CEPA Discussion Papers
ISSN (online) 2628-653X
URN urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-series-954
CEPA Discussion Papers are edited by
Rainald Borck, Lisa Bruttel, Marco Caliendo, Maik Heinemann and Alexander Kritikos.
The CEPA Discussion Papers Series is meant to disseminate recent research results by CEPA members to the scientific community and the interested public. Research findings published in a CEPA Discussion Paper reflect on-going research prior to publication in peer-reviewed journal articles. If you consider submitting an article to CEPA, please look at our submission guidelines.
URN urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-series-954
CEPA Discussion Papers are edited by
Rainald Borck, Lisa Bruttel, Marco Caliendo, Maik Heinemann and Alexander Kritikos.
The CEPA Discussion Papers Series is meant to disseminate recent research results by CEPA members to the scientific community and the interested public. Research findings published in a CEPA Discussion Paper reflect on-going research prior to publication in peer-reviewed journal articles. If you consider submitting an article to CEPA, please look at our submission guidelines.
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Stochastic uncertainty can cause difficult coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can do so. To test this, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeatedly played Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not entail an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two main reasons for this finding: First, the stochastic uncertainty forces proposers to accept high strategic uncertainty if they intend to cooperate by claiming a low amount (which many proposers do not). Second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperative by transferring too little (which hinders cooperation in future periods).