action goal than infants in the nonfrequent condition. In addition, findings revealed rapid learning in the case of certainty and no learning in the case of uncertainty of goal selection over the course of trials. Together, our data indicate that by the end of their first year of life, infants rely on information about the certainty of goal selection to make inferences about others' action goals.
Positive objects or actions are associated with physical highness, whereas negative objects or actions are related to physical lowness. Previous research suggests that metaphorical connection ("good is up" or "bad is down") between spatial experience and evaluation of objects is grounded in actual experience with the body. Prior studies investigated effects of spatial metaphors with respect to verticality of either static objects or self-performed actions. By presenting videos of object placements, the current three experiments combined vertically-located stimuli with observation of vertically-directed actions. As expected, participants' ratings of emotionally-neutral objects were systematically influenced by the observed vertical positioning, that is, ratings were more positive for objects that were observed being placed up as compared to down. Moreover, effects were slightly more pronounced for "bad is down," because only the observed downward, but not the upward, action led to different ratings as compared to a medium-positioned action. Last, some ratings were even affected by observing only the upward/downward action, without seeing the final vertical placement of the object. Thus, both, a combination of observing a vertically-directed action and seeing a vertically-located object, and observing a vertically-directed action alone, affected participants' evaluation of emotional valence of the involved object. The present findings expand the relevance of spatial metaphors to action observation, thereby giving new impetus to embodied-cognition research.
Looking times and gaze behavior indicate that infants can predict the goal state of an observed simple action event (e.g., object-directed grasping) already in the first year of life. The present paper mainly focuses on infants' predictive gaze-shifts toward the goal of an ongoing action. For this, infants need to generate a forward model of the to-be-obtained goal state and to disengage their gaze from the moving agent at a time when information about the action event is still incomplete. By about 6 months of age, infants show goal-predictive gaze-shifts, but mainly for familiar actions that they can perform themselves (e.g., grasping) and for familiar agents (e.g., a human hand). Therefore, some theoretical models have highlighted close relations between infants' ability for action-goal prediction and their motor development and/or emerging action experience. Recent research indicates that infants can also predict action goals of familiar simple actions performed by non-human agents (e.g., object-directed grasping by a mechanical claw) when these agents display agency cues, such as self-propelled movement, equifinality of goal approach, or production of a salient action effect. This paper provides a review on relevant findings and theoretical models, and proposes that the impacts of action experience and of agency cues can be explained from an action-event perspective. In particular, infants' goal-predictive gaze-shifts are seen as resulting from an interplay between bottom-up processing of perceptual information and top-down influences exerted by event schemata that store information about previously executed or observed actions.