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In this paper, we study one channel through which communication may facilitate cooperative behavior – belief precision. In a prisoner’s dilemma experiment, we show that communication not only makes individuals more optimistic that their partner will cooperate but also increases the precision of this belief, thereby reducing strategic uncertainty. To disentangle the shift in mean beliefs from the increase in precision, we elicit beliefs and precision in a two-stage procedure and in three situations: without communication, before communication, and after communication. We find that the precision of beliefs increases during communication.
Stochastic uncertainty can cause coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can increase efficiency. To test this transfer mechanism, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeated Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not lead to an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two major reasons for this failure: first, stochastic uncertainty forces proposers intending to cooperate to accept high strategic uncertainty, which many proposers avoid; second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperatively, which hinders cooperation in future periods.
Leadership plays an important role for the efficient and fair solution of social dilemmas but the effectiveness of a leader can vary substantially. Two main factors of leadership impact are the ability to induce high contributions by all group members and the (expected) fair use of power. Participants in our experiment decide about contributions to a public good. After all contributions are made, the leader can choose how much of the joint earnings to assign to herself; the remainder is distributed equally among the followers. Using machine learning techniques, we study whether the content of initial open statements by the group members predicts their behavior as a leader and whether groups are able to identify such clues and endogenously appoint a “good” leader to solve the dilemma. We find that leaders who promise fairness are more likely to behave fairly, and that followers appoint as leaders those who write more explicitly about fairness and efficiency. However, in their contribution decision, followers focus on the leader’s first-move contribution and place less importance on the content of the leader’s statements.
Hallo Zukunft!
(2022)
Gedruckte Elektronik ist nicht nur ein aufstrebendes Forschungsfeld, sie wird in naher Zukunft auch eine wesentliche Rolle in unserem Alltag spielen. Gedruckte, elektronische Bauteile können sehr dünn und flexibel sein und somit vielfältig eingesetzt werden. Für die Implementation in der (Hoch-)Schule haben die Autoren eine flexible, lichtemittierende Folie entwickelt, die mit einfachen Materialien und Methoden manuell gedruckt werden kann.
Active use of social networking sites (SNSs) has long been assumed to benefit users' well-being. However, this established hypothesis is increasingly being challenged, with scholars criticizing its lack of empirical support and the imprecise conceptualization of active use. Nevertheless, with considerable heterogeneity among existing studies on the hypothesis and causal evidence still limited, a final verdict on its robustness is still pending. To contribute to this ongoing debate, we conducted a week-long randomized control trial with N = 381 adult Instagram users recruited via Prolific. Specifically, we tested how active SNS use, operationalized as picture postings on Instagram, affects different dimensions of well-being. The results depicted a positive effect on users' positive affect but null findings for other well-being outcomes. The findings broadly align with the recent criticism against the active use hypothesis and support the call for a more nuanced view on the impact of SNSs. <br /> Lay Summary Active use of social networking sites (SNSs) has long been assumed to benefit users' well-being. However, this established assumption is increasingly being challenged, with scholars criticizing its lack of empirical support and the imprecise conceptualization of active use. Nevertheless, with great diversity among conducted studies on the hypothesis and a lack of causal evidence, a final verdict on its viability is still pending. To contribute to this ongoing debate, we conducted a week-long experimental investigation with 381 adult Instagram users. Specifically, we tested how posting pictures on Instagram affects different aspects of well-being. The results of this study depicted a positive effect of posting Instagram pictures on users' experienced positive emotions but no effects on other aspects of well-being. The findings broadly align with the recent criticism against the active use hypothesis and support the call for a more nuanced view on the impact of SNSs on users.
Faced with the triad of time-cost-quality, the realization of knowledge-intensive tasks at economic conditions is not trivial. Since the number of knowledge-intensive processes is increasing more and more nowadays, the efficient design of knowledge transfers at business processes as well as the target-oriented improvement of them is essential, so that process outcomes satisfy high quality criteria and economic requirements. This particularly challenges knowledge management, aiming for the assignment of ideal manifestations of influence factors on knowledge transfers to a certain task. Faced with first attempts of knowledge transfer-based process improvements [1], this paper continues research about the quantitative examination of knowledge transfers and presents a ready-to-go experiment design that is able to examine quality of knowledge transfers empirically and is suitable to examine knowledge transfers on a quantitative level. Its use is proven by the example of four influence factors, which namely are stickiness, complexity, competence and time pressure.
Getting a yes
(2020)
This paper studies how the request for a favor has to be devised in order to maximize its chance of success. We present results from a mini-dictator game, in which the recipient can send a free-form text message to the dictator before the latter decides. We find that putting effort into the message, writing in a humorous way and mentioning reasons why the money is needed pays off. Additionally, we find differences in the behavior of male and female dictators. Only men react positively to efficiency arguments, while only women react to messages that emphasize the dictators power and responsibility.
This study examines whether incentives affect public employees' intention to share knowledge. Tested incentives satisfy needs for either achievement or appreciation. Both treatments were tested on implicit as well as explicit knowledge sharing. A 2 x 3 factorial survey experiment was designed to observe within-person and between-person effects. Data were collected from public employees in the core administration and healthcare sector (n = 623) in 2018. The analysis indicates that both treatments positively affect knowledge-sharing intention if it is explicit knowledge that ought to be shared. However, no effects of either treatment can be found in either type of knowledge sharing. No negative effect of the tested incentives on knowledge sharing was observed. Hence, incentives might not harm knowledge sharing but also do not pay off in organizational practice. In contrast to these motivation-enhancing human resource practices, ability and opportunity-enhancing practices should be tested to foster knowledge sharing.
This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices.
In the time of digitalization the demand for organizational change is rising and demands ways to cope with fundamental changes on the organizational as well as individual level. As a basis, learning and forgetting mechanisms need to be understood in order to guide a change process efficiently and successfully. Our research aims to get a better understanding of individual differences and mechanisms in the change context by performing an experiment where individuals learn and later re-learn a complex production process using a simulation setting. The individual’s performance, as well as retentivity and prior knowledge is assessed. Our results show that higher retentivity goes along with better learning and forgetting performances. Prior knowledge did not reveal such relation to the learning and forgetting performances. The influence of age and gender is discussed in detail.
The experimental literature on antitrust enforcement provides robust evidence that communication plays an important role for the formation and stability of cartels. We extend these studies through a design that distinguishes between innocuous communication and communication about a cartel, sanctioning only the latter. To this aim, we introduce a participant in the role of the competition authority, who is properly incentivized to judge communication content and price setting behavior of the firms. Using this novel design, we revisit the question whether a leniency rule successfully destabilizes cartels. In contrast to existing experimental studies, we find that a leniency rule does not affect cartelization. We discuss potential explanations for this contrasting result.
This paper studies the effects of two different frames on decisions in a dictator game. Before making their allocation decision, dictators read a short text. Depending on the treatment, the text either emphasizes their decision power and freedom of choice or it stresses their responsibility for the receiver’s payoff. Including a control treatment without such a text, three treatments are conducted with a total of 207 dictators. Our results show a different reaction to these texts depending on the dictator’s gender. We find that only men react positively to a text that stresses their responsibility for the receiver, while only women seem to react positively to a text that emphasizes their decision power and freedom of choice.
In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird untersucht, in wie weit physikalische Experimente ein flow-Erleben bei Lernenden hervorrufen. Flow-Erleben wird als Motivationsursache gesehen und soll den Weg zu Freude und Glück darstellen. Insbesondere wegen dem oft zitierten Fachkräftemangel in naturwissenschaftlichen und technischen Berufen ist eine Motivationssteigerung in naturwissenschaftlichen Unterrichtsfächern wichtig. Denn trotz Leistungssteigerungen in internationalen Vergleichstests möchten in Deutschland deutlich weniger Schüler*innen einen solchen Beruf ergreifen als in anderen Industriestaaten. Daher gilt es, möglichst früh Schüler*innen für naturwissenschaftlich-technische Fächer zu begeistern und insbesondere im regelrecht verhassten Physikunterricht flow-Erleben zu erzeugen.
Im Rahmen dieser Arbeit wird das flow-Erleben von Studierenden in klassischen Laborexperimenten und FELS (Forschend-Entdeckendes Lernen mit dem Smartphone) als Lernumgebung untersucht. FELS ist eine an die Lebenswelt der Schüler*innen angepasste Lernumgebung, in der sie mit Smartphones ihre eigene Lebenswelt experimentell untersuchen.
Es zeigt sich, dass sowohl klassische Laborexperimente als auch in der Lebenswelt durchgeführte, smartphonebasierte Experimente flow-Erleben erzeugen. Allerdings verursachen die smartphonebasierten Experimente kaum Stressgefühle.
Die in dieser Arbeit herausgefundenen Ergebnisse liefern einen ersten Ansatz, der durch Folgestudien erweitert werden sollte.
Stochastic uncertainty can cause difficult coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can do so. To test this, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeatedly played Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not entail an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two main reasons for this finding: First, the stochastic uncertainty forces proposers to accept high strategic uncertainty if they intend to cooperate by claiming a low amount (which many proposers do not). Second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperative by transferring too little (which hinders cooperation in future periods).
Numerous studies investigate which sanctioning institutions prevent cartel formation but little is known as to how these sanctions work. We contribute to understanding the inner workings of cartels by studying experimentally the effect of sanctioning institutions on firms’ communication. Using machine learning to organize the chat communication into topics, we find that firms are significantly less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing when sanctioning institutions are present. At the same time, average prices are lower when communication is less explicit. A mediation analysis suggests that sanctions are effective in hindering cartel formation not only because they introduce a risk of being fined but also by reducing the prevalence of explicit price communication.
Envy is an unpleasant emotion. If individuals anticipate that comparing their payoff with the (potentially higher) payoff of others will make them envious, they may want to actively avoid information about other people’s payoffs. Given the opportunity to reduce another person’s payoff, an individual’s envy may trigger behavior that is detrimental to welfare. In this case, if individuals anticipate that they will react in a welfare-reducing way, they may also avoid information about other people’s payoffs from the outset. We investigated these two hypotheses using three experiments. We found that 13% of our potentially envious subjects avoided information when they did not have the opportunity to reduce another participant’s payoff. Psychological scales do not explain this behavior. We also found that voluntarily uninformed subjects did neither deduct less of the payoff nor less frequently than subjects who could not avoid the information.
Fairness versus efficiency
(2018)
We investigate in a laboratory experiment whether procedural fairness concerns affect how well individuals are able to solve a coordination problem in a two-player Volunteer's Dilemma. Subjects receive external action recommendations, either to volunteer or to abstain from it, in order to facilitate coordination and improve efficiency. We manipulate the fairness of the recommendation procedure by varying the probabilities of receiving the disadvantageous recommendation to volunteer between players. We find evidence that while recommendations improve overall efficiency regardless of their implications for expected payoffs, there are behavioural asymmetries depending on the recommendation: advantageous recommendations are followed less frequently than disadvantageous ones and beliefs about others' actions are more pessimistic in the treatment with recommendations inducing unequal expected payoffs.
Cooperation is — despite not being predicted by game theory — a widely documented aspect of human behaviour in Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) situations. This article presents a comparison between subjects restricted to playing pure strategies and subjects allowed to play mixed strategies in a one-shot symmetric PD laboratory experiment. Subjects interact with 10 other subjects and take their decisions all at once. Because subjects in the mixed-strategy treatment group are allowed to condition their level of cooperation more precisely on their beliefs about their counterparts’ level of cooperation, we predicted the cooperation rate in the mixed-strategy treatment group to be higher than in the pure-strategy control group. The results of our experiment reject our prediction: even after controlling for beliefs about the other subjects’ level of cooperation, we find that cooperation in the mixed-strategy group is lower than in the pure-strategy group. We also find, however, that subjects in the mixedstrategy group condition their cooperative behaviour more closely on their beliefs than in the pure-strategy group. In the mixed-strategy group, most subjects choose intermediate levels of cooperation.
Cooperation is — despite not being predicted by game theory — a widely documented aspect of human behaviour in Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) situations. This article presents a comparison between subjects restricted to playing pure strategies and subjects allowed to play mixed strategies in a one-shot symmetric PD laboratory experiment. Subjects interact with 10 other subjects and take their decisions all at once. Because subjects in the mixed-strategy treatment group are allowed to condition their level of cooperation more precisely on their beliefs about their counterparts’ level of cooperation, we predicted the cooperation rate in the mixed-strategy treatment group to be higher than in the pure-strategy control group. The results of our experiment reject our prediction: even after controlling for beliefs about the other subjects’ level of cooperation, we find that cooperation in the mixed-strategy group is lower than in the pure-strategy group. We also find, however, that subjects in the mixedstrategy group condition their cooperative behaviour more closely on their beliefs than in the pure-strategy group. In the mixed-strategy group, most subjects choose intermediate levels of cooperation.
Being ignorant of key aspects of a strategic interaction can represent an advantage rather than a handicap. We study one particular context in which ignorance can be beneficial: iterated strategic interactions in which voluntary cooperation may be sustained into the final round if players voluntarily forego knowledge about the time horizon. We experimentally examine this option to remain ignorant about the time horizon in a finitely repeated two-person prisoners’ dilemma game. We confirm that pairs without horizon knowledge avoid the drop in cooperation that otherwise occurs toward the end of the game. However, this effect is superposed by cooperation declining more rapidly in pairs without horizon knowledge during the middle phase of the game, especially if players do not know that the other player also wanted to remain ignorant of the time horizon.