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The value concept of traditional resource economics is welfare. Therefore, sustainability of welfare is often taken to characterise our obligations to future generations. This paper argues that this view is inappropriate because it leaves no room for future generations autonomy. Future generations should be free to make their own decisions. Consequently freedom of choice is the appropriate value concept on which resource economics should be based. The concept of sustainability receives a new interpretation. Sustainability is a principle of intertemporal distributive justice which requires equitable opportunities across generations.
Of Rawls's two principles of justice only the second has received attention from economists. The second principle is concerned with the social and economic conditions in a just society. The first principle, however, has largely been neglected. It claims, that all people in society should have equal basic liberties. In this paper Rawls's first principle is characterised in a freedom of choice framework. The analysis reveals conceptual problems of the Rawlsian approach to justice.
In modern political philosophy social contract theory is the most prominent approach to individual rights and fair institutions. According to social contract theory the system of rights in a society ought to be justified by reconstructing its basic features as a contract between the mutually unconcerned members of society. This paper explores whether social contract theory can successfully be applied to justify rights of future generations. Three competing views are analysed: Rawls's theory of justice, Hobbes's radical liberalism and Gauthier's bargaining framework based on the Lockean proviso.
The paper is an enquiry into dynamic social contract theory. The social contract defines the rules of resource use. An intergenerational social contract in an economy with a single exhaustible resource is examined within a framework of an overlapping generations model. It is assumed that new generations do not accept the old social contract, and access to resources will be renegotiated between any incumbent generation and their successors. It turns out that later generations will be in an unfortunate position regardless of their bargaining power.