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Mass loss from the Antarctic Ice Sheet constitutes the largest uncertainty in projections of future sea level rise. Ocean-driven melting underneath the floating ice shelves and subsequent acceleration of the inland ice streams are the major reasons for currently observed mass loss from Antarctica and are expected to become more important in the future. Here we show that for projections of future mass loss from the Antarctic Ice Sheet, it is essential (1) to better constrain the sensitivity of sub-shelf melt rates to ocean warming and (2) to include the historic trajectory of the ice sheet. In particular, we find that while the ice sheet response in simulations using the Parallel Ice Sheet Model is comparable to the median response of models in three Antarctic Ice Sheet Intercomparison projects - initMIP, LARMIP-2 and ISMIP6 - conducted with a range of ice sheet models, the projected 21st century sea level contribution differs significantly depending on these two factors. For the highest emission scenario RCP8.5, this leads to projected ice loss ranging from 1:4 to 4:0 cm of sea level equivalent in simulations in which ISMIP6 ocean forcing drives the PICO ocean box model where parameter tuning leads to a comparably low sub-shelf melt sensitivity and in which no surface forcing is applied. This is opposed to a likely range of 9:1 to 35:8 cm using the exact same initial setup, but emulated from the LARMIP-2 experiments with a higher melt sensitivity, even though both projects use forcing from climate models and melt rates are calibrated with previous oceanographic studies. Furthermore, using two initial states, one with a previous historic simulation from 1850 to 2014 and one starting from a steady state, we show that while differences between the ice sheet configurations in 2015 seem marginal at first sight, the historic simulation increases the susceptibility of the ice sheet to ocean warming, thereby increasing mass loss from 2015 to 2100 by 5% to 50 %. Hindcasting past ice sheet changes with numerical models would thus provide valuable tools to better constrain projections. Our results emphasize that the uncertainty that arises from the forcing is of the same order of magnitude as the ice dynamic response for future sea level projections.
Acceleration of the flow of ice drives mass losses in both the Antarctic and the Greenland Ice Sheet. The projections of possible future sea-level rise rely on numerical ice-sheet models, which solve the physics of ice flow, melt, and calving. While major advancements have been made by the ice-sheet modeling community in addressing several of the related uncertainties, the flow law, which is at the center of most process-based ice-sheet models, is not in the focus of the current scientific debate. However, recent studies show that the flow law parameters are highly uncertain and might be different from the widely accepted standard values. Here, we use an idealized flow-line setup to investigate how these uncertainties in the flow law translate into uncertainties in flow-driven mass loss. In order to disentangle the effect of future warming on the ice flow from other effects, we perform a suite of experiments with the Parallel Ice Sheet Model (PISM), deliberately excluding changes in the surface mass balance. We find that changes in the flow parameters within the observed range can lead up to a doubling of the flow-driven mass loss within the first centuries of warming, compared to standard parameters. The spread of ice loss due to the uncertainty in flow parameters is on the same order of magnitude as the increase in mass loss due to surface warming. While this study focuses on an idealized flow-line geometry, it is likely that this uncertainty carries over to realistic three-dimensional simulations of Greenland and Antarctica.
Recently a multitude of empirically derived damage models have been applied to project future tropical cyclone (TC) losses for the United States. In their study (Geiger et al 2016 Environ. Res. Lett. 11 084012) compared two approaches that differ in the scaling of losses with socio-economic drivers: the commonly-used approach resulting in a sub-linear scaling of historical TC losses with a nation's affected gross domestic product (GDP), and the disentangled approach that shows a sub-linear increase with affected population and a super-linear scaling of relative losses with per capita income. Statistics cannot determine which approach is preferable but since process understanding demands that there is a dependence of the loss on both GDP per capita and population, an approach that accounts for both separately is preferable to one which assumes a specific relation between the two dependencies. In the accompanying comment, Rybski et al argued that there is no rigorous evidence to reach the conclusion that high-income does not protect against hurricane losses. Here we affirm that our conclusion is drawn correctly and reply to further remarks raised in the comment, highlighting the adequateness of our approach but also the potential for future extension of our research.
Earth’s surface temperature will continue to rise for another 20 to 30 years even with the strongest carbon emission reduction currently considered. The associated changes in rainfall patterns can result in an increased flood risk worldwide. We compute the required increase in flood protection to keep high-end fluvial flood risk at present levels. The analysis is carried out worldwide for subnational administrative units. Most of the United States, Central Europe, and Northeast and West Africa, as well as large parts of India and Indonesia, require the strongest adaptation effort. More than half of the United States needs to at least double their protection within the next two decades. Thus, the need for adaptation to increased river flood is a global problem affecting industrialized regions as much as developing countries.
Floating ice shelves, which fringe most of Antarctica’s coastline, regulate ice flow into the Southern Ocean1,2,3. Their thinning4,5,6,7 or disintegration8,9 can cause upstream acceleration of grounded ice and raise global sea levels. So far the effect has not been quantified in a comprehensive and spatially explicit manner. Here, using a finite-element model, we diagnose the immediate, continent-wide flux response to different spatial patterns of ice-shelf mass loss. We show that highly localized ice-shelf thinning can reach across the entire shelf and accelerate ice flow in regions far from the initial perturbation. As an example, this ‘tele-buttressing’ enhances outflow from Bindschadler Ice Stream in response to thinning near Ross Island more than 900 km away. We further find that the integrated flux response across all grounding lines is highly dependent on the location of imposed changes: the strongest response is caused not only near ice streams and ice rises, but also by thinning, for instance, well-within the Filchner–Ronne and Ross Ice Shelves. The most critical regions in all major ice shelves are often located in regions easily accessible to the intrusion of warm ocean waters10,11,12, stressing Antarctica’s vulnerability to changes in its surrounding ocean.
Increasing Earth’s surface air temperature yields an intensification of its hydrological cycle. As a consequence, the risk of river floods will increase regionally within the next two decades due to the atmospheric warming caused by past anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. The direct economic losses caused by these floods can yield regionally heterogeneous losses and gains by propagation within the global trade and supply network. Here we show that, in the absence of large-scale structural adaptation, the total economic losses due to fluvial floods will increase in the next 20 years globally by 17% despite partial compensation through market adjustment within the global trade network. China will suffer the strongest direct losses, with an increase of 82%. The United States is mostly affected indirectly through its trade relations. By contrast to the United States, recent intensification of the trade relations with China leaves the European Union better prepared for the import of production losses in the future.
After the United Kingdom has left the European Union it remains unclear whether the two parties can successfully negotiate and sign a trade agreement within the transition period. Ongoing negotiations, practical obstacles and resulting uncertainties make it highly unlikely that economic actors would be fully prepared to a “no-trade-deal” situation. Here we provide an economic shock simulation of the immediate aftermath of such a post-Brexit no-trade-deal scenario by computing the time evolution of more than 1.8 million interactions between more than 6,600 economic actors in the global trade network. We find an abrupt decline in the number of goods produced in the UK and the EU. This sudden output reduction is caused by drops in demand as customers on the respective other side of the Channel incorporate the new trade restriction into their decision-making. As a response, producers reduce prices in order to stimulate demand elsewhere. In the short term consumers benefit from lower prices but production value decreases with potentially severe socio-economic consequences in the longer term.
After the United Kingdom has left the European Union it remains unclear whether the two parties can successfully negotiate and sign a trade agreement within the transition period. Ongoing negotiations, practical obstacles and resulting uncertainties make it highly unlikely that economic actors would be fully prepared to a “no-trade-deal” situation. Here we provide an economic shock simulation of the immediate aftermath of such a post-Brexit no-trade-deal scenario by computing the time evolution of more than 1.8 million interactions between more than 6,600 economic actors in the global trade network. We find an abrupt decline in the number of goods produced in the UK and the EU. This sudden output reduction is caused by drops in demand as customers on the respective other side of the Channel incorporate the new trade restriction into their decision-making. As a response, producers reduce prices in order to stimulate demand elsewhere. In the short term consumers benefit from lower prices but production value decreases with potentially severe socio-economic consequences in the longer term.
Recent observations and ice-dynamic modeling suggest that a marine ice-sheet instability (MISI) might have been triggered in West Antarctica. The corresponding outlet glaciers, Pine Island Glacier (PIG) and Thwaites Glacier (TG), showed significant retreat during at least the last 2 decades. While other regions in Antarctica have the topographic predisposition for the same kind of instability, it is so far unclear how fast these instabilities would unfold if they were initiated. Here we employ the concept of similitude to estimate the characteristic timescales of several potentially MISI-prone outlet glaciers around the Antarctic coast. Our results suggest that TG and PIG have the fastest response time of all investigated outlets, with TG responding about 1.25 to 2 times as fast as PIG, while other outlets around Antarctica would be up to 10 times slower if destabilized. These results have to be viewed in light of the strong assumptions made in their derivation. These include the absence of ice-shelf buttressing, the one-dimensionality of the approach and the uncertainty of the available data. We argue however that the current topographic situation and the physical conditions of the MISI-prone outlet glaciers carry the information of their respective timescale and that this information can be partially extracted through a similitude analysis.