CEPA Discussion Papers
ISSN (online) 2628-653X
URN urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-series-954
CEPA Discussion Papers are edited by
Rainald Borck, Lisa Bruttel, Marco Caliendo, Maik Heinemann and Alexander Kritikos.
The CEPA Discussion Papers Series is meant to disseminate recent research results by CEPA members to the scientific community and the interested public. Research findings published in a CEPA Discussion Paper reflect on-going research prior to publication in peer-reviewed journal articles. If you consider submitting an article to CEPA, please look at our submission guidelines.
URN urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-series-954
CEPA Discussion Papers are edited by
Rainald Borck, Lisa Bruttel, Marco Caliendo, Maik Heinemann and Alexander Kritikos.
The CEPA Discussion Papers Series is meant to disseminate recent research results by CEPA members to the scientific community and the interested public. Research findings published in a CEPA Discussion Paper reflect on-going research prior to publication in peer-reviewed journal articles. If you consider submitting an article to CEPA, please look at our submission guidelines.
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24
The experimental literature on antitrust enforcement provides robust evidence that communication plays an important role for the formation and stability of cartels. We extend these studies through a design that distinguishes between innocuous communication and communication about a cartel, sanctioning only the latter. To this aim, we introduce a participant in the role of the competition authority, who is properly incentivized to judge communication content and price setting behavior of the firms. Using this novel design, we revisit the question whether a leniency rule successfully destabilizes cartels. In contrast to existing experimental studies, we find that a leniency rule does not affect cartelization. We discuss potential explanations for this contrasting result.