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Agricultural landscapes safeguard ecosystem services (ES) and biodiversity upon which human well-being depends. However, only a fraction of these services are generally considered in land management decisions, resulting in trade-offs and societally inefficient solutions. The TEEB Study (The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity) spearheaded the development of assessments of the economic significance of ES and biodiversity. Several national TEEB follow-ups have compiled case studies and derived targeted policy advice. By synthesizing insights from "Natural Capital Germany - TEEB DE" and focusing on rural areas, the objectives of this study were (i) to explore causes of the continued decline of ES and biodiversity, (ii) to introduce case studies exemplifying the economic significance of ES and biodiversity in land use decisions, and (iii) to synthesize key recommendations for policy, planning and management. Our findings indicate that the continued decrease of ES and biodiversity in Germany can be explained by implementation deficits within a well-established nature conservation system. Three case studies on grassland protection, the establishment of riverbank buffer zones and water-sensitive farming illustrate that an economic perspective can convey recognition of the values of ES and biodiversity. We conclude with suggestions for enhanced consideration, improved conservation and sustainable use of ES and biodiversity. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Moving Forces
(2017)
Throughout a large part of the twentieth century, the body was interpreted as a field of signs, the meaning of which pointed to an unconscious dimension. At the height of the popularity of structuralism, Jacques Lacan deemed the unconscious to be “structured like a language.” Starting in the early 1990s, however, a deep shift occurred in the way the body was interpreted. A new movement cast tremendous doubt on the hegemony of language and instead advocated a performative, pictorial, and affective approach — the so-called material turn — which encompassed all of these. In the words of Karen Barad, this turn inquired as to why meaning, history, and truth are assigned to language only, whereas the movements of materiality are given less prominence: “How did language come to be more trustworthy than matter? Why are language and culture granted their own agency and historicity while matter is figured as passive and immutable?” With this shift toward the material, bodies began to be seen in a different light and their materiality understood as something that follows its own laws and movements, which cannot be understood exclusively in terms of social-cultural codes. Instead, these laws and movements call into question the very dichotomies of nature/culture and body/spirit.
Ecology of Affect
(2017)
The way we conceive the human today is particularly affected by the shifts in media technology during the 20th century. Affect emerges as the new liminal concept that renders the body compatible in novel ways with the technology and politics of media. By ways of a relational reorganization the organic end technological life is condensed in a new, intense way to an ecology of affects.
In a recent article in this journal, Ahrne, Brunsson, and Seidl (2016) suggest a definition of organization as a ‘decided social order’ composed of five elements (membership, rules, hierarchies, monitoring, and sanctions) which rest on decisions. ‘Partial organization’ uses only one or a few of these decidable elements while ‘complete organization’ uses them all. Such decided orders may also occur outside formal organizations, as the authors observe. Although we appreciate the idea of improving our understanding of organization(s) in modern society, we believe that Ahrne, Brunsson, and Seidl's suggestion jeopardizes the concept of organization by blurring its specific meaning. As the authors already draw on the work of Niklas Luhmann, we propose taking this exploration a step further and the potential of systems theory more seriously. Organizational analysis would then be able to retain a distinctive notion of formal organization on the one hand while benefiting from an encompassing theory of modern society on the other. With this extended conceptual framework, we would expect to gain a deeper understanding of how organizations implement and shape different societal realms as well as mediate between their particular logics, and, not least, how they are related to non-organizational social forms (e.g. families).
Despite the proliferation and promise of subnational climate initiatives, the institutional architecture of transnational municipal networks (TMNs) is not well understood. With a view to close this research gap, the article empirically assesses the assumption that TMNs are a viable substitute for ambitious international action under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It addresses the aggregate phenomenon in terms of geographical distribution, central players, mitigation ambition and monitoring provisions. Examining thirteen networks, it finds that membership in TMNs is skewed toward Europe and North America while countries from the Global South are underrepresented; that only a minority of networks commit to quantified emission reductions and that these are not more ambitious than Parties to the UNFCCC; and finally that the monitoring provisions are fairly limited. In sum, the article shows that transnational municipal networks are not (yet) the representative, ambitious and transparent player they are thought to be.
This article explores the various futures of relations between the European Union (EU) and Ukraine. After distilling two major drivers we construct a future compass in order to conceive of four futures of relations between the EU and Ukraine. Our scenarios aim to challenge deep-rooted assumptions on the EU’s neighbourhood with Ukraine: How will the politico-economic challenges in the European countries influence the EU’s approach towards the East? Will more EU engagement in Ukraine contribute to enduring peace? Does peace always come with stability? Which prospects does the idea of Intermarium have? Are the pivotal transformation players in Ukraine indeed oligarchs or rather small- and medium-sized entrepreneurs? After presenting our scenarios, we propose indicators to know in the years to come, along which path future relations do develop. By unearthing surprising developments we hope to provoke innovative thoughts on Eastern Europe in times of post truth societies, confrontation between states and hybrid warfare.
Bisherige Studien zur Demokratieförderung analysierten „erfolgreiche“ Beispiele. Das ist teilweise eine Reflektion der politischen Ökonomie von Demokratieförderung, in der sie Beispielen im Inland erzeugter demokratischer Durchbrüche folgt. Dennoch kann eine wissenschaftliche Analyse externer Einflüsse auf interne Veränderungen sich nicht nur auf Fälle erfolgreicher Demokratieentwicklung beziehen, sondern muss Beispiele von Regimeveränderungen, die nicht in einer Demokratie resultierten, berücksichtigen, um Selektionsvorurteile zu vermeiden und die kausalen Mechanismen zu isolieren, die für einen demokratischen Wandel notwendig sind, neben dem Zusammenbruch eines autoritären Regimes und einer Liberalisierung.
In dieser Studie dienen Marokko und Tunesien als Fallbeispiele, Länder, die nach langjähriger Diktaturerfahrung versuchen demokratische Strukturen aufzubauen und sich anderen Herausforderungen stellen müssen als sich demokratisierende Regime, die über einen relativ effektiven Staat verfügen.
Da es wenig Austausch zwischen Analysten von demokratischen Übergängen, Konsolidierung und Post-Konflikt Staatenbildung gab, überrascht, dass diese radikal unterschiedliche Situation von demokratischem Wandel und variierenden Rollen externer Akteure in jeder Kategorie bisher nicht differenziert wurde. Die Studie widmet sich den hieraus resultierenden Kernfragen: „Wie, Warum und durch Was wird Demokratieförderung durch externe Akteure funktionieren?“
Die Frage nach dem „Wie“ ist hier die schwierigste, es ist eine Frage nach den Methoden und Strategien des Demokratisierungsprozesses sowie der Unterstützung, die sorgfältig durchdachte Techniken und ihre breite Akzeptanz durch eine Vielzahl von Partner erfordert. Antwort auf die Frage nach dem „Was“ und „Warum“ hingegen findet sich in der Grundlage schlechter Regierungsarbeit und schlechter Wirtschaftsleistung, die zu Aufständen der Bevölkerung führen. Die Resultate der Studie tragen zum Fortschritt in der Demokratieförderung bei.
Are potential cabinets more likely to form when they control institutional veto players such as symmetric second chambers or minority vetoes? Existing evidence for a causal effect of veto control has been weak. This article presents evidence for this effect on the basis of conditional and mixed logit analyses of government formations in 21 parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies between 1955 and 2012. It also shows that the size of the effect varies systematically across political-institutional contexts. The estimated causal effect was greater in countries that eventually abolished the relevant veto institutions. It is suggested that the incidence of constitutional reform is a proxy for context-specific factors that increased the incentives for veto control and simultaneously provided a stimulus for the weakening of institutional veto power.
Dialogue. Divergence. Veiled Reception. Criticism: Georg Simmel’s
relationship with Emile Durkheim
(2017)
Simmel was the only German sociologist who directly cooperated with Durkheim. After an initial impression of convergence between the sociology of social facts and the sociology of social forms, a break between the two founders of sociology became inevitable. Yet, Durkheim and Simmel went on positioning themselves against one other in the years ahead. Durkheim’s allegation of ‘individual psychologism’ induced Simmel to a veiled reception of Durkheim’s methodological approach that permitted him to refine the sociological epistemology he eventually presented in the Soziologie published in 1908. On this basis, he was able to formulate a final criticism of the sociology of social facts as a social psychology.
The interview offers a reconstruction of the German reception of Durkheim since the middle of the 1970s. Hans Joas, who was one of its major protagonists, discusses the backdrop that finally permitted a scholarly examination of Durkheim’s sociology in Germany. Focussing on his personal reception Joas then gives an account of the Durkheimian themes that inspire his work.
Durkheim in Germany
(2017)
Just after the publication of the Theory of Communicative Action in 1981, a new generation of interpreters started a different reception of Durkheim in Germany. Hans-Peter Müller, sociologist and editor of the German translation of Leçons de sociologie, reconstructs the history of the German Durkheim’s Reception and illuminates the reasons for his interest in the French sociologist. He delivers different insights into the background which permitted the post-Habermasian generation to reach a new understanding of Durkheim’s work by enlightening the scientific and political conditions from which this new sensibility emerged.
The corrosion of character
(2017)
The topic of this imaginary dialogue between Georg Simmel and Max Weber is the relation between work – in the sense of labour – and personality. Its aim is to show that the thinking of these ‘founding fathers’ of sociology can furnish valuable insight into the current issue of the corrosion of character in contemporary post-Fordist society. The concept of work still represents one of the major factors determining modern individuals’ ability (or inability) to formulate personal, stable identities that enable them to become fully socialized. Both Simmel and Weber make reference to a common theoretical background that views the human being as a creature with originally rational potential, who is faced with the task of becoming a personality by means of consciously chosen life behaviour: This is evident in the parallelism between Simmel’s interest in the concept of ‘style of life’ (Der Stil des Lebens) and Weber’s research on the ‘life conduct’ (Lebensführung) that arose in Western rationalistic culture.
Veto player theory is a powerful approach to comparative politics. This article argues that the debate about its explanatory success would benefit from more systematic distinctions. The theory not only comes in different theoretical variants, it is also used in radically different ways empirically. Starting from recent debates about the ‘testing’ of theoretical models, the article distinguishes five ways in which theoretical models can be used empirically: contrastive, axiomatic, exploratory, presumptive and modular. The typology is applied to veto player theory and illustrated with exemplary studies and debates. The article concludes that each type raises different questions that should be answered in individual studies. Moreover, while veto player theory has an excellent track record on four empirical uses, the picture on its contrastive use is far more nuanced. More explicitly contrastive testing of the theory is desirable.
The past few years have witnessed the emergence of a plethora of transnational climate governance experiments. They have been developed by a broad range of actors, such as cities, non-profit organizations, and private corporations. Several scholars have lately devoted particular attention to voluntary global business initiatives in the policy domain of climate change. Their studies have provided considerable insights into the role and function of such new modes of climate governance. However, the precise nature of the relationship between the various climate governance experiments and the international climate negotiations has not been analyzed in enough detail. Against this backdrop, the present article explores the interplay of a business sector climate governance experiment, i.e. the Greenhouse Gas Protocol (GHG Protocol) with the international climate regime. On the one hand, the article underscores that the GHG Protocol has filled a regulatory gap in global climate policy-making by providing the means for the corporate sector to comprehensively account and report their GHGs. On the other hand, it reveals that the application of the GHG Protocol guidelines depends to a large extent on the existence of an overarching policy framework set up by nation-states at the intergovernmental level. Only if private companies receive a clear political signal that stringent mandatory GHG emission controls and a global market-based instrument are at least likely to be adopted will they put substantial efforts into the accurate measurement and management of their GHGs. Thus, this article points to the limits of climate governance experimentation and suggests that business sector climate governance experiments need to be embedded in a coherent international regulatory setting which generates a clear stimulus for corporate action.
Much of the literature in the field of international relations is currently concerned with the changing patterns of authority in world politics. This is particularly evident in the policy domain of climate change, where a number of authors have observed a relocation of authority in global climate governance. These scholars claim that multilateral treaty making has lost much of its spark, and they emphasize the emergence of transnational governance arrangements, such as city networks, private certification schemes, and business self-regulation. However, the different types of interactions between the various transnational climate initiatives and the intergovernmental level have not been studied in much detail and only recently attracted growing scholarly interest. Therefore, the present article addresses this issue and focuses on the interplay between three different transnational climate governance arrangements and the international climate regime. The analysis in this article underscores that substate and nonstate actors have attained several authoritative functions in global climate policy making. Nevertheless, the three case studies also demonstrate that this development does not imply that we are witnessing a general shift of authority away from the intergovernmental level toward transnational actors. Instead, what can be observed in global climate governance is an ongoing reconfiguration of authority, which apparently reaffirms the centrality of the international climate regime. Thus, this article points to the need for a more nuanced perspective on the changing patterns of authority in global climate governance. In a nutshell, this study shows that the international climate regime is not the only location where the problem of climate change is addressed, while it highlights the persistent authority of state-based forms of regulation.